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### Advantage {X}: US Aggression

#### US drone policy in Pakistan is violating Pakistan consent and setting an aggressive international precedent

Entous at. al ’12 (Adam Entous (National security correspondent for The Wall Street Journal), Siobhan Gorman (reporter for The Wall Street Journal covering terrorism, counter terrorism, and intelligence, which includes the activities of the sixteen intelligence agencies and the national security threats they aim to combat) and Evan Perez (reporter in the Washington bureau of The Wall Street Journal where he covers the Justice Department), “U.S. Unease Over Drone Strikes”, <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10000872396390444100404577641520858011452>, September 26, 2012)

Obama Administration Charts Delicate Legal Path Defending Controversial Weapons About once a month, the Central Intelligence Agency sends a fax to a general at Pakistan's intelligence service outlining broad areas where the U.S. intends to conduct strikes with drone aircraft, according to U.S. officials. The Pakistanis, who in public oppose the program, don't respond. On this basis, plus the fact that Pakistan continues to clear airspace in the targeted areas, the U.S. government concludes it has tacit consent to conduct strikes within the borders of a sovereign nation, according to officials familiar with the program. Representatives of the White House's National Security Council and CIA declined to discuss Pakistani consent, saying such information is classified. In public speeches, Obama administration officials have portrayed the U.S.'s use of drones to kill wanted militants around the world as being on firm legal ground. In those speeches, officials stopped short of directly discussing the CIA's drone program in Pakistan because the operations are covert. Now, the rationale used by the administration, interpreting Pakistan's acquiescence as a green light, has set off alarms among some administration legal officials. In particular, lawyers at the State Department, including top legal adviser Harold Koh, believe this rationale veers near the edge of what can be considered permission, though they still think the program is legal, officials say. Two senior administration officials described the approach as interpreting Pakistan's silence as a "yes." One dubbed the U.S. approach "cowboy behavior." In a reflection of the program's long-term legal uncertainty and precedent-setting nature, a group of lawyers in the administration known as "the council of counsels" is trying to develop a more sustainable framework for how governments should use such weapons. The effort is designed to fend off legal challenges at home as well as to ease allies' concerns about increasing legal scrutiny from civil-liberties groups and others. The White House also is worried about setting precedents for other countries, including Russia or China, that might conduct targeted killings as such weapons proliferate in the future, officials say. Because there is little precedent for the classified U.S. drone program, international law doesn't speak directly to how it might operate. That makes the question of securing consent all the more critical, legal specialists say. In public, Pakistan has repeatedly expressed opposition to the drone program, and about 10 months ago closed the CIA's only drone base in the country. In private, some Pakistani officials say they don't consider their actions equivalent to providing consent. They say Pakistan has considered shooting down a drone to reassert control over the country's airspace but shelved the idea as needlessly provocative. Pakistan also has considered challenging the legality of the program at the United Nations. "No country and no people have suffered more in the epic struggle against terrorism than Pakistan," Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari told the U.N. General Assembly Tuesday. "Drone strikes and civilian casualties on our territory add to the complexity of our battle for hearts and minds through this epic struggle." A former Pakistani official who remains close to the program said Pakistan believes the CIA continues to send notifications for the sole purpose of giving it legal cover. It is possible Pakistan is playing both sides. Ashley Deeks, a former State Department assistant legal adviser under Mr. Koh who is now at the University of Virginia, said a lack of a Pakistani response to U.S. notifications might be a way for Pakistan to meet seemingly contradictory goals—letting the CIA continue using its airspace but also distancing the government of Pakistan from the program, which is deeply unpopular among Pakistanis. Legal experts say U.S. law gives the government broad latitude to pursue al Qaeda and its affiliates wherever they may be. A joint resolution of Congress after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks authorized the president to use force against the planners of the attacks and those who harbor them. Then-President George W. Bush that month signed a classified order known as a "finding" authorizing covert action against al Qaeda. Government consent provides the firmest legal footing, legal experts say. The U.S. has that in Yemen, whose government assists with U.S. strikes against an al Qaeda affiliate. In Somalia, the nominal government, which controls little territory, has welcomed U.S. military strikes against militants. In an April speech, White House counterterrorism adviser John Brennan said the administration has concluded there is nothing in international law barring the U.S. from using lethal force against a threat to the U.S., despite the absence of a declared war, provided the country involved consents or is unable or unwilling to take action against the threat. On the international stage, matters are less clear-cut. The unwilling-or-unable doctrine, which was first publicly stated by the George W. Bush administration and has been affirmed by the Obama administration, remains open to challenge abroad, legal experts say. Conducting drone strikes in a country against its will could be seen as an act of war. Benjamin Wittes, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, said the U.S. drone approach in Pakistan is getting closer to the edge. "It doesn't mean it is illegal, but you are at the margins of what can reasonably be construed as consent," he said. Enlarge Image Kenneth Anderson, a law professor at American University, defended the right to conduct drone operations without consent if a country refuses to address the threat. He added, however, that such a program can't be sustained by secret winks and nods. "Strategic ambiguity is a real bad long-term policy because it eventually blows up in your face," Mr. Anderson said. "It's not stable." Senior U.S. officials worry about maintaining the support of an important ally—the U.K.—where officials have begun to express concerns privately about the extent of Pakistan's consent. Britain began a review to see whether under British law it could continue to cooperate with the program, say U.S. and British officials, after Pakistan closed the CIA's drone base in December. Pakistan took that action after a strike by a manned U.S. aircraft killed two dozen Pakistani troops mistaken for militants. Britain eventually decided to maintain its cooperation. John Bellinger, the top State Department legal adviser in the George W. Bush administration, said that for the U.S., it is "not unreasonable to assume consent" from Pakistan for the use of drones, "particularly when the U.S. conducts repeated attacks and it's open and obvious." But some in the U.K., Mr. Bellinger added, might "need to have greater clarity that there actually is consent," given increasing domestic legal scrutiny for Britain's supporting role in the program. Until the raid that killed Osama bin Laden, there was a more open channel of communication. In the early days of the Afghan war, lists of specific individuals to be targeted on Pakistani soil by U.S. drones were approved by both the U.S. and Pakistan, in what was called a "dual-key" system. Starting about four years ago, the U.S. began increasingly to go it alone. By last year, according to U.S. officials, the system in place was that the CIA would send a regular monthly fax to Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency. The fax would outline the boundaries of the airspace the drones would use—large areas along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border referred to as flight "boxes" because they are shaped like three-dimensional rectangles in the sky. There was no mention of specific targets. The ISI would send back a fax acknowledging receipt. The return messages stopped short of endorsing drone strikes. But in U.S. eyes the fax response combined with the continued clearing of airspace to avoid midair collisions—a process known as "de-confliction"—represented Pakistan's tacit consent to the program. After the May 2011 bin Laden raid, which the U.S. did without Pakistani permission or knowledge, the ISI stopped acknowledging receipt of U.S. drone notifications, according to U.S. and Pakistani officials. Replies were stopped on the order of the ISI chief at that time, said an official briefed on the matter. "Not responding was their way of saying 'we're upset with you,' " this official said. The official said the ISI chief chose that option knowing an outright denial of drone permission would spark a confrontation, and also believing that withdrawing consent wouldn't end the strikes. Administration lawyers, including those with qualms such as Mr. Koh, believe the CIA's campaign is legal. They believe they have consent, however tacit, primarily because the Pakistani military continues to clear airspace for drones and doesn't interfere physically with the unpiloted aircraft in flight, according to officials involved with the administration's legal thinking. Still, for some U.S. officials, including Mr. Koh, the lack of an ISI response to faxes was unnerving, leaving already-vague communications even more open to interpretation. Spurred by concerns about the future of the drone program in Pakistan, administration lawyers have been considering the feasibility of making changes. One idea calls for putting some of the drones under control of the U.S. military, which would allow officials to talk more openly about how the program works and open the door to closer cooperation with the Pakistanis, according to U.S. and Pakistani officials. The U.S. has also considered a coordinated campaign that could involve both U.S. drones and Pakistani F-16 fighter planes, these officials said. In meetings in Washington last month with the new chief of Pakistan's ISI, Lt. Gen. Zahir ul-Islam, American officials raised the prospect of a "drone drawdown," according to Pakistani officials. American officials said the idea of ramping down the program gradually as security conditions permit has been hotly debated for months. Pakistani officials considered the proposal to be "amorphous" and "without detail," an adviser to Pakistan's government said. Americans also raised the prospect of creating "joint ownership" of the drone program, the Pakistani adviser said, but no changes were agreed to. Since retired Gen. David Petraeus became CIA director about a year ago, the agency has taken some steps to ease concerns about the drone program, according to officials. The frequency of drone strikes in Pakistan has fallen to an average of four a month, versus 10 monthly in the prior 12 months, based on a tally from the New America Foundation, a nonpartisan think tank. Officials said Gen. Petraeus has occasionally overruled recommendations of the CIA's Counterterrorism Center and declined to authorize some strikes that could create friction with Pakistan. One U.S. official said the pace of counterterrorism operations mirrors the thinner ranks of al Qaeda after years of strikes. The effort to put the program on a firmer legal footing is running into some hurdles. The council of counsels wants to make details of counterterrorism programs public in some ways to address court challenges and reassure anxious allies, as well as to avoid spurring future use of these kinds of technologies by other countries. But the agency general counsels have drawn the line at revealing detailed criteria for picking targets or disclosing who makes the decisions. Officials say leaving these things ambiguous could help shield officials involved against possible court challenges and avoid providing information that militants could use to evade targeting. Courts in Europe have sought to put on trial some of the CIA officers and foreign partners alleged to be involved in detaining suspected militants in secret sites during the Bush administration.

#### Miscalc escalates gobally- China, Indo-Pak, and Iran escalate

Bergen and Rowland ’12 [Peter Bergen, director of the National Security Studies Program at the New America Foundation, a research fellow at New York University's Center on Law and Security and CNN's national security analyst, former adjunct lecturer at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and an Adjunct Professor at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, CNN National Security analyst, and Jennifer Rowland, research associate at the New America Foundation, “A dangerous new world of drones,” <http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/01/opinion/bergen-world-of-drones/index.html>]

A decade ago, the United States had a virtual monopoly on drones. Not anymore. According to data compiled by the New America Foundation, more than 70 countries now own some type of drone, though just a small number of those nations possess armed drone aircraft. The explosion in drone technology promises to change the way nations conduct war and threatens to begin a new arms race as governments scramble to counterbalance their adversaries. Late last month, China announced that it would use surveillance drones to monitor a group of uninhabited islands in the South China Sea that are controlled by Japan but claimed by China and Taiwan. In August 2010, Iran unveiled what it claimed was its first armed drone. And on Tuesday, the country's military chief, Gen. Amir Ali Hajizadeh, disclosed details of a new long-range drone that he said can fly 2,000 kilometers (1,250 miles), which puts Tel Aviv easily in range. Israel looks to Lebanon after drone shot down But without an international framework governing the use of drone attacks, the United States is setting a dangerous precedent for other nations with its aggressive and secretive drone programs in Pakistan and Yemen, which are aimed at suspected members of al Qaeda and their allies. Just as the U.S. government justifies its drone strikes with the argument that it is at war with al Qaeda and its affiliates, one could imagine that India in the not too distant future might launch such attacks against suspected terrorists in Kashmir, or China might strike Uighur separatists in western China, or Iran might attack Baluchi nationalists along its border with Pakistan. This moment may almost be here. China took the United States by surprise in November 2010 at the Zhuhai Air Show, where it unveiled 25 drone models, some of which were outfitted with the capability to fire missiles. It remains unclear just how many of China's drones are operational and how many of them are still in development, but China is intent on catching up with the United States' rapidly expanding drone arsenal. When President George W. Bush declared a "War on Terror" 11 years ago, the Pentagon had fewer than 50 drones. Now, it has around 7,500. As Bush embarked on that war, the United States had never used armed drones in combat. The first U.S. armed drone attack, which appears to be the first such strike ever, took place in mid-November 2001 and killed the military commander of al Qaeda, Mohammed Atef, in Afghanistan. Since then, the CIA has used drones equipped with bombs and missiles hundreds of times to target suspected militants in Pakistan and Yemen. Only the United States, United Kingdom and Israel are known to have launched drone strikes against their adversaries, although other members of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, such as Australia, have "borrowed" drones from Israel for use in the war there. Drone technology is proliferating rapidly. A 2011 study estimated that there were around 680 active drone development programs run by governments, companies and research institutes around the world, compared with just 195 in 2005. In 2010, U.S.-based General Atomics received export licenses to sell unarmed versions of the Predator drone to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco and the United Arab Emirates. And in March, the U.S. government agreed to arm Italy's six Reaper drones but rejected a request from Turkey to purchase armed Predator drones. An official in Turkey's Defense Ministry said in July that Turkey planned to arm its own domestically produced drone, the Anka. Israel is the world's largest exporter of drones and drone technology, and the state-owned Israeli Aerospace Industries has sold to countries as varied as Nigeria, Russia and Mexico. Building drones, particularly armed drones, takes sophisticated technology and specific weaponry, but governments are increasingly willing to invest the necessary time and money to either buy or develop them, as armed drones are increasingly seen as an integral part of modern warfare. Sweden, Greece, Switzerland, Spain, Italy and France are working on a joint project through state-owned aeronautical companies and are in the final stages of developing an advanced armed drone prototype called the Dassault nEURon, from which the France plans to derive armed drones for its air force. And Pakistani authorities have long tried to persuade the United States to give them armed Predator drones, while India owns an armed Israeli drone designed to detect and destroy enemy radar, though it does not yet have drones capable of striking other targets. The Teal Group, a defense consulting firm in Virginia, estimated in June that the global market for the research, development and procurement of armed drones will just about double in the next decade, from $6.6 billion to $11.4 billion. States are not alone in their quest for drones. Insurgent groups, too, are moving to acquire this technology. Last year, Libyan opposition forces trying to overthrow the dictator Moammar Gadhafi bought a sophisticated surveillance drone from a Canadian company for which they paid in the low six figures. You can even buy your own tiny drone on Amazon for $250. (And for an extra $3.99, you can get next-day shipping.) As drone technology becomes more widely accessible, it is only a matter of time before well-financed drug cartels acquire them. And you can imagine a day in the not too distant future where armed drones are used to settle personal vendettas. Given the relatively low costs of drones -- already far cheaper than the costs of a fighter jet and of training a fighter jet pilot -- armed drones will play a key role in future conflicts. While the drone industry thrives and more companies, research institutes and nations jump on board the drone bandwagon, the United States is setting a powerful international norm about the use of armed drones, which it uses for pre-emptive attacks against presumed terrorists in Pakistan and Yemen. It is these kinds of drone strikes that are controversial; the use of drones in a conventional war is not much different than a manned aircraft that drops bombs or fires missiles. According to figures compiled by the New America Foundation, drone attacks aimed at suspected militants are estimated to have killed between 1,900 and 3,200 people in Pakistan over the past eight years. While there has been considerable discussion of the legality of such strikes in a number of U.S. law schools, there has been almost no substantive public discussion about drone attacks among policymakers at the international level. The time has come for some kind of international convention on the legal framework surrounding the uses of such weapons, which promise to shape the warfare of the future as much as tanks and bombers did during the 20th century.

#### Independently- Executive uncertainty of US Drone policy cause accident and escalatory wars

**Dean ‘13** [Adriana, degree from the University of Southern California in Philosophy, Politics and Law, Chapter Officer of Young Americans for Liberty, an organization with over 125,000 members nationwide, “Targeted Killings Behind the Veil of Ignorance,” <http://www.academia.edu/3832442/Targeted_Killings_Behind_the_Veil_of_Ignorance>]

While there are some justifiable points for the targeted killing program that individuals behind the veil of ignorance may find appealing, there is something to be said for the intuition that the possibility of a superpower state running rogue with a lethal program that has little to no oversight and a high probability for civilian casualties would be unnerving to anyone behind the veil of ignorance. Behind the veil, individual states cannot definitively determine if they would be on the sending or receiving end of a Hellfire missile. This uncertainty alone would pose truly terrifying implications for every state involved. It can be just as reasonably argued behind the veil of ignorance that al-Qaeda could have the drones and the whole of the United States would be under attack. This reality would place the entire American populace at risk. Al-Qaeda has definitively identified the United States as the single greatest threat to Islam. Unlike the United States, which has said repeatedly that it is not at war with Islam or with Muslims in general; al-Qaeda would not discriminate between leaders, military members, and civilians. While flawed, there is still a general attempt by the United States to minimize civilian casualties. Al-Qaeda would not be so kind. Perhaps even more chilling than simply the role reversal of the United States and al-Qaeda, the use of drones by the United States has had a consequence that no one could have predicted. Drones seem to have effectively erased the conventional understanding of “battlefields.” While the United States operates in¶ Pakistan with some semblance of approval from the government, it is generally understood that Pakistan is not approving every single strike that is carried out on its soil. If the President only signs off on a third of ¶ personality ¶ strikes in Pakistan, how many strikes can we reasonably assume that the Pakistani government is informed of? And what of signature strikes? The incessant pursuit of terrorists by the United States has opened up the entire world to the realm of drone strikes. Indeed, although not covered in this paper, the United States has also expanded its use of drones to both Yemen and Somalia, and these three states only constitute the states in which that the international community¶ knows¶ drone strikes are taking place. If the United States is capable of riding roughshod over the world and the general principles of engagement, it has set a dangerous precedent for the future use of drones by other states. The global implications of modern drone warfare would be fully realized if the conditions of the veil of ignorance were simply equalized, meaning that every state, and perhaps even all terrorist organizations, had access to drones. While it can be easily argued that terrorist organizations¶ would never abide by legal rules of “drone engagement,” just as¶ they do not follow military rules of engagement now, the United States has certainly done itself no favors by not regulating itself with respect to drone usage. If states such as Iran, who are openly hostile to the United States, had access to drones (a possibility that is not entirely far-¶ fetched given Iran’s current possession of a downed US drone) it could pose a threat even more terrifying than nuclear proliferation. Drones are silent, precision weapons. In a world where numerous states had obtained drones, they could be utilized covertly without much risk of discovery. It is easy to envision scenarios in which political figures could be assassinated, military instillations targeted, and major civilian population centers attacked without any indication as to who the perpetrator might be. The lack of oversight and accountability championed by the¶ United States in today’s targeted killing program only lends to this horrifying scenario of ¶ globalized drone usage. If the United States cannot regulate itself in its own usage of drones, it cannot reasonably expect that any other state would listen to international cries for oversight once it obtained drones of its own. The view of targeted killings from behind the veil of ignorance should disturb any state or group. In the first place, the equal likelihood that a state could be the exactor or victim of drone strikes should be enough to deter states from any inclination to utilize drone strikes in which there is no definitive oversight program and the possibility to use signature strikes. Secondly, the knowledge that the loose standards for using targeted killings within ones own country could lead to unfettered global drone warfare among a host of different states should be an even greater incentive for states to adopt more egalitarian means by which to utilize drones. This is not to say that the use of drones is outright unjustifiable. More to the point, it can simply be said that certain components and the resulting implications of the program are categorically unfair. The¶ unfairness inherent in the United States’ lack of oversight and accountability,¶ the use of signature strikes, and the hypothetical role reversal between the United States and al-Qaeda, or the expansion of drone strikes to a global model, behind the veil of ignorance indicates¶ a need for profound change within the United States’ targeted killing¶ program. While there seems to be little to object to with regard to the use of strikes against clearly identified senior-level al-Qaeda targets, the targeted killing program has expanded far beyond the bounds of permissibility behind the veil of ignorance. To this end, the United States must recognize that somewhere along its path of pursuing terrorist is has lost the fundamental principles that defined its claim to self-defense. Senseless collateral loss of civilian life, as well as questionable targeting practices by the executive branch, aid only in¶ undermining the United States’ goal of national security. The drone program must be either¶ drastically reformed in order to return it to a state of justifiability, or else it must be ended entirely. It is clear that the program has departed entirely from the realm of fairness, and every day that the United States continues to utilize the current program is one step further down the path of a precedent that will one day come back to haunt not only the executive, but the United States as a whole.

#### Acceding to self-determination claims is an ethical stance that does not endorse Western domination

Bergoffen ‘8 (Debra Bergoffen, Professor of Philosophy and a member of the Women's Studies and Cultural Studies programs at George Mason University, Spring 2008, The Just War Tradition: Translating the Ethics of Human Dignity into Political Practices, Hypatia Volume 23, Number 2)

In its beginnings, these strictures were vulnerable to being co-opted by the logic of domination, for they were formulated within the boundaries of a Western tradition that considered its visions of reality absolute. In throwing off the yoke of colonialism, emerging nation states challenged the Western grounds of just war concepts of war and peace, crimes against humanity and war crimes laws. Former colonies, criticizing the imperialist biases of these ideas insisted on establishing a priority right to development and self-determination (Bouandel 1977, 48). Similarly, feminist critiques of the masculine and heterosexist biases embedded in these rights challenge the universality claimed for these laws (Peterson and Parisi 1998). One would think that these arguments, not only because they reflect strongly held principles but also because they represent important power struggles, would destroy the credibility of the just war tradition and its legacies of wartime rules and peacetime aspirations. That has not happened. Instead, there is an emerging cross-cultural consensus definition of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and human rights that condemns torture and killing, recognizes the necessity of political and civil rights (this a result of the end of the cold war), and is beginning to include economic and social rights (Bouandel 1977, 62–63). There was a point in time when it could have been said that the universality claimed for these identified crimes and rights were no more than a figment of the Western imagination, or less kindly, a product of Western hegemony; one more sign of the power of the West to impose its will on the rest of the world. This argument, intended to criticize Western arrogance, is itself a display of this arrogance. It presumes that human rights can only be derived from Enlightenment principles. The fact that countries and peoples who find Enlightenment appeals to autonomy and individual rights alien and find resources within their own traditions for adopting human rights principles falsifies this arrogant presumption (Coomaraswamy 1999, 168–69; Donnelly 2003, 71). Further, in the area of developing human rights laws at least, the era of Western hegemony is over. If human rights laws and war crimes prosecutions continue to be a matter of international concern, it will not be because the West is imposing its will on others, and it will not be because some absolute foundation grounded in the Western metaphysical or religious traditions will be invoked. It will be the effect of a common interest emerging from peoples of diverse traditions and absolutes finding themselves in an increasingly global environment that requires them to confront other peoples, traditions, and absolutes. As often [End Page 88] as not, these confrontations will follow the logic of the friend and the enemy and its demand that only one absolute prevail. Increasingly, however, the hot violence of war and the cold violence of the peace that war produces have been supplemented by what Merleau-Ponty called (1973) the violence of dialogue. This violence, instead of initiating a logic where the nature of certain issues is determined by the one who succeeds in dominating the other(s), introduces a logic where the many, instead of being reduced first to a two of the enemy and friend and then to a victorious one, are supported in their differences through reference to a shared point of departure that makes both their differences and their commonality possible.

### Advantage {X}: Sharif Legitimacy

Drones will ruin Sharif’s political leadership in the squo- this risk total kickout and backlash

Toosi ’13 (Nahal Toosi, Associated Press Editor, “Pakistan Summons U.S. Envoy Over Drone Strike”, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/08/pakistan-us-envoy-summoned_n_3407803.html>, June 8, 2013)

ISLAMABAD — Just days after taking power, Pakistan's new government summoned a top U.S. envoy Saturday to lodge a protest over a U.S. drone strike, suggesting that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's team fully intends to make good on its promise to aggressively push for an end to such strikes. Friday night's drone strike near the Afghan border, which was said to have killed seven militants, came two days after Sharif was sworn in as premier and the same day his Cabinet members took their oaths. Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League-N handily won general elections last month and is expected to govern with a relatively strong mandate because it doesn't need to rely on coalition partners. Sharif, who wants to pursue peace talks with militants threatening his country, has insisted the U.S. stop the drone strikes, saying they violate Pakistan's sovereignty and are counterproductive because they often kill innocent civilians and stoke anti-U.S. sentiment in this nation of 180 million. The U.S. insists the CIA-run strikes primarily kill al-Qaida and other militants who threaten the West as well as efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. In a recent speech, President Barack Obama pledged more transparency and restrictions on the highly secretive program. Sharif adviser Tariq Fatemi, acting on the premier's instructions, summoned U.S. Embassy Charge D'Affaires Richard Hoagland to the Foreign Office on Saturday to complain about the latest drone strike, according to a Pakistani government statement. U.S. Ambassador Richard Olson was out of Pakistan at the time. "The importance of bringing an immediate end to drone strikes was emphasized," the government statement said. "It was also stressed that these drone strikes have a negative impact on the mutual desire of both countries to forge a cordial and cooperative relationship and to ensure peace and stability in the region." A U.S. Embassy official confirmed the encounter but did not provide further details. He requested anonymity because he was not authorized to publicly talk about diplomatic discussions. Issuing the summons so quickly after taking power indicates Sharif wants to quickly carve out as much political space as he can – domestically and in his relations with the U.S. It could also be a fairly calculated move in this country, where the military retains significant power and where political rivals have gained traction by being even more vocal against drones. While the previous government of the Pakistan People's Party did, on occasion, summon U.S. envoys over drone strikes, it usually stuck to routine press releases denouncing them. It was also widely believed that many People's Party leaders privately supported the drone strikes. At the same time, Sharif has to strike a balance in his approach to a powerful ally such as the U.S., which has provided Pakistan with billions in military and humanitarian aid over the years, said Babar Sattar, a political and legal analyst in Pakistan. "Reaction more stringent than this with an ally and friend would obviously have the possibility of disrupting the relationship – and he's made it clear that's not what he wants," Sattar said, noting that Sharif has not, for example, backed calls by some activists that Pakistan shoot down the drones. Sharif also has been far more careful than his People's Party predecessors in his rhetoric about militancy in Pakistan and has said he wants to enter a dialogue with the Pakistani Taliban. That has raised concerns in the West that he might be too sympathetic to the Islamist extremists, but he also may simply want to exhaust the option of peace talks so as to later gain public support for military action, Sattar said. A stop to drone strikes could give him more space in that process. In its first drone strike in Pakistan after the country's recent election, the U.S. in late May killed Waliur Rehman, deputy leader of the Pakistani Taliban. The Pakistani Taliban, who have killed thousands of people in bombings and other attacks across the country, confirmed Rehman's death and promptly said they would not talk peace with Sharif. Sharif – while not naming Rehman or the Taliban – spoke out against that drone strike, and his party in a statement noted that it was "highly regrettable" that it came after Obama's speech. The drone strike Friday night struck a compound in Mangrothi village in the Shawal area, along the border dividing the North and South Waziristan tribal regions, two Pakistani intelligence officials said, speaking on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to release the information on the record. The tribal regions are nearly impossible to access for foreign and many Pakistani journalists, so the report could not be independently confirmed. But North and South Waziristan are known to be havens for multiple militant groups, including the Pakistani Taliban. The U.S. has launched hundreds of drone strikes in Pakistan since 2008, though the frequency has fallen significantly in recent years. For all his rhetoric, it remains unclear if Sharif can actually stop the U.S. from using the drones to launch missiles at militants Washington believes are a threat. For one thing, despite his numbers in parliament, Sharif still has to contend with Pakistan's army for influence over security and foreign policies. And If he's unable to end the strikes in Pakistan as the months wear on, that could give more room to opposition politician Imran Khan, the former cricket star, to drain support from Sharif and his party. Khan has been especially strident in campaigning against the drone strikes.

#### Newest reports prove

Business Recorder 1/8 (Business Recorder, Pakistan Financial News Agency, “Pakistan protests drone attacks at all levels: Sartaj”, <http://www.brecorder.com/top-news/108-pakistan-top-news/152306-pakistan-protests-drone-attacks-at-all-levels-sartaj.html>, January 8, 2014)

ISLAMABAD: Advisor to Prime Minister on National Security and Foreign Affairs Sartaj Aziz Wednesday said Pakistan has been protesting against the drone attacks at all levels as these are un-productive and violate Pakistan's sovereignty. Talking to newsmen today after addressing a book launching ceremony here at Islamabad Institute of Strategic Study, Sartaj Aziz said Pakistan has got the support from international community on its stance on the drone attacks. He said a resolution by the General Assembly of the United Nations has also been adopted to condemn the drone attacks that reflects the international public opinion that also speaks of legality and illegality of the use of drones. Reiterating Pakistan's position on the drone attacks that these strikes violate sovereignty of the country and cause collateral damage, he said Pakistan will continue to protest against these drone attacks at all levels. He said although these drone attacks have achieved the results according to United States that high value targets have been killed in these strikes, therefore, now these drone attacks should be stopped. He said the next move by Pakistan will be to approach the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva against drone attacks and make efforts for adoption of similar resolution there. He said Pakistan will continue to build international opinion against drone attacks. Sartaj Aziz said government is using force against those elements who are challenging writ of the government in the tribal areas. Replying to a question, he said the use of force by former President Pervez Musharraf damaged the tribal culture and made difficult for the government to resolve the issue of militants in the region. The Advisor said the war on terror in the last more than ten years have achieved less and caused more damage especially in Pakistan and Afghanistan. He said due to war against terror, the local public in these areas have become against the government and some criminal elements have intruded in the area who are disturbing the situation. Replying to a question on the progress of negotiations with Taliban, Sartaj Aziz said some contacts have been established in this connection but refused to elaborate further on the development of these talks. He said besides starting negotiations with the Taliban, initiating development projects in the tribal areas, the government has decided to strengthen the border areas to stop illegal movement of the people across the border. He said in seven of the eight tribal agencies, the government has established its writ and was making efforts to establish its writ in the 8th agency. Earlier, addressing the function to launch the book, "The Thistle and the Drone: How America's War on Terror Became a Global War on Tribal Islam" written by renowned writer Akbar Ahmad, Sartaj Aziz said tribal culture and ethics should be ensured to have peace and security in these areas. Appreciating the efforts of Akbar Ahmed for writing a comprehensive book on the issue of war against terror and tribal culture, he agreed that the war had destroyed the tribal culture. Sartaj Aziz said that the use of drones against tribal people is paradoxical. He said that in dissecting the conflict, the analogy of thistle and the drones is very revealing. Talking about total ignorance about the values and realities of tribal societies he said that each chapter of the book elaborate theme into its varying dimensions. He said that America is fighting the wrong war with wrong methods against the wrong people. The Chairman of the ISSI, Ambassador Khalid Mehmood speaking on the occasion that ethnicity and tribal identity is a crucial factor to terrorism. He believes that the government needs to develop strong counter narrative to the people of the tribal area. He said it is important to understand the aspiration and grievances of the people of the tribal area. He said use of drones which are also inflicting havoc on innocent civilians is not merely a question of legality and constitutionally. Earlier, the Director General (ISSI), Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais in his welcome remarks said that Professor Akbar Ahmad is one of the few Pakistanis who have attained international recognition. Professor Akbar S. Ahmed addressing on this occasion said the drone became a symbol of America's war on terror. He said its main targets appeared to be Muslim tribal groups belonging to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, on Kurds in Turkey and Tausug in the Philippines. He said drones are also used by the US against the Pukhtun tribes of Afghanistan, by France in northern Mali against the Tuareg, and by Israel in Gaza. Professor Ahmed said that these communities - some of the most impoverished and isolated in the world, with identities that are centuries old had become the targets of the twenty-first centuries most advanced kill technology. He said that drone embodied the weaponry of globalization: high tech in performance, sleek in appearance and global in reach. Professor Ahmad briefly talked about tribal societies and focused on four major groups: the Pukhtun, Yemenis, Somalis and Kurds. He said three strong pillars essential for the stability of the culture including tribal elders, Mullah, and Political agent have been destroyed in the tribal areas that has disturbed the law and order situation. He said basic rights of the people living in tribal areas had to ensured to improve the situation.

#### And Sharif’s election means relations are in a position to skyrocket but drones are acting as a floodgate

Riechmann ’13 (Deb Riechmann, writer for The Associated Press, “US, Pakistan to Resume High-Level Negotiations”, <http://www.military.com/daily-news/2013/08/01/us-pakistan-to-resume-high-level-negotiations.html>, August 1, 2013)

ISLAMABAD - U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and his Pakistani counterpart, Sartaj Aziz, said Thursday that the two countries will resume high-level negotiations over security issues. Kerry also said he had invited Pakistan's newly elected Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, to come to Washington to meet with President Barack Obama. "I'm pleased to announce that today, very quickly, we were able to agree to a resumption of the strategic dialogue in order to foster a deeper, broader and more comprehensive partnership between our countries," Kerry said at a press conference with Aziz in Islamabad. He said the talks will cover "all of the key issues between us, from border management to counterterrorism to promoting U.S. private investment and to Pakistan's own journey to economic revitalization." The U.S. and Pakistan launched high-level talks on a wide swath of security and development programs in 2010. But the talks stalled in November 2011 after U.S. airstrikes on a Pakistani post on the Afghan border accidentally killed 24 Pakistani soldiers. Even before that, the bilateral relationship was severely damaged by a variety of incidents, including a CIA contractor shooting to death two Pakistanis in the eastern city of Lahore and the covert U.S. raid that killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistani town of Abbottabad. The resumption of the strategic dialogue indicates that the relationship between the two countries has improved since that low point. But there is still significant tension and mistrust between the two countries, especially regarding U.S. drone strikes and Pakistan's alleged ties with Taliban militants using its territory to launch cross-border attacks against American troops in Afghanistan. "It is also no secret that along this journey in the last few years we've experienced a few differences," Kerry said. "I think we came here today, both the prime minister and myself, with a commitment that we cannot allow events that might divide us in a small way to distract from the common values and the common interests that unite us in big ways." Kerry was also asked about progress on a bilateral security agreement with Afghanistan that would keep some U.S. forces in that country after 2014. "I am personally confident that we will have an agreement, and the agreement will be timely," he replied. "And I am confident that the president has ample space here within which to make any decisions he wants to make regarding future troop levels." While this is Kerry's first visit to Islamabad as secretary of state, he has a long history of dealing with Pakistan as former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Sharif described him as "a wonderful friend," and Kerry said, "I have had the pleasure of visiting (Sharif's) home and having a number of meals with him." Before heading into a closed-door meeting, Sharif asked Kerry about his wife, Teresa Heinz Kerry, who was hospitalized after a seizure last month. "She's doing better," Kerry said. Sharif came to power in an election that marked the first time in Pakistan that a civilian government completed its full five-year term and transferred power in democratic elections. The country has a history of civilian leaders being overthrown in military coups. "This is a historic transition that just took place," Kerry told U.S. Embassy employees. "Nobody should diminish it." Senior administration officials traveling with Kerry told reporters that while relations with Pakistan have grown touchy in recent years, there is the prospect of resetting those ties with Sharif's government and working together on major issues - counterterrorism, energy, regional stability, economic reforms, trade and investment. The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because they weren't authorized to publicly discuss Kerry's agenda. The U.S. wants to help strengthen the role of the civilian government in Pakistan, where the military long has been dominant, and wants Sharif to tackle rising extremist attacks inside his country. The prison break this week that freed hundreds of inmates raises serious questions about Pakistan's ability to battle an insurgency that has raged for years and killed tens of thousands. Suspected Islamic militants killed at least 160 people during the new government's first month in office. Sharif's government has not articulated an alternate strategy. The U.S. also wants Pakistan to pressure leaders of the Afghan Taliban to negotiate with Afghan President Hamid Karzai's government, renounce violence and sever ties with al-Qaida. Officials in neighboring Afghanistan are demanding that Pakistan dismantle extremists' havens inside Pakistan and push the Taliban to join the peace process. Both the U.S. and Afghanistan say that if attacks are allowed to continue, the region will never become stable. Pakistani officials say they do not control the Taliban, but Karzai's government isn't convinced. Drone strikes are another point of contention. Washington says it needs to attack dangerous militants with drones because Pakistan's government refuses to engage them militarily. Pakistan contends the drone strikes are a fresh violation of its sovereignty, and they have increased widespread anti-American sentiment in the country. The United States has reduced the number of drone attacks against militants in Pakistan and limited strikes to top targets. These moves appear to have appeased Pakistan's generals for now, U.S. officials said. But some officials worry about pushback from the new civilian officials, including Sharif, who wants the attacks ended. There have been 16 drone strikes in Pakistan this year, compared with a peak of 122 in 2010, 73 in 2011 and 48 in 2012, according to the New America Foundation, a U.S.-based think tank. After Kerry wraps up his meetings in Islamabad, he is scheduled to fly to London. The State Department said he will meet there with United Arab Emirates Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed Al-Nahyan to discuss Egypt, Syria and Middle East peace.

#### Sharif legitimacy key to economic reform and development- resolves causes for development

Gienger ’13 (Viola Gienger, Writer, editor, professional questioner. U.S. Institute of Peace Senior Writer. Frmr Bloomberg News reporter, editor, “Pakistan Premier Sharif Calls for Trade While Pledging Security Solutions”, <http://www.usip.org/publications/pakistan-premier-sharif-calls-trade-while-pledging-security-solutions>, October 22, 2013)

Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, visiting Washington for the first time since his party won the general election in May, made a pitch for more foreign investment and trade links, saying he’s determined to tackle the domestic and regional security problems that hamper economic growth and development. Addressing an audience at the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) today, Sharif promised “reforms at home and a new direction in our foreign policy.” Pakistan is “determined to transform our relations with friends around the world, but more importantly, with our immediate neighbors.” The “greatest challenge” to Pakistan comes from terrorism and extremism, he said. But he rejected common characterizations of his country as a “source” or “epicenter” of terrorism. He cited the more than 7,000 soldiers, security personnel and police and more than 40,000 civilians killed in militant attacks in the past decade. “Our sacrifices are immeasurable, both in terms of the loss of human lives and the damage caused to our infrastructure,” Sharif said. On the economy, the premier said his administration is embarking on reforms to reduce the deficit and improve the balance of payments, curb inflation and reduce dependence on foreign loans and other assistance. Pakistan also aims to bring a half million more taxpayers onto the rolls to increase revenue, and to privatize state-owned enterprises such as the national airline, steel mills and oil- and gas companies. Sharif won his post when his center-right Pakistan Muslim League (N) party prevailed with a surprisingly large margin in the May general elections, which generated the highest voter turnout in Pakistan since the 1970s and resulted in a historic peaceful transition of elected authority. His victory returned him to the seat he lost in a 1999 military coup led by then-Chief of Army Staff General Pervez Musharraf, who later became president. Sharif returned from exile in Saudi Arabia in 2007. “This is a new and confident Pakistan,” he told the audience. “But I’m not oblivious to the daunting challenges we have inherited. My government is fully aware of the enormous economic and security challenges that face us today. We’re also conscious that the people of Pakistan have high expectations from us.” His predecessor, Asif Ali Zardari, was weakened by allegations of corruption and a failure to deliver security and basic services. Delivering more reliable electricity to homes and businesses was among the priorities Sharif cited in a wide-ranging speech that also covered relations with Afghanistan, India and the U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry hosted Sharif on Oct. 20, and the premier also is due to meet with President Barack Obama and members of Congress during his visit. He’s scheduled to have dinner with U.S. Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew tonight. Prior to Sharif’s arrival, the Associated Press reported that the U.S. plans to begin releasing $1.6 billion of military and economic aid to Pakistan that had been on hold since tensions escalated in 2011, in part over the U.S. raid that killed al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden. The prime minister’s talks with Kerry included counterterrorism efforts, Afghanistan, energy collaboration and ways to increase trade and investment. “Both sides agreed on the importance of our continued counterterrorism cooperation, and that extremism is countered in part by opportunities arising from greater economic stability,”according to the State Department. “To that end, the U.S., Pakistan’s largest trading partner, remains committed to an economic relationship increasingly based on trade and investment.” USIP’s Pakistan program has organized almost 80 discussions and public events in the U.S. in the past three years, with more than 90 influential Pakistanis, in addition to events in Pakistan. The Institute’s work on Pakistan focuses on analysis to better understand the dynamics of conflict and peace in the country and programs to promote tolerance and counter ideas that justify violence. “The prime minister is in a difficult job in a difficult part of the world,” USIP President Jim Marshall told the audience today. In Washington, Pakistan has often been accused of only selectively targeting militant groups that go on to wage attacks across its borders in Afghanistan and India. Sharif said he believes a “peaceful, stable and united Afghanistan is in Pakistan’s vital interest.” He urged the international community to stay engaged in Afghanistan, and said Pakistan is spending more than $450 million on reconstruction in the neighboring country, focusing on health, infrastructure and education. That includes a plan to extend the Karachi-Peshawar highway to Kabul. “This is our modest contribution to bringing Afghanistan into the regional economic hub,” he said. Sharif cited energy projects such as one that also encompasses Turkmenistan and India, as well as a Central Asia-South Asia electricity transmission project and the four-country CASA 1000 electricity-sharing program. “This will undoubtedly help strengthen efforts for peace and stability and advance our common objective of progress and prosperity,” Sharif said. On India, he admitted to lost opportunities over the years and said he’s “confident there are areas where we can make quick progress,” possibly including normalization of trade relations. “I am confident that we can overcome challenges and find solutions to all issues, as long as we stay engaged,” he said. “Had our two countries not wasted their precious resources in a never-ending arms race, we would not only have avoided the futile conflicts, but also emerged as stable and prosperous nations,” he said. Despite the deep strains with the U.S. in recent years, Sharif sought an optimistic note. “Contrary to the common perception, Pakistan-United States relations have stood the test of time,” he said. But he also called for “mutual respect.” Citing the repeated U.S. drone strikes on militant targets within Pakistan, Sharif reiterated his opposition to such attacks, saying they “have deeply disturbed and agitated our people” and end up undermining efforts to suppress insurgencies. Amnesty International issued a report today calling for the U.S. to investigate reports of civilian casualties as a result of the strikes. “This issue has become a major irritant in our bilateral relations,” Sharif said. “I would therefore stress the need for an end to drone attacks.” He said Pakistan is “firmly resolved” to end militant violence. But he also alluded to his administration’s efforts to negotiate with insurgents, an approach that yields outside skepticism because of failures when it was attempted by previous administrations. “It cannot be done overnight,” Sharif said. “Nor can it be done by unleashing senseless force against our citizens without first making every effort to bring the misguided and confused elements of society back in the mainstream.” He also urged more American businesses to take advantage of his country’s skilled labor force with more investment. And he repeated a call for a U.S.-Pakistan agreement to cooperate on producing nuclear power for civilian use similar to a 2008 U.S. pact with India, a proposition that has received little support in the U.S. Congress. “It is my endeavor to approach this important relationship with an open and fresh mind, leaving behind the baggage of trust deficit and mutual suspicions,” Sharif said. “Instead, cooperation in key areas including trade, investment, energy, technology, education and agriculture under the rubric of strategic dialogue should be the main plank of our partnership.”

#### Two scenarios- first energy

#### Sharif solves Pakistan economic collapse and trading blocs- key to solve multiple scenarios for escalatory great power war

**Younus ‘13** [Uzair, international security studies analyst for the Fletcher Security Review, focusing on international trade in South West Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa, graduated summa cum laude from Bentley University, “PAKISTAN LOOKS TO NAWAZ SHARIF WITH HOPE,” June 10, http://foreignpolicy.com.pk/pakistan-looks-to-nawaz-sharif-with-hope/]

In his first speech as Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif spoke with a seriousness rarely found in Pakistani politicians. He spoke of the crippling issues facing the country today and expressed the need for consensus in developing cohesive policies needed to rescue Pakistan. Unlike most Pakistani politicians, the PM has shown that he means what he says: he outrightly declined proposals of Maulana Fazlur Rehman to sideline PTI in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and made a brave decision in nominating Mr. Baloch as Chief Minister of Baluchistan.¶ REINVIGORATING A CRIPPLING ECONOMY WILL BE A TOUGH TEST¶ Nawaz Sharif’s biggest challenge will lie on the economic and foreign policy front and luckily or unluckily, the two are interconnected. The fact of the matter is that the Pakistani economy is on the brink of collapse: foreign exchange reserve are falling rapidly, the economy is stagnating due to energy shortfalls and poor law and order, and massive government debts and interest payments have left the new government with little room for expansionary policy.¶ The foreign policy of the government will determine whether Pakistan can develop a local environment where investment, development, and trade can flourish again. Popular discourse in Pakistan on foreign policy revolves mainly around drone strikes and the United States. This is a futile exercise and draws attention away from more serious issues. Fact of the matter is that the United States will slowly withdraw from Afghanistan but continue its much-despised drone strikes in the tribal belt. There is simply no alternative to this for the time being. However, Pakistan’s relations with its immediate neighbors in a post-NATO world will be key in determining the country’s future.¶ NAWAZ SHARIF MUST PROMOTE REGIONAL TRADE AND COOPERATION¶ For centuries, the land mass that we now call Pakistan has been used as a trade route connecting the landlocked countries of Central Asia and ancient Persia to the fertile and rich empires of India and China. It was from this region that trade flowed from the East to the West and vice versa, enabling everyone from Pashtun tribes, Punjabi Nobles, and Sindhi bankers to enrich themselves and develop their states. Poor relations between India and Pakistan and the collapse of Afghan society essentially froze this ancient route. This continues to be an issue today: India cannot get its products across Pakistan into Central Asia, Iran cannot sells its oil and gas to China and India, and Afghanistan is unable to use its land mass as a corridor for Central Asian gas and Chinese and Indian goods.¶ Nawaz Sharif has made statements about the need for developing strong and peaceful relations with India and hinted that trade-based solutions would be a good starting point. Afghanistan is also keen on being part of these developments, while the Iranians are watching with interest and would be interested in joining on as well. China has already bought up large chunks of mines in Afghanistan and would be a party to any trade agreements and would be keen on developing energy routes that reduce its dependence on the shipping lanes of the Indian Ocean. China’s continuing interest in Gwadar despite the poor law and order situation in Baluchistan is proof of this interest. Everyone in the region has something to gain from cooperation but so far, no one has been able to bring all parties to the table.¶ It is Pakistan today that holds the key to the reintegration of Central and Southwest Asia and Pakistani policymakers must realize that history can pave way for a prosperous future. For centuries the trading routes connecting Central Asia to China and India brought wealth, trade, and even war to this region. Today, these routes are virtually frozen and the development of a cohesive trading bloc could do wonders. The economic growth generated by just enabling trade between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India would go a long way in diffusing tensions, militancy, and the current crisis that our region is in the midst of.¶ Nawaz Sharif has emphasized the need to bring all local stakeholders in Pakistan to the table in solving the country’s vast problems. A similar strategy of building rapport and asking all regional stakeholders to come to the table to discuss solutions would do wonders. Luckily for Mr. Sharif, regional and global leaders feel that he is someone that they can work with. Mr. Sharif must use this trust as a means to further Pakistan’s interests and move the region towards greater economic and trade cooperation.¶ REGIONAL INTEGRATION CAN DRAMATICALLY REDUCE TENSIONS¶ In a rapidly globalizing world, our region is one of the few in the world that is not integrated by trade. The animosity amongst all the neighboring countries creates a scenario where no one is better off. It also creates an environment where scarce resources are used to fund an arms-race that leads to further escalation in tensions. Pakistan, India, China, Iran, and now even Afghanistan are locked in a regional battle for supremacy and each government is increasingly more and more aggressive. Fostering greater trade and economic cooperation would reduce this animosity and if Nawaz Sharif really wants to take Pakistan forward, he must seriously develop a means to further trade between Pakistan’s neighbors. If he succeeds, then the Pakistani state would be very different than the one Mr. Sharif is ruling today. A failure to do so would all but guarantee further militancy, instability, and increases in defence spending.

#### He is key to Pakistan’s economy- alternative is rampant instability

**Ahmed ’13** [Akbar S. Ahmed, the Ibn Khaldun chair of Islamic studies and a professor of International Relations at the American University in Washington, D.C. He served in several administrative positions as a civil servant in Pakistan, and was Pakistan’s High Commissioner to the United Kingdom from 1999 to 2000, “After Sharif’s win, Pakistan is cautiously optimistic,” 8-6-13, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Article.aspx?id=226386#axzz2rFn6GNU6]

The Pakistani economy is in desperate need of revival. The country’s basic infrastructure is woefully inadequate. Corruption remains rampant. The daily lives of Pakistanis are clouded by the constant threat of violence. The people are tired of all the promises of improvement from a succession of ineffective governments. They have reached the stage where they are beyond impatient. The situation is volatile and could easily spin out of control.¶ Adding to these domestic issues is Pakistan’s important and sensitive international situation. Bordered by India, China, Afghanistan, and Iran, Pakistan stands at a strategic crossroads. It has been deeply affected by the spillover effects of events beyond its control, particularly the brutal invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 by the Soviet Union and, more immediately, the post-Sept. 11. 2001, intervention by NATO forces and the emergence within Pakistan of the havoc-wreaking Pakistani Taliban, or Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan.¶ With the imminent withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan, Pakistan faces a new set of potential problems. Continuing American drone strikes aimed at terrorist targets in Pakistan’s border tribal provinces are killing innocent civilians, boosting terrorist recruitment, and deepening existing resentment of the United States. The raid carried out by the United States in 2011 that killed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad made things even worse. Pakistanis view the operation as a breach of their country’s sovereignty, while America makes the accusation that the Pakistanis knowingly harbored bin Laden.¶ The solution to all of these problems lies in the fundamental issue of law and order – not rhetorical law and order piously mouthed by politicians in Islamabad, but real, on-the-ground law and order. It’s the only thing that, if improved, can bring stability to those many Pakistanis eager to go about their lives in peace and security. This stability, in turn, can foster investment and economic development.¶ Much depends on Sharif’s resolve to solve these problems. If he does not, Pakistan, a nuclear power, risks collapsing into anarchy.¶ As someone who had the privilege, as a member of Pakistan’s civil service, to hold a number of key administrative positions in the border districts, I would argue first for a return to a more traditional approach to governance.¶ The three key pillars of authority at the district level were traditionally the tribal chiefs, the religious leaders, and the authority of the central government. They operated symbiotically to assure a measure of stability. All three have been shaken, broken, or destroyed. Reviving these structures of authority will help check violence and reinforce a more just, efficient and accessible kind of administration.¶ Under Sharif’s leadership, Pakistan and the United States have to defuse the deep, toxic distrust they have developed for each other. The revelation that the Pakistani government has been playing a double game with its own people by privately condoning drone attacks even as it has publicly denounced them only muddies the waters. Meanwhile, accusations from the American side about alleged Pakistani complicity in anti-American terrorist attacks only entrenches the current view of the United States as an arrogant, powerful bully. There’s too much at stake for both sides to let this situation fester.¶ Sharif has the credibility to effect real change. He was brought to power in a legitimate democratic election – representing the first time that a civilian government in Pakistan completed its full term and handed over power to another democratically elected government. This is also Sharif’s third term as prime minister – itself something unprecedented – and he likely wants to leave behind him a positive legacy. None of this, however, makes his actual task any easier.¶ Nawaz Sharif understands the challenges facing Pakistan. He needs to act quickly and effectively. Pakistanis are unlikely to tolerate yet another government that cannot deliver on its promises.

#### Central Asian resource crunch causes war

Makarenko ‘9 (Dr Tamara Makarenko is Associate Lecturer, University of Dundee and Partner, West Sands Advisory LLP. She was also a key speaker at a NATO Science for Peace and Security workshop, “Central Asia: where power, politics and economics collide”, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2009/Asia/central_asian_geopolitics/EN/index.htm>, 2009)

Central Asia: where power, politics and economics collide

In an increasingly energy hungry world, Central Asia's resources are attracting growing interest Having been involved with Central Asia since 1998 on both an academic and professional level, I have concluded that the region provides exhaustive case studies of how relations between international interests, the legitimate economy, criminality and political violence collide and/or converge. This view originally resulted from my academic research on the crime-terror nexus – deducing in 2000 that the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan gained momentum because Juma Namanganiy was able to weave (the façade of) legitimate business dealings with narcotics trafficking. Examples evolved into more sophisticated operations over the years as business, criminal and political interests increasingly converged. For example, evidence in Kyrgyzstan suggests that although key economic sectors are often intertwined with illegal activities, they are given carte blanche access to the banking system and attract foreign investment. Instead of adopting Western espoused and supported democratic ideals and market mechanisms as the a priori ways through which economic growth and political stability could be achieved, Central Asia has found its development constrained by the power amassed by authoritarian regimes, oligarchs, and criminal networks. Furthermore, despite regularly admonishing the region for their lack of democratic progress or their inability to establish control over criminality and rising extremism, the actions of external actors perpetuate autocratic rule and corruption, which subsequently feeds into a climate of economic, political and social instability. Central Asia is part of several struggles that intermittently see external actors compete for attention and ultimately for access to resources Geo-economics as the New Geopolitics Historically, Central Asia has been referred to in the context of its position at the crossroads of East and West, nestled between empires and bordering zones of conflict and insecurity (e.g. Afghanistan, China’s Xinjiang province, and Iran). Although the region was largely ignored throughout the Cold War, its vitality and importance was quickly rediscovered. Central Asia is continuously recognised as an important stakeholder in the Caspian energy game, a conduit to Chinese energy security, a playground of Russian power politics, and a transit area for criminal activity and religious fervour that is played out to its extreme in Afghanistan. Given these regional realities, Central Asia is part of several struggles that intermittently see external actors compete for attention and ultimately for access to resources. The competition for control over regional resources is often exemplified in bilateral and multilateral economic and military agreements that are negotiated with the Central Asian states. Although there is no illusion that external states are in a position to dictate terms of engagement, regional elites have recognised that they can leverage competing interests to their (often personal) advantage. As a result, concepts such as the rule of law, corporate governance, and transparency in commercial operations are often considered to be expendable in the national interest. Plays of power politics are no longer isolated to state actions alone, but incorporate the ability of states to use commercial interests and circumvent criminal control over economic spheres without creating greater short-term instability. Isolating the activities of China, Russia and the U.S., it may be argued that – in doing so - each of these states have helped sustain the status quo of the Central Asian republics. Access to resources and infrastructure have become prioritised as soft power tools through which they perceive to be able to incrementally increase their regional influence. China’s Extended Africa Strategy Involved in the region since the 1990s, the Chinese strategy in Central Asia is undoubtedly multifaceted. A key driver of China’s policy in the region, however, appears to be mirroring its Africa policy. In other words, China is steadily increasing its regional presence through the acquisition of stakes in energy and infrastructure assets, and by providing “no-strings attached” loans. For example, Beijing recently agreed to provide Astana with a U.S. $10 billion loan to be used exclusively for the development of the oil and gas industry: a move likely to be used to expand its energy links in the region. Although several bilateral agreements have been finalised between Beijing and Dushanbe, Tashkent, Almaty and Bishkek respectively and Beijing has attained a balanced position with Russia in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, its strongest foothold has been gained through a carefully targeted investment strategy. This is evident in Tajikistan, with Chinese participation in the aluminium industry and in Kazakhstan, with key commercial agreements signed with KazMunaiGaz and Kazatomprom. Europe has begun to note with concern China’s investment patterns, with Chinese foreign direct investment and long-term loans equalling an estimated U.S. $13 billion in the region. © Reuters/POOL New Leaders of countries in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) at a SCO meeting Russia’s Oligarch Power Plays Russia has also successfully managed to use the commercial sphere to consolidate its influence and power in Central Asia. This has been especially evident in Kazakhstan – arguably Russia’s only direct link to the other republics. Russia has made its initial inroads in the Kazakh banking system through state-owned banks – both through the direct and indirect acquisition of shares. In theory, this policy will allow Moscow to exert influence on the Kazakh economy by controlling access to loans, and decisions on commercial debt. Vnesheconombank, for example, gave Astana a U.S. $3.5 billion loan to be used solely to purchase Russian products. It is also likely that Kazakh BTA Bank will follow a restructuring path that involves a possible sale to Russia’s Sberbank. Despite a focus on cornering the financial market, Russia is also gaining influence in the energy and mining sectors. Companies including Polyus Gold and Polymetal have gained considerable leverage over gold and copper deposits; and LUKoil continues to expand its presence. For example, Moscow offered capital at a time of crisis to ensure that LUKoil could purchase BP’s stake in the Caspian Pipeline Consortium project. It is also worth noting that LUKoil was invited to sit on Kazakhstan’s Foreign Investments Council in 2003 by President Nursultan Nazarbayev. Both China and Russia, in following commercial strategies to gain influence in the region, have inadvertently contributed to securing the current political status quo. Investigating various business deals that have included Chinese or Russian interests has confirmed that in many instances the rule of law, corporate governance, and transparency of beneficial ownership are considered to be luxuries and thus dispensable. State involvement in commercial transactions thus has little to do with contributing to the creation of sustainable economic growth. In fact, several commercial transactions have merely worked to sustain the ‘shadow state’, ensuring that income generation is not tied to economic development but to securing regime survival. U.S. Focus on Security Priorities Unlike China and Russia whose engagement with Central Asia has not been constrained or driven by security considerations, much of U.S. involvement in the region post-9/11 has been focused on securing and managing military base agreements. It is in these commercial agreements that the U.S. has mirrored the actions of China and Russia – circumventing market mechanisms cherished in the West to secure its own national priorities. The example of Manas base in Kyrgyzstan is a well-documented case in point. In 2005 the FBI initiated an investigation that uncovered the embezzlement of millions of dollars from fuel contracts the Pentagon awarded to companies controlled by the then-President’s son and son-in-law. This trend merely continued after Bakiev replaced Akayev, with lucrative fuel contracts now going to companies allegedly controlled by the current President’s son. Not only did the U.S. pay a high financial price to secure access (commercial agreements combined with increased aid), but some also accused Washington of turning a blind eye to the many reported anomalies associated with the last Kyrgyz presidential elections. The heightened importance of Central Asia in the post-9/11 environment has created an altered reality Geo-economic Power Plays & Central Asian Security Security in Central Asia has most readily fallen under the rubric of geopolitics, territorially used as a stage upon which external actors could engage in games of power politics. The heightened importance of the region in the post-9/11 environment has created an altered reality; however one in which the fundamental games have not changed, merely the ways in which they are played. Although the immediate impact of this slight twist in context is not obvious, there is a danger that in building an economic house of cards, Central Asia will be in a position to affect regional instability more directly. Dr Tamara Makarenko The emergence of legitimate business interests and investment opportunities will undoubtedly continue to contribute to some form of widespread economic stability, as it has throughout Central Asia since independence. However, at the same time this commercial environment is being built on an unstable foundation – one layered with corruption, competing political interests, civil unrest and disappointment, and criminally induced instability. Affluence is still the domain of the influential, capital continues to be sent to offshore accounts (often facilitating the movement of illicitly gained money), and civil society is left watching internal and external political actors pursue contradictory policies. For as long as the U.S., Russia and China continue to play geo-economic games in the region, there will remain a semblance of stability. It is in their interests to ensure that this is the case. However, one must question the longevity of this policy, and recognise that any slight withdrawal of interests – for whatever reason – may act as the catalyst that leads the region to slide back into more overt instability.

#### Realism defines energy security - alternative can’t solve

Stephan et al. ‘11 (Hannes R. Stephan, John Vogler, and Fariborz Zelli, “Energy Security and Climate Security: Synergy or Conflict?”, Paper presented at the Third Global International Studies Conference (17-20 August 2011, Porto, Portugal), August 17-20, 2011)

Historically, realist theoretical assumptions have dominated thinking on energy security. Widespread recognition of the role of energy resources during the build-up and conduct of the 5 Second World War ensured the status of energy as an issue belonging to the 'high' politics of national security. The role of energy as a "strategic good" par excellence is not only related to its essential function in 'fuelling' military activities. Its price level and availability also play a fundamental role in a country's economic performance and socio-political stability (Lesage et al. 2010: 183). For instance, there is considerable evidence that a large number of post-war recessions in the US have – at least partly – been caused by spikes in oil prices (Bordoff et al. 2009: 215). A realist interpretation of energy security was further reinforced by events in the 1970s when a trend towards the nationalisation of energy supplies and the sporadic use of oil embargoes, orchestrated by the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC), highlighted the dangers of energy dependence. Even today the privileged position of major energy-exporting countries still represents a constraint on the foreign policy agenda of major importers (Müller-Kraenner 2008: 27). Market expansion and low energy prices from the 1980s until the mid-2000s encouraged the development of liberal approaches to energy security. Greater diversification of sources, a gradual shift to coal and natural gas, and a consolidating world oil market all but eliminated the threat of an effective use of the 'oil weapon'. Well-functioning global markets for oil – and potentially for liquefied natural gas – have been increasingly promoted as effective mechanisms to provide cheaper energy inputs in an increasingly competitive, global economy and guard against both structural undersupply and short-term supply disruptions (Goldthau and Witte 2009). The US economy, for example, is now substantially less vulnerable to fluctuations in oil markets than in previous decades. However, realist notions of energy security have not been superseded. On the contrary, Brazil, Russia, India, and China – the so-called BRIC states – are not just consuming increasing amounts of fossil fuels. They also employ the traditional, statist tools of energy security policy such as bilateral contracts and the promotion of national energy champions (Lesage et al. 2010: 27). China and India have struck numerous energy deals with oil- and gas-exporting countries from the around the world, even if this has meant giving economic and military aid to 'pariah' states in Africa and Latin America (Müller-Kraenner 2008: 72). While this has served to raise rather than lower the availability of fossil fuels on global markets, it demonstrates that – given an uncertain future – no major power will rely exclusively on the market allocation of energy supplies. When it comes to natural gas, a commodity still largely reliant on pipeline infrastructure and long-term supply contracts, overtly political considerations have remained dominant. The European Union, although founded upon an agreement on coal and steel, has yet to produce a coherent energy policy or to perfect a ‘real internal energy market’ (Commission 2007:6). There are very significant differences in the energy mix and strategies of member states whose perspectives remain stubbornly national. Thus, the Commission’s principal approach has been to seek energy security through the perfection of a properly functioning, interconnected and transparent internal energy market. There has also been a largely 6 unsuccessful attempt to extend EU liberalising regulatory practices to the EU’s gas suppliers in its eastern ‘neigbourhood’. Failure was demonstrated in the twin Ukrainian gas crises of 2006 and 2009. In January 2009, ostensibly for commercial reasons (a dispute with Naftogaz of Ukraine) , Gazprom interrupted gas supplies with the serious knock-on effect of reducing EU gas availability by 20%, which affected 12 member states (Commission 2009: 7). The crisis again revealed the EU's vulnerability and the lack of internal planning and emergency coordination. It was only resolved through an EU-mediated political agreement between Russia and Ukraine (ibid: 4). Russia, having rejected the EU’s invitation to subscribe to the Energy Charter Treaty, increasingly relies on its economic power derived from natural resources and energy services. It uses the mechanism of 'pipeline politics' to compensate for its loss of superpower status and to preserve its zone of influence, particularly in the Caspian region and Central and Eastern Europe (Baran 2007; Müller-Kraenner 2008: 47-56). The EU counterpart is the suggestion that security of supply can be achieved through diversification involving new pipelines circumventing Russian territory, Nabucco providing the best known example. Youngs (2009) has suggested that in fact the EU is in fact caught on the horns of a dilemma, between attempts to install market based governance of energy supplies and an essentially realist approach to the geopolitics of pipelines. Certainly one of the significant outcomes of the gas crises has been the call for energy policy to play a major role in the Union’s external relations in building up a network of bilateral energy supply deals with its neighbours in the Caspian region, in North Africa and beyond (Commission 2007: 23). In the US, by contrast, new shale gas discoveries over the last few years have – for now – made the country virtually independent from imports. The situation is, of course, completely different for oil supplies even though the US – if it was minded to incur the costs – could achieve a degree of autarchy in this sector too.

#### 2) Afghanistan withdrawal

#### US-Pakistan relations key Afghan withdrawal

Waqas ’13 (Muhammad Waqas, Arab News, “US-Pak ties key to region’s stability”, ﻿<http://www.arabnews.com/news/461598>, August 18, 2013)

WHEN the relationship between Pakistan and United States turned sour after Salala incident in May 2011, it was feared that allied forces could lose the plot on war against terror. The two year long stalemate has allowed both countries to reassess the importance of their engagement and define common goals to safeguard their national interests. In this regard, the recent agreement between US Secretary of State John Kerry and new leadership of Pakistan to deepen their partnership and revive the strategic dialogue is a good omen for regional stability. With the allied forces slated to withdraw from Afghanistan in 2014, a stable and prosperous Pakistan is key to ensuring a safe exit from the war-ravaged country. The US fully appreciates Pakistan’s efforts in facilitating a dialogue process with the Taleban and end violence in neighboring Afghanistan. The country has also led from the front and sacrificed the lives of several thousands of civilians and security forces in the fight against terror. Pakistan’s turbulent north region, which borders Afghanistan, is key to withdrawal of US forces from the region as it is remains a key logistics route. To achieve its objectives, the US administration has expressed its interest to develop its mercurial relationship with Pakistan on a broader and more comprehensive level. However, the strategic dialogue faces several thorny issues that have remained in the spotlight of Pakistan’s public. Drone attacks that violate Pakistan’s sovereignty and the return of Dr. Aafia top the list of these contentious issues. The US government needs to urgently resolve these outstanding issues to change its perception in Pakistan and overcome other obstacles to counterterrorism. At the same time, the US should also extend greater financial support to Pakistan and encourage US-based companies to explore the country’s tremendous business potential. Any US support to overcome the country’s crippling energy crisis and sluggish economic growth would be welcomed by Pakistan. The US has already previously warned Pakistan that any decision to import gas from Iran to deal with the country’s persistent energy shortages would prove counterproductive and harm regional stability. Reviving relations with Pakistan are also in the interest of America’s greater designs for the Asian region. The US is seeking to protect its strategic interests by trying to contain China’s growing influence in the region. China’s military and economic rise has posed a serious challenge to US dominance in the region. As Pakistan and China historically enjoy brotherly relations, the US efforts to revitalize its relationship with Pakistan may face a limitation and strategic dialogue may only yield mixed results. Warm ties between the US and India may also help the peace process between India and its archrival Pakistan. By bringing the two sides on a negotiation table, the US can actively play its role in ensuring regional peace and stability. Nevertheless, Pakistan’s stand on Kashmir issue could prove to be an irritant in the dialogue and disrupt the peace efforts. At the same time, Pakistan may use its influence on Iran to convince its neighbor to surrender its nuclear ambitions as desired by the US and global community. Despite its limitations, close cooperation between Pakistan and the US remains in the best interests of South Asia. Full restoration of bilateral ties between the two countries, based on mutual respect and understanding, would help Pakistan to deal with its internal and external challenges, while at the same time promote US interests in the region.

#### Afghanistan withdrawal key to prevent nuclear war

Cronin 13 (Audrey Kurth Cronin is Professor of Public Policy at George Mason University and author of How Terrorism Ends and Great Power Politics and the Struggle over Austria. Thinking Long on Afghanistan: Could it be Neutralized? Center for Strategic and International Studies The Washington Quarterly • 36:1 pp. 55\_72 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2013.751650>)

With ISAF withdrawal inevitable, a sea change is already underway: the question is whether the United States will be ahead of the curve or behind it. Under current circumstances, key actions within Afghanistan by any one state are perceived to have a deleterious effect on the interests of other competing states, so the only feasible solution is to discourage all of them from interfering in a neutralized state. As the United States draws down over the next two years, yielding to regional anarchy would be irresponsible. Allowing neighbors to rely on bilateral measures, jockey for relative position, and pursue conflicting national interests without regard for dangerous regional dynamics will result in a repeat of the pattern that has played out in Afghanistan for the past thirty years\_/except this time the outcome could be not just terrorism but nuclear war.

#### Failure to maintain a successful Afghanistan withdrawal strategy causes nuclear war

Blank ‘12 (Stephen Blank, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College- he studies this stuff, January 27, “Whither the new great game in Central Asia?”, pdf)

Although many scholars dislike the term “great game”¶ or “new great game” because to them these terms smack of¶ echoes of the imperial rivalry of the nineteenth and¶ twentieth centuries; the point of the term “new great¶ game” is precisely that we have surmounted the era and¶ what we see now is something entirely different. This¶ difference does not, however, mean that we have seen the¶ end of policies resembling those of the age of imperialism.¶ First, there is an enormous competition among the US,¶ Russia, India, and China for military bases in Central Asia.¶ All of these states either have bases, have had bases, or have¶ sought bases in Central Asia in the last decade and the¶ growth of the CSTO eloquently testifies to the continuation¶ of the military dimension in the great powers’ search for¶ security in Central Asia. The different factor today is that¶ local governments of their own accord are actively soliciting¶ US military involvement if not that of Russia and China¶ for the reasons outlined above (Kucera, 2011a).¶ Similarly we see what amounts to naked land grabs by¶ the great powers, albeit on a relatively small scale in Central¶ Asia. For example, Tajikistan has been induced to surrender¶ to China 1100 square miles (2000 ha of land) to Chinese¶ farmers. Allegedly this “rectification” of the borders¶ ensures Tajikistan’s inviolability of its borders, definitively¶ solves its border problems with China, and ensures its¶ stability “for decades to come.” (Laruelle & Peyrouse, 2011c)¶ But that statement implies that without this agreement¶ Tajikistan’s security vis-à-vis China would have been¶ questioned if not at risk. And the further details of this¶ agreement indicate the visible presence of Chinese power¶ in Dushanbe’s decision-making.¶ This agreement, allegedly based on a prior accord¶ between the two governments in 2002 that was ratified¶ again in 2010 cedes about 1000 square km in the Pamir¶ Mountains to China, about 1 percent of Tajikistan, albeit¶ a sparsely settled area (Singh, 2011; Pannier, 2011a, 2011b).¶ Tajikistan’s government hailed this as a victory because¶ China had actually claimed some 28,000 km and settled for¶ only about 3.5 percent of its claims. Moreover, Shukhrob¶ Sharipov, Director of the Presidential Center for Strategic¶ Studies, argued that, “If we hadn’t decided to transfer the¶ land (at this time), we would not have been able to resist¶ China’s pressure” (Pannier, 2011a, 2011b). This remark¶ basically sums up the nature of Central Asian states’ relationship¶ to China.¶ This agreement clearly also conformed to the pattern we¶ have seen in China’s earlier expansionist activities vis-à-vis¶ Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Worse yet, the raw material¶ resources in the land ceded by Tajikistan allegedly equals¶ the entire Chinese investment in Tajikistan to date. Thus¶ China has allegedly recouped its investment at no cost to¶ itself and has both the land and its resources as well as¶ maintaining its investments and penetration of Tajikistan¶ (Singh, 2011). On the other hand, these deals triggered¶ a strong political backlash in all three countries against¶ China and its perceived intentions. Perhaps Tajikistan’s¶ backlash was triggered more by the fact that between 1500¶ and 2000 Chinese farmers will settle another 2000 ha of¶ land beyond the border agreement (Pannier, 2011a, 2011b).¶ According to the opposition Tajikistan is becoming¶ increasingly economically dependent on China due to its¶ large investment in the area and this causes great resentment.¶ Attacks on Chinese workers in other countries also¶ testifies to this backlash across Central Asia.¶ At the same time, we might also point to the following¶ likely developments in what presently constitutes the great¶ power rivalry for influence in Central Asia. In the current¶ configuration it is not only the great powers: US, Russia,¶ China, India, and the EU who are pursuing influence, access,¶ and leverage in Central Asia, indeed, middle ranking¶ powers: Pakistan and Iran are clearly enhancing their¶ efforts to improve relations with all the actors in Central¶ Asia as are South Korea and Japan in order to obtain¶ economic-political and possibly even strategic benefits.¶ Third, beyond these aforementioned trends, regional¶ actors like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have already begun¶ to take actions to shape their security environment as their¶ power and wealth grows and second, in the expectation of¶ both the US withdrawal and concurrently intensified Sino-¶ Russian pressure upon them and rivalry with each other for¶ precedence in Central Asia. Indeed, we even find Uzbekistan¶ and Kazakhstan thinking of projecting their influence¶ and power into neighboring Central Asian states like¶ Kyrgyzstan either through investments as in Kazakhstan’s¶ case or in more direct military threats and interference in¶ other states’ economic activity as we often see with Uzbekistan¶ (Weitz, 2008b). But we also find that on occasion, e.g.¶ during the Kyrgyz revolution of 2010, these two governments¶ engaged each other in substantive disussions about¶ possible reactions and power projection into Kyrgyzstan.¶ Fourth, international financial institutions (IFI) like the¶ Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, the UN and its¶ agencies like the UN Development Program (UNDP), are¶ also heavily involved in major projects and policies here.¶ Finally, and perhaps most important, as a mark of distinction¶ from the imperial past, each of the Central Asian states¶ is now a fully empowered (at least formally) state and¶ sovereign foreign policy actor. Consequently each one is¶ conducting its own version, insofar as possible, of a multivector¶ or more accurately balancing approach attempting¶ to balance all the multiple external sources of benefits to¶ them to enhance their domestic stability.¶ Therefore, based on the foregoing we can point to¶ certain likely developments regarding interstate rivalry¶ and especially great or major power rivalry and competition¶ in Central Asia for the foreseeable future. First, because the effort to define and gain control over Central Asia or at¶ least gain lasting influence over it coincides with the¶ escalation of the war in Afghanistan since 2008 the stakes¶ involved in the effort to direct the destiny of Central Asia¶ Central Asia have grown. Though the following assertion by¶ Ahmed Rashid may somewhat exaggerate the importance¶ of these stakes, from the standpoint of regional governments¶ this is actually an understatement because they¶ believe their fate is linked with that of Afghanistan. Thus¶ Rashid writes that,¶ The consequences of state failure in any single country¶ are unimaginable. At stake in Afghanistan is not just the¶ future of President Hamid Karzai and the Afghan people¶ yearning for stability, development, and education but¶ also the entire global alliance that is trying to keep¶ Afghanistan together. At stake are the futures of the¶ United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization¶ (NATO), the European Union, and of course America’s¶ own power and prestige. It is difficult to imagine how¶ NATO could survive as the West’s leading alliance if the¶ Taliban are not defeated in Afghanistan or if Bin Laden¶ remains at large indefinitely.(Rashid, 2009, p. xxxix)¶ Those stakes also involve the other states of Central Asia¶ as well since it is widely believed that a Taliban victory in¶ Afghanistan makes them a prime target for insurgency in¶ the future. Especially in the light of fears for the stability of¶ the Karzai government and the overall region in the light of¶ a US withdrawal, every state, large or small, is jockeying for¶ greater capability and power in the region and some, like¶ Uzbekistan, clearly expect both to have to project power¶ and that they will be asked to project power to neighbors to¶ preserve stability in the area after 2014. Second, as Emelian¶ Kavalski has observed, the nature of what we call the “new¶ great game,” the proliferation of actors in a continuous¶ multi-dimensional struggle for influence in Central Asia¶ precludes any one actor obtaining previous levels of¶ imperial or neo-imperial domination, though Russia still¶ tries for it, and has led to a situation where, given the¶ concurrent proliferation of actors and agents operating in¶ Central Asia,¶ The simultaneity of these two dynamics reveals that the¶ agency of external actors is distinguished not by an¶ imperial desire for the control of territory, but by the¶ establishment of ‘niches of influence.’ Consequently, the¶ notion of the ‘new great game’ comes to characterize the¶ dynamics of processing, selection and internalization of¶ some externally promoted ideas and not others. (Rashid,¶ 2009, p. xxxix).¶ Third, in view of the impending US military withdrawal¶ ssit is not clear that Washington, confronted by wrenching¶ fiscal stresses, either has the vision or the means to develop¶ or implement a coherent post-Afghanistan Central Asian¶ strategy, a vacuum could well develop there with regard to¶ the US position that will inevitably be filled by other actors.¶ Certainly there is no sign yet of what will replace the US¶ military presence after 2014 and no sign of a formal¶ document worked out with Afghanistan that delineates the¶ extent to which a US presence in the region will look like. In¶ the absence of such a policy statement every regional actor¶ is hedging its bets and preparing for the worst in the future,¶ a trend that most likely means intensified competition¶ among the great, regional, and local powers for influence in¶ Central Asia.¶

#### Risk of accidental exchange between the US and Russia over external crises is still high and risks extinction

**Barrett et al. 13** (Anthony M. Barrett- Global Catastrophic Risk Institute, Seth D. Baum- Center for Research on Environmental Decisions, Columbia University, Kelly R. Hostetler- Department of Geography, Pennsylvania State University, 2013, “Analyzing and Reducing the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War Between the United States and Russia”, http://sethbaum.com/ac/fc\_NuclearWar.pdf)

War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, which are by far the largest of any nations, could have globally catastrophic effects such as severely reducing food production for years, 1,2,3,4,5,6 potentially leading to collapse of modern civilization worldwide and even the extinction of humanity. 7,8,9,10 Nuclear war between the US and Russia could occur by various routes, including accidental or unauthorized launch; deliberate first attack by one nation; and inadvertent attack. In an accidental or unauthorized launch or detonation, system safeguards or procedures to maintain control over nuclear weapons fail in such a way that a nuclear weapon or missile launches or explodes without direction from leaders. In a deliberate first attack, the attacking nation decides to attack based on accurate information about the state of affairs. In an inadvertent attack, the attacking nation mistakenly concludes that it is under attack and launches nuclear weapons in what it believes is a counterattack. 11,12 (Brinkmanship strategies incorporate elements of all of the above, in that they involve deliberate manipulation of the risk of otherwise unauthorized or inadvertent attack as part of coercive threats that “leave something to chance,” i.e., “taking steps that raise the risk that the crisis will go out of control and end in a general nuclear exchange.” 13,14 ) Over the years, nuclear strategy was aimed primarily at minimizing risks of intentional attack through development of deterrence capabilities, though numerous measures were also taken to reduce probabilities of accidents, unauthorized attack, and inadvertent war. 15,16,17 For purposes of deterrence, both U.S. and Soviet/Russian forces have maintained significant capabilities to have some forces survive a first attack by the other side and to launch a subsequent counter-attack. However, concerns about the extreme disruptions that a first attack would cause in the other side’s forces and command-and-control capabilities led to both sides’development of capabilities to detect a first attack and launch a counter-attack before suffering damage from the first attack. 18,19,20 Many people believe that with the end of the Cold War and with improved relations between the United States and Russia, the risk of East-West nuclear war was significantly reduced. 21,22 However, it has also been argued that inadvertent nuclear war between the United States and Russia has continued to present a substantial risk. 23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33 While the United States and Russia are not actively threatening each other with war, they have remained ready to launch nuclear missiles in response to indications of attack. 34,35,36,37,38 False indicators of nuclear attack could be caused in several ways. First, a wide range of events have already been mistakenly interpreted as indicators of attack, including weather phenomena, a faulty computer chip, wild animal activity, and control-room training tapes loaded at the wrong time. 39 Second, terrorist groups or other actors might cause attacks on either the United States or Russia that resemble some kind of nuclear attack by the other nation by actions such as exploding a stolen or improvised nuclear bomb, 40,41,42 especially if such an event occurs during a crisis between the United States and Russia. 43 A variety of nuclear terrorism scenarios are possible. 44 Al Qaeda has sought to obtain or construct nuclear weapons and to use them against the United States. 45,46,47 Other methods could involve attempts to circumvent nuclear weapon launch control safeguards or exploit holes in their security. 48,49 It has long been argued that the probability of inadvertent nuclear war is significantly higher during U.S.-Russian crisis conditions, 50,51,52,53 with the Cuban Missile Crisis being a prime historical example of such a crisis. 54,55,56,57,58 It is possible that U.S.-Russian relations will significantly deteriorate in the future, increasing nuclear tensions. 59 There are a variety of ways for a third party to raise tensions between the United States and Russia, making one or both nations more likely to misinterpret events as attacks. 60,61,62,63

#### States act in their own self interest in Central Asia- trying alternatives causes global ethnic wars and extinction

Mois Moshev, 10-15-03, analyst specializing in Central Asian affairs, American University Bulgaria, “Realism is Still the Best Perspective”

The basic implication for the relevance of realism would be instability in the international system and the possibility (or presence) of war. Even at this very moment it is quite possible that some country is secretly (or openly like the USA or Israel) arming and getting ready to aggressively act on its own interests. At least a few such interests could be listed: territorial claims (say, in the Middle East or India to name just a couple), changes in unilateralism and imperialism (e.g. some European states can blame the US for that), national security (Israel attacking Syria or US attacking North Korea). Besides, there are wars going on in Africa, India/Pakistan, and the Middle East. These facts and possibility confirm the fundamental assumption of realism: human nature is bad and therefore people are not able to govern themselves. If this happened (which would mean complete anarchy on all levels) it may lead to total destruction of humanity – ethical conflicts may break out everywhere, for instance. The lack of rationality and reason in people should be made up for by a rational state. Since the existence of a government is necessary, then war is necessary, or as Randolph Bourne argues, “War is the health of the State” – it unites the people and starts processes that improve production and economy (but helps the ruling elite more). Therefore, war has not been left behind – anarchy requires it. Despite all the liberal talks about international bodies, which aim at reducing anarchy, states are far from being protected from aggression or other problems. Most of these bodies are merely economical, and most simply do not work. The United Nations (often blamed for too much talk, little action) did not stop the US from attacking Iraq. The World Bank and the IMF did not help reduce poverty in Africa and Southern America. These bodies were simply an attempt of gaining influence/power over other states and have never really succeeded. Even international organizations that ‘work’ are more like forums and the actual implementation of their ideas happens mainly within and through a state. The country that is considered by some the most ‘globalized’ (actually globalizing) – the USA – is simply acting for its own security. Since the election of Roosevelt (1932) and the introduction of the New Deal (and even before that) the United States have been acting in a very ‘realistic’ manner – strong nation, thriving economy, huge accumulation of power, some even claim developments toward fascism. Events like 9/11 strengthened issues of national security. The War on Terrorism and the Patriot Act (and possibly the War on Drugs) are a straightforward effort for preserving US security. An approach other than realistic would fail to control such a huge population (China although a communist state is rather realistic too). Leo Strauss, the ‘conservative king of America’, whose ideas shaped US foreign policy during and after the Reagan administration, asks “Are political entities, not compelled to use force and fraud…if they are to prosper?” Force is still a way to prosperity and some have no remorse for using it. The US (and UK) actions are but a reaction to an insecure international situation, which proves realism to be relevant. The current international conditions are not stable – anarchy is still present. A war is always possible, and every contrary argument would be a mere delusion. It might be argued that a large-scale war is possible at this moment. The idea of ‘democratic peace’ would fail immediately if even one democratic state starts arming, or its interests are deeply offended and it reacts. The only factor that keeps a number of wars from breaking out is the balance of power – even the US have a reason for being afraid to attack directly (despite Iraq, which probably did not upset anyone’s interests too badly). The last, but not least, advantage of realism is its “practicality” – it is still the best perspective as long as action and function are concerned. Normative and deeply philosophical approaches rarely have actual results, in contrast to realism.

### Solvency

#### Solves case

Markey ’13 (Daniel Markey, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and author of the forthcoming No Exit From Pakistan: America's Tortured Relationship with Islamabad, “A New Drone Deal For Pakistan How to Bargain With a Newly Drone-Skeptical Islamabad”, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139584/daniel-markey/a-new-drone-deal-for-pakistan?page=show>, July 16, 2013)

For all its successes, the U.S. drone program in Pakistan is unlikely to survive much longer in its current form. Less than a week after his election on May 11, Pakistan’s new prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, reportedly declared to his cabinet that “the policy of protesting against drone strikes for public consumption, while working behind the scenes to make them happen, is not on.” This fall, Pakistan’s national and provincial assemblies will elect a new president, likely a Sharif loyalist, and the prime minister will also select a new army chief. It is safe to say that these men are unlikely to follow their predecessors in offering tacit endorsements of the United States' expansive counterterrorism efforts. In other words, the United States is going to have to hammer out a new drone deal with Pakistan in the years ahead, one that is sensitive to Pakistan's own concerns and objectives. This will likely mean that Washington will face new constraints in its counterterrorism operations. But managed with care, a new agreement could put the targeted killing campaign against al Qaeda on firmer political footing without entirely eliminating its effectiveness. Ever since its inception in 2004, the U.S. drone campaign in Pakistan has been stumbling along shaky legal and strategic ground. At various points in time, Washington and Islamabad constructed different fictions to enable the drone campaign. Before launching the first drone strike that killed Taliban leader Nek Muhammad in June 2004, Washington sought personal authorization from then President and army chief Pervez Musharraf. For several years thereafter, the Pakistani army claimed responsibility for all drone strikes, publicly denying (however implausibly) American intervention. But the program’s remarkable success in killing al Qaeda and Taliban leaders, combined with the otherwise largely unaddressed problem of sanctuaries in Pakistan’s tribal areas, encouraged U.S. officials to expand their list of targets. As the program grew, and especially as Washington killed militants with suspected links to Pakistan’s own military and intelligence services, such as members of the Afghan Taliban–affiliated Haqqani Network, Pakistani officials shed the fiction that the strikes were their own. Islamabad instead bowed to what it perceived as a powerful domestic consensus against the drones and criticized the United States in increasingly shrill terms for violating Pakistan’s territorial sovereignty. Privately, however, Musharraf and his immediate successors -- including the civilian government led by the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the army under General Kayani -- continued to greenlight the drone program. As the drone strikes mounted, the hypocrisy of the official Pakistani position became ever more difficult to hide. Opposition politician and former cricket star Imran Khan made the criticism of drones a centerpiece of his Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party’s election campaign in 2011 and 2012. And in early 2012, the Pakistani parliament unequivocally denounced the drone strikes and called for them to end. This unmistakable sovereign act called into question oft-repeated U.S. claims that Pakistan actually provides “tacit consent” for the drone campaign. Pakistan's current and future leaders, starting with Nawaz Sharif, will have little reason to implicate themselves in the drone hypocrisy of their predecessors. Sharif is on sounder political footing than his predecessor, but -- as his top lieutenants are already signaling -- he cannot weather the political storm that is likely to result if the United States appears to blithely disregard his authority. Washington’s failure to shift its policy would lead Islamabad to escalate its diplomatic protests. One step in this escalation has already happened, with Pakistan taking its case against drones to the international community by way of the United Nations. If Pakistani frustration mounts without yielding results, one can imagine Sharif’s new army chief threatening to shoot U.S. drones from the sky, just as past Pakistani leaders have threatened to take down helicopters that cross into the nation’s airspace. At that stage, Washington would likely pull the drones from normal operation rather than play a high-stakes game of chicken. (Indeed, Washington has a habit of taking extended breaks from drone strikes at sensitive periods: for instance, there were no strikes for over six weeks after the so-called Salala incident at the Afghan border.) The question is whether Washington and Islamabad can find a deal that addresses Pakistani concerns without depriving the United States of a counterterrorism tool that has been more effective, at least in a tactical sense, than any other. Short of ending the drone program altogether, the only way that Pakistan’s leaders can credibly claim to assert their sovereign authority -- and thereby prove their nationalist credentials to political allies and adversaries alike -- is if Washington cedes to Islamabad a greater degree of control over the program, especially when it comes to target selection. At one extreme, this would mean doing what a number of Pakistani leaders (including General Musharraf) have requested for years: placing the drones under Pakistani command. Of course, given the highly sensitive nature of drone technology, along with the fact that U.S. officials do not adequately trust their Pakistani counterparts to deploy the drones in ways that would effectively eliminate top terrorist leaders, this solution remains off the table in nearly any conceivable future. Somewhat less pie-in-the-sky, if still unrealistic at this stage, would be the idea of disarming U.S. drones and leaving Pakistani forces to act as the “trigger pullers” whenever terrorist targets are identified. Strikes would then be launched by Pakistani Air Force jets, helicopters, or perhaps even artillery, and would use U.S. intelligence for target selection. This solution also has an assortment of practical problems, from the time lag between identifying targets and shooting at them to, once again, U.S. officials’ lack of faith in their Pakistani counterparts’ ability and desire to act on that intelligence in the first place. Then there is the option of crafting a “dual-key” authority at the operational level, perhaps by informing Pakistani officers in real time as drone strikes are launched and by implementing a mutually acceptable mechanism through which Islamabad could veto a specific strike, or at least raise it up the chain of command in a timely manner. Versions of a dual-key approach have been tried in the past, with some success. But given the fraught terms of cooperation between Washington and Islamabad in recent years, it is hard to imagine U.S. officials accepting this sort of arrangement, at least not yet. The real-time nature of the decision process would limit the potential for unwanted leaks or tip-offs to targets, but U.S. officials would still be wary that Pakistani officials could acquire too much knowledge of the drone program and its capabilities. If political trust improves over time, however, this might be a useful model for cooperation. A final option -- and the only realistic compromise at present -- would be for Washington to seek Islamabad’s pre-authorization for specific targets and zones for strikes. The United States would retain full operational control over drone missions, and unlike the earliest stage in the drone program, when Musharraf’s explicit approval was required to kill Nek Muhammad, this process could provide blanket authority for a much longer (mutually agreed, if not publicly disclosed) target list. In return, Pakistani leaders would acknowledge publicly the terms of the new arrangement. Accompanying this preauthorization regime, Washington and Islamabad could establish a mechanism for reviewing claims of civilian losses and providing appropriate compensation, as the United States has done in Afghanistan and Iraq. In bringing the program out of the shadows, U.S. operational authority for the drones would almost certainly have to shift from the CIA to the Pentagon, as the Obama administration has already said it plans to do in other countries. Admittedly, this final compromise option would be painful for both Islamabad and Washington. Pakistani leaders would finally have to come clean to their people about authorizing drone strikes. That would eliminate even the thin veneer of deniability that past leaders have maintained to protect themselves from political fallout. It would also place Sharif’s party firmly on the blacklists of the Pakistani Taliban and other targeted groups, which to date have enjoyed slightly more ambiguous relationships. For their part, U.S. counterterror officials would chafe at any preauthorization program. This would be especially true if the target list excluded individuals, such as senior Afghan Taliban commanders, with whom the Pakistanis would prefer to maintain ties. A preauthorization regime would also mean foregoing the controversial U.S. practice of signature strikes, in which drones have been used to attack individuals who fit the profile of terrorists -- for example, people who move about in armed convoys or visit known terrorist camps -- but whose identities are not yet known to U.S. officials. The new drone deal would be premised on the assumption that the United States is prepared to accept less frequent drone strikes than it has become accustomed to. So one potentially insurmountable stumbling block to this compromise would be if Washington planned to use the drone campaign as a primary tool for shaping the battlefield in Afghanistan, for instance by intensifying strikes against the Haqqani Network in the FATA’s North Waziristan agency. Pakistani leaders would almost certainly reject this strategy. Under such conditions, however, it is hard to imagine anything other than a tense and conflict-prone relationship between Washington and Islamabad, whether or not any new drone deal has been negotiated. But officials in Washington would be wise not to let relations with Pakistan deteriorate to that point. The United States faces potential challenges in Pakistan that are even more daunting than the war in Afghanistan or the fight against al Qaeda. Nuclear-armed and battling a hardened Islamist insurgency, Pakistan is on track to be the fourth most populous country in the world by midcentury. Pakistan, in short, is here to stay -- as is Nawaz Sharif, at least for the immediate future. Sharif may not be the man that the United States would choose to lead Pakistan, but he is one that Washington would be wise to learn how to bargain with.

The Defense Committee of the Cabinet or DCC is key to Sharif legitimacy and Pakistan stability

Rafiq ’13 (Arif Rafiq, Arif Rafiq is an adjunct scholar at the Middle East Institute and president of Vizier Consulting, LLC, which provides strategic guidance on Middle East and South Asian political and security issues, “Nawaz Sharif 3.0 – How Will He Govern?”, <http://thediplomat.com/2013/06/17/nawaz-sharif-3-0-how-will-he-govern/3/?all=true>, June 17, 2013)

On June 5, Pakistan's National Assembly elected Nawaz Sharif as the country's prime minister. Though it’s his third time in office, almost fourteen years have passed since Sharif last led Pakistan. There is a legitimate question, then, as to how exactly he will govern. Pakistan has changed in many ways since 1999, when Sharif was overthrown by General Pervez Musharraf. New players have joined the power elite alongside the politicians and military brass. An activist judiciary brought down a once-powerful army ruler and continues to challenge elected politicians, the bureaucracy, and the military. Private cable news channels, of which there are now around two dozen, team up with the high courts and serve as a check on pretty much everyone, feeding what has become a public addiction to political infotainment and a strong desire for accountability. Alongside political battles, there are multiple hot wars being fought on Pakistani soil. Islamic militants are now the country’s chief security threat. The Pakistani Taliban has killed thousands of Pakistanis, including a former prime minister. It holds a veto power over the future of the country’s northwest. And for over a decade, not only have tens of thousands of U.S. troops been stationed in neighboring Afghanistan, but Washington has also seen Pakistan as an undeclared theater of conflict, regularly targeting it with drone strikes and other covert intelligence operations, in addition to providing it with billions of dollars in aid annually. For his part, Sharif too has changed since he was unseated from power. The Nawaz Sharif we see today is a kinder, gentler statesman – in marked contrast to his confrontational style two decades ago. His party, the Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz (PML-N), provided a measured opposition to the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) government that had ruled for the past five years. The PML-N cooperated with the PPP to pass three major constitutional amendments – just a few of many indicators of the elite political culture's shift toward greater cooperation and restraint. Indeed, Sharif represents a new brand of center-right politics in Pakistan, one that is outspoken against military interference in politics, strongly in support of constitutionalism and the rule of law, and keen on using conciliation and compromise to resolve internal disputes. This time around, the Nawaz Sharif ver. 3.0 appears intent on reducing corruption, enhancing economic growth, putting the military back in the barracks, achieving "zero problems" with neighboring Afghanistan and India, institutionalizing civilian rule, and resolving the country's major ethnic secessionist dispute in Balochistan. In these respects, Sharif's "REPAIR" agenda echoes the priorities of Turkey's Recep Tayyip Erdogan upon taking office. And while such an analogy might be unflattering at the moment given Erdogan's use of force against Taksim Square protesters this month, Sharif's past is similar to Erdogan's present excesses. Buoyed by a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly after the 1997 elections, Sharif clashed with the courts, cracked down on the media, tried to enhance his constitutional powers, and was heavily inclined toward majoritarian and even quasi-Islamist policies. Fortunately for Pakistan, it's unlikely that Sharif will revert to old form. He is well aware that Pakistan is far too fractured and its challenges too grave for him to go on an authoritarian binge once again. What Sharif does have is a strong electoral mandate, support from the business community, and space given to him by the military to push forward much – but not all – of his REPAIR agenda. To succeed, Sharif must prioritize among his goals and implement them in the right sequence. Institutionalizing civilian control over national security policymaking should take precedence over exposing or punishing the military for its unlawful activities in the past. The two could be mutually exclusive if Sharif takes the military head on and fails. The Charter of Democracy, which Sharif signed in 2006, calls for the creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to investigate the military's illegal actions post-1996. Creating such a body while Sharif needs the army to fight a war against the Pakistani Taliban would be unwise. Sharif should keep the big picture in mind. Five years from now, if Sharif’s government completes its tenure, succeeds in bringing the country out of its current economic and security morass, conducts free and fair elections, and is either re-elected or passes on power to another democratically-elected government, the door to military dictatorship could be firmly shut. Avoiding confrontation with the military doesn't mean that Sharif should let it run the show when it comes to Pakistan's foreign policy. In fact, Sharif must push forward with bolstering civilian-led national security policymaking bodies. Rather than having private meetings with the army chief as has been common, Sharif should hold weekly meetings for the Defense Committee of the Cabinet (DCC), Pakistan's equivalent of a national security council. The DCC needs someone akin to a national security advisor on top – a retired civil servant able to work with the military, but not necessarily an ex-officer. And it needs a permanent staff, selected from among the best and the brightest of the country's bureaucracy, who can think outside the box and integrate inputs from various ministries, including defense, finance, and water and power. With the prime minister at its helm, the DCC must be the chief forum in which Pakistan's civilian and military leaders get together to discuss domestic and regional security challenges. Hardline elements in the military will likely resist Sharif’s efforts toward normalizing relations with India and rolling back Pakistan’s heavy-handed Afghanistan policy. But he will have potential allies among a broad segment of Pakistan’s political class, which is keen on peace with all of the country’s neighbors. Sharif’s government should use all-parties conferences and parliamentary committees, such as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to get the opposition to buy into his peace initiatives and reduce the maneuvering space of conservative forces in the military. Sharif could use the same approach to resolve the insurgency in Balochistan, which – like Turkey’s Kurdish region – is home to a marginalized ethnic group that is pushing for greater autonomy or even secession. Baloch nationalist politicians have a high degree of confidence in Sharif, who has been among the most outspoken against military operations in the region. Their initial demands are almost exclusively focused on the powerful military and intelligence agencies. The Baloch seek an end to unlawful detentions and extrajudicial killings by the military, and want internally displaced persons to be allowed to return to the Dera Bugti region. Working with the provincial government as well as other major national parties, Sharif must put an end to the human rights abuses in the province and develop a framework for dealing with the bigger, more complicated issues behind the insurgency: autonomy, language rights, and resource control. The cruel irony is that Sharif’s pursuit of zero problems with neighbors could result in greater problems at home. Peace with India might result in more jihadists joining the fight against the Pakistani state, as had happened after 9/11 when Musharraf sided with Washington in the war on terror and sought to normalize ties with New Delhi. Similarly, a political settlement in Afghanistan that makes too many concessions to the Afghan Taliban might actually embolden Pakistan’s Taliban factions in their war against Islamabad. A civil war in Afghanistan also bears the same risks. But neither a full-fledged assault on militants in Pakistan nor a continued approach of pitting different militant groups against one another would bring an end to Pakistan’s misery. Instead, Sharif must work with his army to develop a comprehensive exit strategy for the use of jihadists as proxies – a strategy that is national in focus, encompasses all militant organizations, and moves in sequence with progress in resolving disputes with neighbors. Less – or even zero – problems with neighbors and recalcitrant forces within would amplify Sharif’s ability to deal with his primacy focus: reviving Pakistan’s dormant economy. An end to the Balochistan insurgency would allow Pakistan to fully develop the Gwadar port as an energy and trade corridor that links China’s landlocked Xinjiang region by road and rail to the Arabian Sea. Pakistan could see gas flowing in from Afghanistan or Iran and Foreign Direct Investment from India as well as the United States and Europe. But meaningful external capital inflows require Sharif’s government to be vigilant about collecting corporate and income taxes as well as arrears on electricity bills owed by both household and business consumers. Sharif might have to butt heads with his base – middle-class traders and industrialists – and fight against the predatory instincts of Pakistani politicians, including those in his own party who see politics as a get-rich-quick scheme. But the payoff for real economic and anti-corruption reform, namely a return to rapid GDP growth experienced during much of the last decade, would far outweigh the risks from continued stagflation and near-insolvency.

#### Ending drones strikes *isn’t enough*- Pakistanis want a voice in the process- that’s key to increase relations and boost Sharif legitimacy

Rodriquez ’13 (Alex Rodriquez, Los Angeles Times , “Obama's drone limits may bolster ties with Pakistan”, <http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/24/world/la-fg-pakistan-drones-20130525>, March 24, 2013)

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — President Obama's commitment to scaling back the use of unmanned aircraft to kill suspected terrorists could pave the way for improved relations between the United States and Pakistan, analysts and political leaders said Friday. But the Pakistani government maintained its insistence that the drone campaign does more harm than good and should be shut down. Obama's decision to continue using targeted killings abroad while imposing restrictions that could significantly reduce the frequency of drone strikes comes at a particularly sensitive time for Islamabad as it prepares for a new civilian government led by Nawaz Sharif, who served as prime minister in the 1990s. In the wake of their party's victory in national elections May 11, Sharif and his aides have been careful in their remarks, declaring opposition to the drone campaign — deeply unpopular in Pakistan — without appearing excessively confrontational to Washington, which Islamabad relies on for billions of dollars in military and economic aid. One of Sharif's advisors, Sen. Tariq Azeem, on Friday called the policy shift outlined by Obama in a speech a day earlier "a positive sign." "Apart from killing a few Al Qaeda terrorists, drones have caused immense damage to the image of the U.S.," said Azeem, a member of Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League-N Party. "If President Obama has had a rethink, I think it's a welcome step." The United States has relied heavily on its controversial drone campaign to take out Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders holed up in Pakistan's tribal regions, a swath of rugged territory along the Afghan border that Islamabad has never been able to fully control. Since Obama took office in January 2009, the United States has carried out 293 drone strikes in northwestern Pakistan, according to the Long War Journal website. Several top Al Qaeda leaders have been killed in such strikes in recent years, including the terrorist network's second in command, Abu Yahya al Libi, in June 2012. Privately, commanders in Pakistan's politically powerful military have acknowledged the utility of drone strikes in taking out top militant commanders and leaders. Under President Asif Ali Zardari's administration, Pakistan has maintained a policy of publicly condemning drone strikes while tacitly allowing them to occur. But the drone campaign has been one of the primary sources of friction in Washington's tenuous relationship with Islamabad. Pakistanis view it as a blatant violation of their country's sovereignty and say it has become a major recruiting tool for militants because of the number of civilians mistakenly killed in the strikes. Foreign Ministry spokesman Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry, in a statement released Friday, said Pakistan appreciated Obama's remarks that "force alone cannot make us safer." The Pakistani government maintains that drone strikes "are counterproductive, entail loss of innocent civilian lives … and violate the principles of national sovereignty, territorial integrity and international law, " said Chaudhry, a member of a caretaker government serving as a transition between Zardari's administration and the incoming government led by Sharif, presumably as prime minister. Analysts said that if the U.S. followed through on scaling back the drone program, it would help shield Sharif from public pressure on the issue as he begins tackling the country's most pressing problems, including crippling power outages and a weak economy. "This is a welcome development, especially if there's great restraint applied during the initial months of the new government," said Talat Masood, a security analyst and retired Pakistani general. "It won't put the new government on the defensive." Reducing the frequency of strikes makes sense for Washington, which needs Pakistan's help in facilitating peace talks with Taliban leaders in Afghanistan and in using Pakistani territory as a transit route for the withdrawal of most U.S. troops from the Afghan conflict by the end of next year. Even before Obama's speech Thursday, the number of drone strikes had fallen steadily. There have been 13 drone strikes in Pakistan's tribal areas so far this year, compared with 64 in all of 2011 and 117 in 2010, according to the Long War Journal. Last year there were 46 U.S. drone strikes in the tribal belt. "It's a great opportunity for both countries to further improve their relations," Masood said. "And it's in the U.S. interests to be more sensitive about drones. Pakistan-U.S. relations are at a critical stage, and the upcoming withdrawal from Afghanistan makes it even more important." Vali Nasr, a former State Department senior advisor on Pakistan, said that while most Pakistanis would welcome new limits on drone use, Obama stopped far short of offering what Pakistanis really want, which is some control over the use of the weapons in their country. "He got the program out in the open, put limits on it and explained the U.S. view, and all that's positive," said Nasr, dean of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. "But he didn't provide a role for the people in the countries where the drones are used."

#### Creating a legal drone regime with Pakistan key

Hauri ’10 (Andrin Hauri, Andrin Hauri is a research assistant for the Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich. He holds a master’s of philosophy in political science from the University of Lausanne, Analyst @ International Relations and Security Network, ISN Security Watch, “Obama’s Drone Handicap”, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=116243>, May 17, 2010)

The CIA drone campaign in Pakistan has been stepped up under President Barack Obama without having its legal issues addressed – a fact that could backfire on the US, Andrin Hauri comments for When Barack Obama took office in January 2009, he announced a review of the contended practices utilized in the war on terror that were introduced by his predecessor. He forbade the CIA from using harsh interrogation methods beyond those permitted by the US military, shut down the Agency's network of secret prisons around the world and announced the eventual closure of Guantanamo Bay. However, when it comes to CIA drone strikes in Pakistan, the new US administration continues with the practice established under the previous presidency and has even authorized a sharp increase in the number of such strikes. The overall use of drones by the US military, and the CIA in particular, has significantly increased over the last decade, as they have proven an excellent tool for operations such as targeted assassinations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The US military budget has allocated $3.5 billion for drones in 2010 alone, and this figure is predicted to rise to $55 billion by 2020. Today, the US Air Force already trains more drone operators than fighter and bomber pilots, and has plans to commission hundreds of new drones over the next few years. Given that the capabilities provided by drones - such as 24/7 surveillance or timely strikes against time-sensitive targets - are widely considered in the US military as ‘game changing,’ their use is bound to increase as part of the campaign against terrorism and future conflicts. After taking office in summer 2009, the new commander of US forces in Afghanistan, General Stanley A McChrystal, responded quickly to mounting criticism of spiralling civilian casualties among the Afghani population over the last two years. He declared population protection his most important objective and set tough new guidelines for the use of air strikes in Afghanistan - with the notable exception of drone strikes. The US Air Force in Afghanistan and particularly the CIA operating in the remote tribal areas in Pakistan were granted even more leeway in their respective drone campaigns. Consequently, the number of CIA drone strikes in Pakistan rose from 34 in 2008 to 53 in 2009, and is expected to significantly exceed this number in 2010. As of the end of April, 33 strikes have already been executed. Despite official protests from Pakistan against the drone strikes, the Pakistani government has secretly given its okay and now partially supports them as they are regarded as less objectionable violations of Pakistan’s sovereignty than ground incursions by US Special Forces. Given that the US military has no UN mandate outside of Afghanistan, CIA drone strikes are largely considered by the Obama administration as the most effective tool to hand against militants in Waziristan. CIA Director Leon Panetta has even referred to the drone program as "the only game in town." Hence, Obama seems determined to continue to make intensive use of this means in future. Against this background, it is remarkable that there still is not and never has been a large public debate about the legal and moral issues surrounding the CIA drone program of targeted assassinations within the borders of Pakistan. This is all the more surprising when bearing in mind that former US president George W Bush previously came under fire for considering to dispatch somewhat more traditional hit -squads abroad to capture or take out suspected terrorists. The drone strikes in Waziristan on the other hand do not per se provide for the option to capture any suspects alive. Prior to 9/11, US governments had also continuously condemned the Israeli campaign of targeted assassinations in the Palestinian Territories as "extrajudicial killings, we do not support", as Martin Indyk, then-US ambassador to Israel, put it in July 2001. Back then, even former CIA chief George Tenet advised against the use of armed drones by his agency, arguing that it would be "a terrible mistake [for] the CIA to fire a weapon like that." Nonetheless, in the post-9/11 atmosphere, criticism on the issue largely withered away, though it had lost nothing of its significance. Among the issues raised in the discussion of the CIA drone program in Pakistan, two main criticisms stand out. Firstly, it is the use of drones by a US intelligence agency to conduct clandestine strikes in a theater where the US military is currently not operating that is met with criticism, not the use of the technology as such. Thus, the CIA drone strikes not only covertly extend the war in South Asia, but the program’s secrecy also obscures the possible consequences if something goes wrong as no visible structures of accountability are in place. This creates a situation with the potential to open the floodgates to the indiscriminate use of CIA drones in other theaters worldwide, where the US military is prohibited to operate. Secondly, connected to this, it is claimed that the CIA drone strikes amount to a program of extrajudicial targeted killings without a clear guiding policy. In 2009, UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions Philip Alston stated that "the onus is really on the US government to reveal more about the ways in which it makes sure that arbitrary extra judicial executions aren’t in fact being carried out through the use of these weapons." Given that both the definition of acceptable high value targets by the US and the geographic scope of the program appear to keep broadening, the unchallenged usage by Washington of what it had criticized other countries for only a few years previously raises the question of whether such strikes are now more legitimate because it is the US that perpetrates them. So far, Washington has refused to disclose the legal basis of the program, the precautions taken to ensure the legality of the targets under international humanitarian law as well as potential review mechanisms after the strike, and the safeguards designed to minimize civilian harm. What we are witnessing in northwest Pakistan is the massive expansion of a new method of warfare, spearheaded by the US. It is a war that promises quick and seemingly clean successes without having to put one’s own troops in danger. Nonetheless, it also has the potential to ultimately result in state-ordered murder, eroding the international norm against targeted assassinations. For this reason, there is the need for a large public debate about the use of armed drones by a US intelligence agency. The US administration would be well advised to bring more transparency into the CIA program with regard to any relevant bilateral agreement between the US and the states where the CIA deploys armed drones as well as to the legal grounds on which it justifies who and what constitutes a legitimate target. Moreover, it should seek a binding, over-arching legal regime that governs the utilization of armed drones internationally, clarifying ambiguities and grey areas. By putting the use of armed drones by the military and intelligence agencies on a solid legal fundament, such a regime would likely create greater support for drone strikes even within Pakistan, allow for the prosecution of potential misuse, and regulate their deployment in conflicts to come. Failure to do so undermines the US stance of occupying the moral high ground in this war and may sooner rather than later rebound upon the US itself.

# 2AC

## Case

### Drone Prolif- Norms Solve

#### Even if prolif is inevitable, the plan sends a signal of norms of restraint that solve war

Roberts ’13 (Kirstin Roberts, News Editor for National Journal and was news editor and deputy bureau chief for Reuters’ Washington bureau, “When the Whole World Has Drones”, <http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/when-the-whole-world-has-drones-20130321>, March 23, 2013)

A slim aircraft glided through Israeli airspace, maintaining low altitude and taking a winding path to avoid detection. It flew over sensitive military installations and was beginning its approach to the Dimona nuclear reactor when it was blown from the sky by the Israel Defense Forces. The plane was pilotless, directed by agents elsewhere, and had been attempting to relay images back home. Whether they were successfully transmitted, Israelis won’t say, perhaps because they don’t know. But here’s what’s certain: It wasn’t American. It wasn’t Russian or Chinese. It was an Iranian drone, assembled in Lebanon and flown by Hezbollah. The proliferation of drone technology has moved well beyond the control of the United States government and its closest allies. The aircraft are too easy to obtain, with barriers to entry on the production side crumbling too quickly to place limits on the spread of a technology that promises to transform warfare on a global scale. Already, more than 75 countries have remote piloted aircraft. More than 50 nations are building a total of nearly a thousand types. At its last display at a trade show in Beijing, China showed off 25 different unmanned aerial vehicles. Not toys or models, but real flying machines. It’s a classic and common phase in the life cycle of a military innovation: An advanced country and its weapons developers create a tool, and then others learn how to make their own. But what makes this case rare, and dangerous, is the powerful combination of efficiency and lethality spreading in an environment lacking internationally accepted guidelines on legitimate use. This technology is snowballing through a global arena where the main precedent for its application is the one set by the United States; it’s a precedent Washington does not want anyone following. America, the world’s leading democracy and a country built on a legal and moral framework unlike any other, has adopted a war-making process that too often bypasses its traditional, regimented, and rigorously overseen military in favor of a secret program never publicly discussed, based on legal advice never properly vetted. The Obama administration has used its executive power to refuse or outright ignore requests by congressional overseers, and it has resisted monitoring by federal courts. To implement this covert program, the administration has adopted a tool that lowers the threshold for lethal force by reducing the cost and risk of combat. This still-expanding counterterrorism use of drones to kill people, including its own citizens, outside of traditionally defined battlefields and established protocols for warfare, has given friends and foes a green light to employ these aircraft in extraterritorial operations that could not only affect relations between the nation-states involved but also destabilize entire regions and potentially upset geopolitical order. “I don’t think there is enough transparency and justification so that we remove not the secrecy, but the mystery of these things.”—Dennis Blair, former director of national intelligence Hyperbole? Consider this: Iran, with the approval of Damascus, carries out a lethal strike on anti-Syrian forces inside Syria; Russia picks off militants tampering with oil and gas lines in Ukraine or Georgia; Turkey arms a U.S.-provided Predator to kill Kurdish militants in northern Iraq who it believes are planning attacks along the border. Label the targets as terrorists, and in each case, Tehran, Moscow, and Ankara may point toward Washington and say, we learned it by watching you. In Pakistan, Yemen, and Afghanistan. This is the unintended consequence of American drone warfare. For all of the attention paid to the drone program in recent weeks—about Americans on the target list (there are none at this writing) and the executive branch’s legal authority to kill by drone outside war zones (thin, by officials’ own private admission)—what goes undiscussed is Washington’s deliberate failure to establish clear and demonstrable rules for itself that would at minimum create a globally relevant standard for delineating between legitimate and rogue uses of one of the most awesome military robotics capabilities of this generation. THE WRONG QUESTION The United States is the indisputable leader in drone technology and long-range strike. Remote-piloted aircraft have given Washington an extraordinary ability to wage war with far greater precision, improved effect, and fewer unintended casualties than conventional warfare. The drones allow U.S. forces to establish ever greater control over combat areas, and the Pentagon sees the technology as an efficient and judicious force of the future. And it should, given the billions of dollars that have gone into establishing and maintaining such a capability. That level of superiority leads some national security officials to downplay concerns about other nations’ unmanned systems and to too narrowly define potential threats to the homeland. As proof, they argue that American dominance in drone warfare is due only in part to the aircraft itself, which offers the ability to travel great distances and loiter for long periods, not to mention carry and launch Hellfire missiles. The drone itself, they argue, is just a tool and, yes, one that is being copied aggressively by allies and adversaries alike. The real edge, they say, is in the unparalleled intelligence-collection and data-analysis underpinning the aircraft’s mission. “There is what I think is just an unconstrained focus on a tool as opposed to the subject of the issue, the tool of remotely piloted aircraft that in fact provide for greater degrees of surety before you employ force than anything else we use,” said retired Lt. Gen. David Deptula, the Air Force’s first deputy chief of staff for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. “I think people don’t realize that for the medium altitude aircraft—the MQ-1 [Predator] and MQ-9 [Reaper] that are generally written about in the press—there are over 200 people involved in just one orbit of those aircraft.… The majority of those people are analysts who are interpreting the information that’s coming off the sensors on the aircraft.” The analysts are part of the global architecture that makes precision strikes, and targeted killing, possible. At the front end, obviously, intelligence—military, CIA, and local—inform target decisions. But in as near-real time as technologically possible, intel analysts in Nevada, Texas, Virginia, and other locations watch the data flood in from the aircraft and make calls on what’s happening on target. They monitor the footage, listen to audio, and analyze signals, giving decision-makers time to adjust an operation if the risks (often counted in potential civilian deaths) outweigh the reward (judged by the value of the threat eliminated). “Is that a shovel or a rifle? Is that a Taliban member or is this a farmer? The way that warfare has advanced is that we are much more exquisite in our ability to discern,” Maj. Gen. Robert Otto, commander of the Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Agency, told National Journal at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada. “We’re not overhead for 15 minutes with a fighter that’s about to run out of gas, and we have to make a decision. We can orbit long enough to be pretty sure about our target.” Other countries, groups, and even individuals can and do fly drones. But no state or group has nearly the sophisticated network of intelligence and data analysis that gives the United States its strategic advantage. Although it would be foolish to dismiss the notion that potential U.S. adversaries aspire to attain that type of war-from-afar, pinpoint-strike capability, they have neither the income nor the perceived need to do so. That’s true, at least today. It’s also irrelevant. Others who employ drones are likely to carry a different agenda, one more concerned with employing a relatively inexpensive and ruthlessly efficient tool to dispatch an enemy close at hand. “It would be very difficult for them to create the global-strike architecture we have, to have a control cell in Nevada flying a plane over Afghanistan. The reality is that most nations don’t want or need that,” said Peter Singer, director of the Brookings Institution’s Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and one of the foremost experts in advanced military technology. “Turkey’s not looking to conduct strikes into the Philippines.... But Turkey is looking to be able to carry out long-duration surveillance and potentially strike inside and right on its border.” And that’s a NATO ally seeking the capability to conduct missions that would run afoul of U.S. interests in Iraq and the broader Middle East. Already, Beijing says it considered a strike in Myanmar to kill a drug lord wanted in the deaths of Chinese sailors. What happens if China arms one of its remote-piloted planes and strikes Philippine or Indian trawlers in the South China Sea? Or if India uses the aircraft to strike Lashkar-e-Taiba militants near Kashmir? “We don’t like other states using lethal force outside their borders. It’s destabilizing. It can lead to a sort of wider escalation of violence between two states,” said Micah Zenko, a security policy and drone expert at the Council on Foreign Relations. “So the proliferation of drones is not just about the protection of the United States. It’s primarily about the likelihood that other states will increasingly use lethal force outside of their borders.” LOWERING THE BAR Governments have covertly killed for ages, whether they maintained an official hit list or not. Before the Obama administration’s “disposition matrix,” Israel was among the best-known examples of a state that engaged, and continues to engage, in strikes to eliminate people identified by its intelligence as plotting attacks against it. But Israel certainly is not alone. Turkey has killed Kurds in Northern Iraq. Some American security experts point to Russia as well, although Moscow disputes this. In the 1960s, the U.S. government was involved to differing levels in plots to assassinate leaders in Congo and the Dominican Republic, and, famously, Fidel Castro in Cuba. The Church Committee’s investigation and subsequent 1975 report on those and other suspected plots led to the standing U.S. ban on assassination. So, from 1976 until the start of President George W. Bush’s “war on terror,” the United States did not conduct targeted killings, because it was considered anathema to American foreign policy. (In fact, until as late as 2001, Washington’s stated policy was to oppose Israel’s targeted killings.) When America adopted targeted killing again—first under the Bush administration after the September 11 attacks and then expanded by President Obama—the tools of the trade had changed. No longer was the CIA sending poison, pistols, and toxic cigars to assets overseas to kill enemy leaders. Now it could target people throughout al-Qaida’s hierarchy with accuracy, deliver lethal ordnance literally around the world, and watch the mission’s completion in real time. The United States is smartly using technology to improve combat efficacy, and to make war-fighting more efficient, both in money and manpower. It has been able to conduct more than 400 lethal strikes, killing more than 3,500 people, in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and North Africa using drones; reducing risk to U.S. personnel; and giving the Pentagon flexibility to use special-forces units elsewhere. And, no matter what human-rights groups say, it’s clear that drone use has reduced the number of civilians killed in combat relative to earlier conflicts. Washington would be foolish not to exploit unmanned aircraft in its long fight against terrorism. In fact, defense hawks and spendthrifts alike would criticize it if it did not. “If you believe that these folks are legitimate terrorists who are committing acts of aggressive, potential violent acts against the United States or our allies or our citizens overseas, should it matter how we choose to engage in the self-defense of the United States?” asked Rep. Mike Rogers, R-Mich., chairman of the House Intelligence Committee. “Do we have that debate when a special-forces team goes in? Do we have that debate if a tank round does it? Do we have the debate if an aircraft pilot drops a particular bomb?” But defense analysts argue—and military officials concede—there is a qualitative difference between dropping a team of men into Yemen and green-lighting a Predator flight from Nevada. Drones lower the threshold for military action. That’s why, according to the Council on Foreign Relations, unmanned aircraft have conducted 95 percent of all U.S. targeted killings. Almost certainly, if drones were unavailable, the United States would not have pursued an equivalent number of manned strikes in Pakistan. And what’s true for the United States will be true as well for other countries that own and arm remote piloted aircraft. “The drones—the responsiveness, the persistence, and without putting your personnel at risk—is what makes it a different technology,” Zenko said. “When other states have this technology, if they follow U.S. practice, it will lower the threshold for their uses of lethal force outside their borders. So they will be more likely to conduct targeted killings than they have in the past.” The Obama administration appears to be aware of and concerned about setting precedents through its targeted-strike program. When the development of a disposition matrix to catalog both targets and resources marshaled against the United States was first reported in 2012, officials spoke about it in part as an effort to create a standardized process that would live beyond the current administration, underscoring the long duration of the counterterrorism challenge. Indeed, the president’s legal and security advisers have put considerable effort into establishing rules to govern the program. Most members of the House and Senate Intelligence committees say they are confident the defense and intelligence communities have set an adequate evidentiary bar for determining when a member of al-Qaida or an affiliated group may be added to the target list, for example, and say that the rigor of the process gives them comfort in the level of program oversight within the executive branch. “They’re not drawing names out of a hat here,” Rogers said. “It is very specific intel-gathering and other things that would lead somebody to be subject for an engagement by the United States government.” BEHIND CLOSED DOORS The argument against public debate is easy enough to understand: Operational secrecy is necessary, and total opacity is easier. “I don’t think there is enough transparency and justification so that we remove not the secrecy, but the mystery of these things,” said Dennis Blair, Obama’s former director of national intelligence. “The reason it’s not been undertaken by the administration is that they just make a cold-blooded calculation that it’s better to hunker down and take the criticism than it is to get into the public debate, which is going to be a hard one to win.” “Consistently, nations have gone down the pathway of first only surveillance and then arming.”—Peter Singer, Brookings Institution But by keeping legal and policy positions secret, only partially sharing information even with congressional oversight committees, and declining to open a public discussion about drone use, the president and his team are asking the world to just trust that America is getting this right. While some will, many people, especially outside the United States, will see that approach as hypocritical, coming from a government that calls for transparency and the rule of law elsewhere. “I know these people, and I know how much they really, really attend to the most important details of the job,” said Barry Pavel, a former defense and security official in the Bush and Obama administrations who is director of the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council. “If I didn’t have that personal knowledge and because there isn’t that much really in the press, then I would be giving you a different rendering, and much more uncertain rendering.” That’s only part of the problem with the White House’s trust-us approach. The other resides in the vast distance between the criteria and authorization the administration says it uses in the combat drone program and the reality on the ground. For example, according to administration officials, before a person is added to the targeted strike list, specific criteria should be met. The target should be a 1) senior, 2) operational 3) leader of al-Qaida or an affiliated group who presents 4) an imminent threat of violent attack 5) against the United States. But that’s not who is being targeted. Setting aside the administration’s redefining of “imminence” beyond all recognition, the majority of the 3,500-plus people killed by U.S. drones worldwide were not leaders of al-Qaida or the Taliban; they were low- or mid-level foot soldiers. Most were not plotting attacks against the United States. In Yemen and North Africa, the Obama administration is deploying weaponized drones to take out targets who are more of a threat to local governments than to Washington, according to defense and regional security experts who closely track unrest in those areas. In some cases, Washington appears to be in the business of using its drone capabilities mostly to assist other countries, not to deter strikes against the United States (another precedent that might be eagerly seized upon in the future). U.S. defense and intelligence officials reject any suggestion that the targets are not legitimate. One thing they do not contest, however, is that the administration’s reliance on the post-9/11 Authorization for Use of Military Force as legal cover for a drone-strike program that has extended well beyond al-Qaida in Afghanistan or Pakistan is dodgy. The threat that the United States is trying to deal with today has an ever more tenuous connection to Sept. 11. (None of the intelligence officials reached for this article would speak on the record.) But instead of asking Congress to consider extending its authorization, as some officials have mulled, the administration’s legal counsel has chosen instead to rely on Nixon administration adviser John Stevenson’s 1970 justification of the bombing of Cambodia during the Vietnam War, an action new Secretary of State John Kerry criticized during his confirmation hearing this year. Human-rights groups might be loudest in their criticism of both the program and the opaque policy surrounding it, but even the few lawmakers who have access to the intelligence the administration shares have a hard time coping with the dearth of information. “We can’t always assume we’re going to have responsible people with whom we agree and trust in these positions,” said Sen. Angus King, I-Maine, who sits on the Senate Intelligence Committee. “The essence of the Constitution is, it shouldn’t matter who is in charge; they’re still constrained by principles and rules of the Constitution and of the Bill of Rights.” PEER PRESSURE Obama promised in his 2013 State of the Union to increase the drone program’s transparency. “In the months ahead, I will continue to engage Congress to ensure not only that our targeting, detention, and prosecution of terrorists remains consistent with our laws and system of checks and balances, but that our efforts are even more transparent to the American people and to the world,” the president said on Feb. 12. Since then, the administration, under pressure from allies on Senate Intelligence, agreed to release all of the legal memos the Justice Department drafted in support of targeted killing. But, beyond that, it’s not certain Obama will do anything more to shine light on this program. Except in situations where leaks help it tell a politically expedient story of its skill at killing bad guys, the administration has done little to make a case to the public and the world at large for its use of armed drones. Already, what’s become apparent is that the White House is not interested in changing much about the way it communicates strike policy. (It took Sen. Rand Paul’s 13-hour filibuster of CIA Director John Brennan’s nomination to force the administration to concede that it doesn’t have the right to use drones to kill noncombatant Americans on U.S. soil.) And government officials, as well as their surrogates on security issues, are actively trying to squash expectations that the administration would agree to bring the judicial branch into the oversight mix. Indeed, judicial review of any piece of the program is largely off the table now, according to intelligence officials and committee members. Under discussion within the administration and on Capitol Hill is a potential program takeover by the Pentagon, removing the CIA from its post-9/11 role of executing military-like strikes. Ostensibly, that shift could help lift the secret-by-association-with-CIA attribute of the program that some officials say has kept them from more freely talking about the legitimate military use of drones for counterterrorism operations. But such a fix would provide no guarantee of greater transparency for the public, or even Congress. And if the administration is not willing to share with lawmakers who are security-cleared to know, it certainly is not prepared to engage in a sensitive discussion, even among allies, that might begin to set the rules on use for a technology that could upend stability in already fragile and strategically significant places around the globe. Time is running out to do so. “They’re not drawing names out of a hat here.”—Mike Rogers, chairman, House Intelligence Committee “The history of technology development like this is, you never maintain your lead very long. Somebody always gets it,” said David Berteau, director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “They’re going to become cheaper. They’re going to become easier. They’re going to become interoperable,” he said. “The destabilizing effects are very, very serious.” Berteau is not alone. Zenko, of the Council on Foreign Relations, has urged officials to quickly establish norms. Singer, at Brookings, argues that the window of opportunity for the United States to create stability-supporting precedent is quickly closing. The problem is, the administration is not thinking far enough down the line, according to a Senate Intelligence aide. Administration officials “are thinking about the next four years, and we’re thinking about the next 40 years. And those two different angles on this question are why you see them in conflict right now.” That’s in part a symptom of the “technological optimism” that often plagues the U.S. security community when it establishes a lead over its competitors, noted Georgetown University’s Kai-Henrik Barth. After the 1945 bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the United States was sure it would be decades before the Soviets developed a nuclear-weapon capability. It took four years. With drones, the question is how long before the dozens of states with the aircraft can arm and then operate a weaponized version. “Pretty much every nation has gone down the pathway of, ‘This is science fiction; we don’t want this stuff,’ to, ‘OK, we want them, but we’ll just use them for surveillance,’ to, ‘Hmm, they’re really useful when you see the bad guy and can do something about it, so we’ll arm them,’ ” Singer said. He listed the countries that have gone that route: the United States, Britain, Italy, Germany, China. “Consistently, nations have gone down the pathway of first only surveillance and then arming.” The opportunity to write rules that might at least guide, if not restrain, the world’s view of acceptable drone use remains, not least because this is in essence a conventional arms-control issue. The international Missile Technology Control Regime attempts to restrict exports of unmanned vehicles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction, but it is voluntary and nonbinding, and it’s under attack by the drone industry as a drag on business. Further, the technology itself, especially when coupled with data and real-time analytics, offers the luxury of time and distance that could allow officials to raise the evidentiary bar for strikes—to be closer to certain that their target is the right one. But even without raising standards, tightening up drone-specific restrictions in the standing control regime, or creating a new control agreement (which is never easy to pull off absent a bad-state actor threatening attack), just the process of lining up U.S. policy with U.S. practice would go a long way toward establishing the kind of precedent on use of this technology that America—in five, 10, or 15 years—might find helpful in arguing against another’s actions. A not-insignificant faction of U.S. defense and intelligence experts, Dennis Blair among them, thinks norms play little to no role in global security. And they have evidence in support. The missile-technology regime, for example, might be credited with slowing some program development, but it certainly has not stopped non-signatories—North Korea and Iran—from buying, building, and selling missile systems. But norms established by technology-leading countries, even when not written into legal agreements among nations, have shown success in containing the use and spread of some weapons, including land mines, blinding lasers, and nuclear bombs. Arguably more significant than spotty legal regimes, however, is the behavior of the United States. “History shows that how states adopt and use new military capabilities is often influenced by how other states have—or have not—used them in the past,” Zenko argued. Despite the legal and policy complexity of this issue, it is something the American people have, if slowly, come to care about. Given the attention that Rand Paul’s filibuster garnered, it is not inconceivable that public pressure on drone operations could force the kind of unforeseen change to U.S. policy that it did most recently on “enhanced interrogation” of terrorists. The case against open, transparent rule-making is that it might only hamstring American options while doing little good elsewhere—as if other countries aren’t closely watching this debate and taking notes for their own future policymaking. But the White House’s refusal to answer questions about its drone use with anything but “no comment” ensures that the rest of the world is free to fill in the blanks where and when it chooses. And the United States will have already surrendered the moment in which it could have provided not just a technical operations manual for other nations but a legal and moral one as well.

### A/A

#### Specifically- Armenian and Caucasus conflicts- draws in Israel/Iran/Russia

Clayton ’12 (Nicholas Clayton, “Drone violence along Armenian-Azerbaijani border could lead to war”, <http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/europe/121022/drone-violence-along-armenian-azerbaijani-border-could-lead-war>, October 23, 2012)

Armenia and Azerbaijan could soon be at war if drone proliferation on both sides of the border continues. YEREVAN, Armenia — In a region where a fragile peace holds over three frozen conflicts, the nations of the South Caucasus are buzzing with drones they use to probe one another’s defenses and spy on disputed territories. The region is also host to strategic oil and gas pipelines and a tangled web of alliances and precious resources that observers say threaten to quickly escalate the border skirmishes and airspace violations to a wider regional conflict triggered by Armenia and Azerbaijan that could potentially pull in Israel, Russia and Iran.

To some extent, these countries are already being pulled towards conflict. Last September, Armenia shot down an Israeli-made Azerbaijani drone over Nagorno-Karabakh and the government claims that drones have been spotted ahead of recent incursions by Azerbaijani troops into Armenian-held territory. Richard Giragosian, director of the Regional Studies Center in Yerevan, said in a briefing that attacks this summer showed that Azerbaijan is eager to “play with its new toys” and its forces showed “impressive tactical and operational improvement.” The International Crisis Group warned that as the tit-for-tat incidents become more deadly, “there is a growing risk that the increasing frontline tensions could lead to an accidental war.” “Everyone is now saying that the war is coming. We know that it could start at any moment.” ~Grush Agbaryan, mayor of Voskepar With this in mind, the UN and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) have long imposed a non-binding arms embargo on both countries, and both are under a de facto arms ban from the United States. But, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), this has not stopped Israel and Russia from selling to them. After fighting a bloody war in the early 1990s over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia and Azerbaijan have been locked in a stalemate with an oft-violated ceasefire holding a tenuous peace between them. And drones are the latest addition to the battlefield. In March, Azerbaijan signed a $1.6 billion arms deal with Israel, which consisted largely of advanced drones and an air defense system. Through this and other deals, Azerbaijan is currently amassing a squadron of over 100 drones from all three of Israel’s top defense manufacturers. Armenia, meanwhile, employs only a small number of domestically produced models. Intelligence gathering is just one use for drones, which are also used to spot targets for artillery, and, if armed, strike targets themselves. Armenian and Azerbaijani forces routinely snipe and engage one another along the front, each typically blaming the other for violating the ceasefire. At least 60 people have been killed in ceasefire violations in the last two years, and the Brussels-based International Crisis Group claimed in a report published in February 2011 that the sporadic violence has claimed hundreds of lives. “Each (Armenia and Azerbaijan) is apparently using the clashes and the threat of a new war to pressure its opponent at the negotiations table, while also preparing for the possibility of a full-scale conflict in the event of a complete breakdown in the peace talks,” the report said. Alexander Iskandaryan, director of the Caucasus Institute in the Armenian capital, Yerevan, said that the arms buildup on both sides makes the situation more dangerous but also said that the clashes are calculated actions, with higher death tolls becoming a negotiating tactic. “This isn’t Somalia or Afghanistan. These aren’t independent units. The Armenian, Azerbaijani and Karabakh armed forces have a rigid chain of command so it’s not a question of a sergeant or a lieutenant randomly giving the order to open fire. These are absolutely synchronized political attacks,” Iskandaryan said. The deadliest recent uptick in violence along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border and the line of contact around Karabakh came in early June as US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was on a visit to the region. While death tolls varied, at least two dozen soldiers were killed or wounded in a series of shootouts along the front. The year before, at least four Armenian soldiers were killed in an alleged border incursion by Azerbaijani troops one day after a peace summit between the Armenian, Azerbaijani and Russian presidents in St. Petersburg, Russia. “No one slept for two or three days [during the June skirmishes],” said Grush Agbaryan, the mayor of the border village of Voskepar for a total of 27 years off and on over the past three decades. Azerbaijan refused to issue accreditation to GlobalPost’s correspondent to enter the country to report on the shootings and Azerbaijan’s military modernization. Flush with cash from energy exports, Azerbaijan has increased its annual defense budget from an estimated $160 million in 2003 to $3.6 billion in 2012. SIPRI said in a report that largely as a result of its blockbuster drone deal with Israel, Azerbaijan’s defense budget jumped 88 percent this year — the biggest military spending increase in the world. Israel has long used arms deals to gain strategic leverage over its rivals in the region. Although difficult to confirm, many security analysts believe Israel’s deals with Russia have played heavily into Moscow’s suspension of a series of contracts with Iran and Syria that would have provided them with more advanced air defense systems and fighter jets. Stephen Blank, a research professor at the United States Army War College, said that preventing arms supplies to Syria and Iran — particularly Russian S-300 air defense systems — has been among Israel’s top goals with the deals. “There’s always a quid pro quo,” Blank said. “Nobody sells arms just for cash.” In Azerbaijan in particular, Israel has traded its highly demanded drone technology for intelligence arrangements and covert footholds against Iran. In a January 2009 US diplomatic cable released by WikiLeaks, a US diplomat reported that in a closed-door conversation, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev compared his country’s relationship with Israel to an iceberg — nine-tenths of it is below the surface. More from GlobalPost: Are Iran's drones coordinating attacks in Syria? Although the Jewish state and Azerbaijan, a conservative Muslim country, may seem like an odd couple, the cable asserts, “Each country finds it easy to identify with the other’s geopolitical difficulties, and both rank Iran as an existential security threat.” Quarrels between Azerbaijan and Iran run the gamut of territorial, religious and geo-political disputes and Tehran has repeatedly threatened to “destroy” the country over its support for secular governance and NATO integration. In the end, “Israel’s main goal is to preserve Azerbaijan as an ally against Iran, a platform for reconnaissance of that country and as a market for military hardware,” the diplomatic cable reads. But, while these ties had indeed remained below the surface for most of the past decade, a series of leaks this year exposed the extent of their cooperation as Israel ramped up its covert war with the Islamic Republic. In February, the Times of London quoted a source the publication said was an active Mossad agent in Azerbaijan as saying the country was “ground zero for intelligence work.” This came amid accusations from Tehran that Azerbaijan had aided Israeli agents in assassinating an Iranian nuclear scientist in January. Then, just as Baku had begun to cool tensions with the Islamic Republic, Foreign Policy magazine published an article citing Washington intelligence officials who claimed that Israel had signed agreements to use Azerbaijani airfields as a part of a potential bombing campaign against Iran’s nuclear sites. Baku strongly denied the claims, but in September, Azerbaijani officials and military sources told Reuters that the country would figure in Israel’s contingencies for a potential attack against Iran. "Israel has a problem in that if it is going to bomb Iran, its nuclear sites, it lacks refueling," Rasim Musabayov, a member of the Azerbiajani parliamentary foreign relations committee told Reuters. “I think their plan includes some use of Azerbaijan access. We have (bases) fully equipped with modern navigation, anti-aircraft defenses and personnel trained by Americans and if necessary they can be used without any preparations." He went on to say that the drones Israel sold to Azerbaijan allow it to “indirectly watch what's happening in Iran.” More from GlobalPost: Despite modern facade, Azerbaijan guilty of rights abuses According to SIPRI, Azerbaijan had acquired about 30 drones from Israeli firms Aeronautics Ltd. and Elbit Systems by the end of 2011, including at least 25 medium-sized Hermes-450 and Aerostar drones. In October 2011, Azerbaijan signed a deal to license and domestically produce an additional 60 Aerostar and Orbiter 2M drones. Its most recent purchase from Israel Aeronautics Industries (IAI) in March reportedly included 10 high altitude Heron-TP drones — the most advanced Israeli drone in service — according to Oxford Analytica. Collectively, these purchases have netted Azerbaijan 50 or more drones that are similar in class, size and capabilities to American Predator and Reaper-type drones, which are the workhorses of the United States’ campaign of drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen. Although Israel may have sold the drones to Azerbaijan with Iran in mind, Baku has said publicly that it intends to use its new hardware to retake territory it lost to Armenia. So far, Azerbaijan’s drone fleet is not armed, but industry experts say the models it employs could carry munitions and be programmed to strike targets. Drones are a tempting tool to use in frozen conflicts, because, while their presence raises tensions, international law remains vague at best on the legality of using them. In 2008, several Georgian drones were shot down over its rebel region of Abkhazia. A UN investigation found that at least one of the drones was downed by a fighter jet from Russia, which maintained a peacekeeping presence in the territory. While it was ruled that Russia violated the terms of the ceasefire by entering aircraft into the conflict zone, Georgia also violated the ceasefire for sending the drone on a “military operation” into the conflict zone. The incident spiked tensions between Russia and Georgia, both of which saw it as evidence the other was preparing to attack. Three months later, they fought a brief, but destructive war that killed hundreds. The legality of drones in Nagorno-Karabakh is even less clear because the conflict was stopped in 1994 by a simple ceasefire that halted hostilities but did not stipulate a withdrawal of military forces from the area. Furthermore, analysts believe that all-out war between Armenia and Azerbaijan would be longer and more difficult to contain than the five-day Russian-Georgian conflict. While Russia was able to quickly rout the Georgian army with a much superior force, analysts say that Armenia and Azerbaijan are much more evenly matched and therefore the conflict would be prolonged and costly in lives and resources. Blank said that renewed war would be “a very catastrophic event” with “a recipe for a very quick escalation to the international level.” Armenia is militarily allied with Russia and hosts a base of 5,000 Russian troops on its territory. After the summer’s border clashes, Russia announced it was stepping up its patrols of Armenian airspace by 20 percent. Iran also supports Armenia and has important business ties in the country, which analysts say Tehran uses as a “proxy” to circumvent international sanctions. Blank said Israel has made a risky move by supplying Azerbaijan with drones and other high tech equipment, given the tenuous balance of power between the heavily fortified Armenian positions and the more numerous and technologically superior Azerbaijani forces. If ignited, he said, “[an Armenian-Azerbaijani war] will not be small. That’s the one thing I’m sure of.”

#### Israel-Iran conflict escalates

Russell ‘9 (James, Senior lecturer in the Department of National Security Affairs at NPS, Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East. Proliferation Papers, 2009)

America’s disapproval of Israeli pre-emption may reflect a reduced national appetite for military action in general, and for unilateral strategic action. However, the intensity of U.S.-Israeli bilateral relations places the United States in an extremely awkward position: on the one hand, a cherished ally could openly be calling for the fulfillment of security commitments77 for its protection and security in response to an external threat; on the other hand, U.S. security commitment to its allies include deterrence and defense, but are widely regarded as excluding preventative actions. To summarize, systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework induce the prospect of strategic instability in which escalation could unfold in a number of scenarios leading to the use of nuclear weapons by either the United States, Israel, or Iran. For purposes of this paper, escalation means an expansion of the intensity and scope of the conflict.78 The common denominator for the proposed scenarios is that nuclear use occurs in the context of conflict escalation – a conflict that could be initiated by a variety of different parties and in a variety of different circumstances.79 It is extremely unlikely that either the United States or Israel would initiate the use of nuclear weapons as part of a pre-emptive attack on Iran’s nuclear sites.80 However, there are escalation scenarios involving state and non-state actors in the coercive bargaining framework that could conceivably lead to nuclear weapons use by Israel and/or the United States. Iran’s response to what would initially start as a sustained stand-off bombardment (Desert Fox Heavy) could take a number of different forms that might lead to escalation by the United States and Israel, surrounding states, and non-state actors. Once the strikes commenced, it is difficult to imagine Iran remaining in a Saddam-like quiescent mode and hunkering down to wait out the attacks. Iranian leaders have unequivocally stated that any attack on its nuclear sites will result in a wider war 81 – a war that could involve regional states on both sides as well as non-state actors like Hamas and Hezbollah. While a wider regional war need not lead to escalation and nuclear use by either Israel or the United States, wartime circumstances and domestic political pressures could combine to shape decision-making in ways that present nuclear use as an option to achieve military and political objectives. For both the United States and Israel, Iranian or proxy use of chemical, biological or radiological weapons represent the most serious potential escalation triggers. For Israel, a sustained conventional bombardment of its urban centers by Hezbollah rockets in Southern Lebanon could also trigger an escalation spiral.

#### Caucus wars go nuclear

Blank ‘99 (Stephen, Director of Strategic Studies Institute at US Army War College, “Every Shark East of Suez: Great Power Interests, Policies and Tactics in the Transcaspian Energy Wars”, Central Asian Survey (18; 2),)

Past experience suggests Moscow will even threaten a Third World War if there is Turkish intervention in the Transcaucasus and the 1997 Russo-Armenian Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance and the 1994 Turkish-Azerbaijani Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation suggest just such a possibility. Conceivably, the two larger states could then be dragged in to rescue their allies from defeat. The Russo-Armenian treaty is a virtual bilateral military alliance against Baku, in that it reaffirms Russia’s lasting military presence in Armenia, commits Armenia not to join NATO, and could justify further fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh or further military pressure against Azerbaijan that will impede energy exploration and marketing. It also reconfirms Russia’s determination to resist an expanded U.S. presence and remain the exclusive regional hegemon. Thus, many structural conditions for conventional war or protracted ethnic conflict where third parties intervene now exist in the Transcaucasus. Many Third World conflicts generated by local structural factors have great potential for unintended escalation. Big powers often feel obliged to rescue their proxies and protégés. One or another big power may fail to grasp the stakes for the other side since interests here are not as clear as in Europe. Hence, commitments involving the use of nuclear weapons or perhaps even conventional war to prevent defeat of a client are not well established or clear as in Europe. For instance, in 1993 Turkish noises about intervening in the Karabakh War on behalf of Azerbaijan induced Russian leaders to threaten a nuclear war in such a case. This confirms the observations of Jim Hoagland, the international correspondent of the Washington Post, that “future wars involving Europe and America as allies will be fought either over resources in chaotic Third World locations or in ethnic upheavals on the southern fringe of Europe and Russia.” Unfortunately, many such causes for conflict prevail across the Transcaspian. Precisely because Turkey is a NATO ally but probably could not prevail in a long war against Russia, or if it could conceivably trigger a potential nuclear blow (not a small possibility given the erratic nature of Russia’s declared nuclear strategies), the danger of major war is higher here than almost anywhere else in the CIS or the so-called arc of crisis from the Balkans to China.

### Georgia

#### Drone proliferation causes Russia-Georgia conflict

Clayton ’12 (Nicholas Clayton, “How Russia and Georgia's 'little war' started a drone arms race”, <http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/europe/russia/121022/russia-georgia-drones-little-war>, October 23, 2012)

TBILISI, Georgia — On the night of August 7, 2008, what military experts and historians say is the world’s first two-sided drone war began. Georgia, convinced Russia was about to annex its separatist region of South Ossetia, made the first move by bombarding and then invading the separatist capital, Tskhinvali. What followed was a destructive five-day war that was to a great extent provoked and fought by drones, waking Russia up to the strategic importance of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technology. The Georgian government lost control over South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the country’s chaotic first years of independence after the Soviet Union fell in 1991. Four months before the war, as peace talks stalled between Georgia and the de facto governments of its breakaway territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia the Georgian government began conducting reconnaissance flights over the conflict regions using medium-sized Hermes-450 drones it had purchased from Israel. “The small countries of the South Caucasus can’t afford to put satellites into space, so [drones] are important.” ~Irakli Aladashvili, editor-in-chief of Arsenali Moscow and Georgia’s capital of Tbilisi have frequently clashed over Georgia’s aspirations to join NATO as well as Russia’s increasing support to Georgian separatists, but the conflict intensified as the drones started to go down. Three to seven Georgian drones were shot down over Abkhazia in April and May 2008. Each side offered conflicting information on the number of incidents and aircraft involved. Georgia accused Russia, which maintained a peacekeeping contingent in each of the territories, of committing a “military aggression” on sovereign Georgian territory by shooting down the drones. On one occasion, Georgia produced video transmissions from one of its downed drones, showing a fighter jet shooting it with a missile. A subsequent UN report found that video proved Russia had shot down the drone using either a MiG-29 or Su-27 fighter. These drone incidents highlighted a grey area of international laws and treaties pertaining to disputed territories and the use of unarmed, unmanned aircraft. The 1994 Moscow Agreement was signed by the parties of the 1993-1994 Georgian-Abkhaz conflict and dictated that heavy weapons and military aircraft would not be allowed in or around the conflict zone. Both the UN and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which had observers deployed in Abkhazia, found that Russia violated the Moscow Agreement by sending the fighter to shoot down the Georgian drone. However, the UN found that Georgia also violated the ceasefire because “a reconnaissance mission by a military aircraft, whether manned or unmanned, constituted ‘military action.’” US Deputy Representative to the United Nations Alejandro Wolff protested the decision at the Security Council saying the Moscow Agreement “at best is unclear on this issue” and highlighted that the shootdown was a “very dangerous development, highly provocative” and a “violation of Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.” On the ground, the UN argued, the drone flights were “bound to be interpreted by the Abkhaz side as a precursor to a military operation,” but in his book “A Little War That Shook the World,” which chronicles the conflict and its causes, Ronald Asmus asserted that by shooting down the drone over internationally recognized Georgian territory, Russia committed the first “military aggression” of the war. In the end, the incident reinforced the notion on each side that the other was preparing to attack. In the three months following the UN’s ruling, border skirmishes continued and escalated leading to Georgia’s offensive against Tskhinvali and a massive Russian counterattack that killed hundreds and caused over $1 billion in damage to Georgia. After the war, Russian officials and military analysts said much of the blame for the military’s performance was due to the poor quality of its drone fleet. To begin with, Russia’s drones were late to the battlefield as Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov initially forgot to sign an order authorizing their use. Unable to gain real-time intelligence on the ground, the Russian top brass sent fighter jets and long-range bombers on reconnaissance and close air support missions before Georgia’s air defenses were neutralized, leaving them vulnerable to being shot down. Russia defense expert Roger McDermott wrote that as “calamitous” as Russia’s losses due to poor intelligence were, they could have been much greater if Georgia used its air-defense platforms more efficiently. By contrast, the Georgian military was viewed as effective in its initial maneuvers, backed by intelligence provided by its Hermes-450s and other smaller Israeli-made drone models. The Hermes-450 is similar in size and capabilities to the US military’s Predator, which has been heavily used for missions across the Middle East. Russian officials later disclosed that the only drones it operated during the war were outdated domestic models developed in the late 1970s-early 1980s and several were lost. Furthermore, even the most advanced Russian-designed drone in the air at the time, “demonstrated many problems, among them a distinct acoustic signature audible from a long distance, which, coupled with its low [flight] ceiling, yielded high vulnerability to ground fire,” said Vladimir Popovkin, head of the Defense Ministry’s procurement wing. However, if Russia was drone-poor and Georgia drone-rich before the conflict, everything changed when Israel switched sides. Less than a year after the war, Russia announced it had bought 12 drones of varying sophistication for $53 million from state defense contractor Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), and in October 2010, the two sides agreed to a $400 million joint venture agreement to produce dozens more. Jamestown Foundation Russia expert Pavel Felgenhauer called the deal “the biggest defense technology transfer deal between Russia and a Western nation since 1945.” Russia is expected to continue to expand its drone arsenal, although its attempts at producing quality drones domestically have been largely fruitless and hardliners in Moscow have strongly resisted the military’s limited foreign purchases. Nonetheless, Russian President Vladimir Putin specifically underlined the development of Russia’s drone capabilities as a priority in a campaign essay ahead of his election in March and has said that Russia intends to spend $13 billion on drones by 2020 as a part of its military modernization. Meanwhile, the fate of the drone deals between Georgia and Israel played a major factor in the quick deterioration of what Caucasus expert Michael Cecire described as a “love affair” turned “messy divorce.” Pre-2008, Israel enjoyed arguably its strongest ties in the region with the pro-Western government of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. Israel sold Georgia 40 drones, anti-aircraft equipment, and trained Georgian infantry through private defense firms. In the run-up to the war, however, Russia put heavy pressure on Israel to cancel its arms deals with Georgia, and publicly implied it would consider selling advanced equipment to Israel’s enemies if it did not give in. Israel acquiesced two days before the start of the conflict, a move that Georgian Minister for Reintegration Temur Yakobashvili, now ambassador to the US, slammed as “a disgrace.” "Israel did it at the Russians' behest. It aided the terrorists, the Russians. It's a disgrace. I don't know what it received in return, I only see that Hezbollah continues to get Russian arms, and plenty of [them],” Yakobashvili told Haaretz at the time. In April 2011, Israeli private defense contractor Elbit Systems, which supplied Georgia’s Hermes-450s and other drones, sued the country for $100 million for allegedly failing to pay for equipment. The two sides later settled the dispute with Georgia paying Elbit $35 million and returning “certain equipment and subsystems.” Furthermore, in emails from private intelligence firm Stratfor leaked by WikiLeaks earlier this year, a Mexican source alleged that the Georgian government believed that Israel had also provided Moscow with the “data link codes” for its Hermes-450 drones, allowing Russian forces to hack them and force them to crash. This came supposedly in return for intelligence on air defense systems Russia had sold Iran. The source, which Stratfor described as close to Mexican defense contractor Hydra Technologies, said Georgian officials were “frantically” looking for drones to replace its Israeli fleet, which they believed had been “compromised.” Several defense industry sources told GlobalPost that it was extremely unlikely Israel would agree to such an intel exchange and doubted the credibility of Stratfor overall. Furthermore, Nick Turse, author of the ebook “Terminator Planet: The First History of Drone Warfare, 2001-2050,” said that there are a number of things that could bring down drones in a conventional warfare scenario, and drones are not particularly difficult to hack even without data link codes. “Even Iraqi insurgents were able to hack drone feeds. So, we’re not talking about sophisticated military technology here,” he said. “In a traditional air war, drones would be decimated by conventional piloted aircraft, and modern air defense systems would make minced meat out of Predator and Reaper [type drones].” Nonetheless, while unveiling what he said were a new line of Georgian-designed-and-produced drones in April, President Saakashvili implied he believed Israel had given Russia the codes. “When you procure from abroad, a seller may not give you a full technology or may share technology [bought] by you to your adversary,” Saakashvili said, as cited by news website Civil.ge. “No one will share this [pointing to the Georgian-made drone] with others.” A month earlier he was quoted as saying it was important Georgia was producing its own drones because “someone may cheat you or share data to others or refuse [to sell weapons] at a decisive moment.” Contrary to Saakashvili’s claims, however, Georgia is still not fully self-sufficient in its drone technology. Shortly after the president presented the drones, military bloggers noted that the supposedly Georgian-designed drones bore a strong resemblance to the Swan, a small drone produced by private Estonian defense contractor ELI. Estonian defense attaché to Georgia Riho Uhtegi confirmed to GlobalPost that the drones were designed by ELI and licensed to Georgia for production. Since the war, Georgia has complained of being under an unofficial arms embargo, even from its Western partners and has publicly demanded weapons systems to replace equipment it lost during the war — specifically drones, air defense and anti-tank weapons. The Estonian drone contract was the biggest arms deal Georgia has made, albeit secretly, since the conflict and Uhtegi said it was necessary for Estonia to gain approval from other NATO member countries before making the sale. Still, drone industry experts also emphasized that the Estonian Swans are a big step down from the medium-sized Israeli Hermes-450. The Swan has limited range and altitude and must be launched by a mobile catapult while only being able to land via parachute. “It’s sort of like comparing a Yugo to a Honda. They’re both cars, they both carry people, but they’re not in the same class,” one expert said. Nonetheless, Irakli Aladashvili, editor-in-chief of the Georgian military journal Arsenali, said that drones continue to be essential for Georgia because they offer the cheapest way for a small country to scout enemy territory. “Drones are the best intelligence devices after satellite surveillance. Obviously, the small countries of the South Caucasus can’t afford to put satellites into space, so [drones] are important,” he said. The first drone war showed that drones can have a major impact on combat, but Turse said they are not necessarily a game-changer on the battlefield. “For the last 100 years or so, there’ve been these wonder weapons that come around that are supposed to revolutionize warfare and give one nation a tremendous advantage — from tanks to machine guns. But whenever wonder weapons appear, countermeasures develop. War always seems to find a way,” he said. However, even if drones do not prove to be crucial in winning conventional wars, Turse says they are likely to help start some new conflicts as international law has been slow to adapt to the new realities and the US has “written the rulebook” on their usage. Those “rules,” he said, include the mentality that violating another country’s territory with a robot isn’t a violation at all. “I think this is embedded in the thinking on this. The US has been violating the sovereignty and airspace of countries for decades now with airplanes and the fact that there are no pilots in these things, the leadership feels like that gives them license to do it, even though there is no fundamental difference between violating it with a piloted plane or a robot plane,” he said. The legality of such actions is even less clear amid territorial disputes, and, the de facto government of South Ossetia announced in September that it was working on measures to shoot down the Georgian drones it frequently spots in what it considers to be its sovereign territory, leading to fears that an escalation similar to 2008 could repeat itself.

#### Causes Russia to nuclear first strike- escalates

Guldseth ‘9 (Adviser in Strategic Communication, Post graduate in "Media, Communication and ICT" Russia's new military doctrine opens for first strike nuclear attacks in "local or regional wars", Eistein Guldseth, 10-14-2009 <http://writern.blogspot.com/2009/10/russia-might-open-for-first-strike.html>)

The Russian newspaper Izvestia reports that Cremlin is working on a new military doctrine on first strike use of nuclear arms against “aggressors”. That must include Georgia according to President Medvedev’s statement after the war in Georgia in 2008: “The aggressor has been punished”. Patrushev: “Nuclear weapons could be used in case of a nuclear attack, but also in 'regional or even local wars.” According to Izvestia, “Russia will insist on the right to pre-emptive nuclear strikes against aggressor countries in its new military doctrine”, the head of the country's Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev, said. A greater threat to Russia's neighboring countries This new doctrine is contrary to US nuclear military policy, which do not allow for first strike attacks. This leads us once more to seriously wonder what’s going on in the Cremlin. Such an aggressive move means a further treat to Russia’s bordering countries and serves no civilized purpose. As we have seen the later period, US’ reset has had no impact on the hawks in Moscow when it comes to serious cooperation on for instance Iran. Judging from this doctrine, one could on the contrary be led to believe that Russia today poses a significant greater danger to civilization than Iran: The combination of Putins restoration of Stalin as "a great leader", Russia claiming a privileged sphere of influence in the former Soviet space, and now the suggested doctrine of first strike use of nuclear arms against local/regional wars and "agressors" should really start to worry all governments in the modern world. Who's the target? Georgia certainly will have to seriously consider it self as a prime target for a nuclear attack from Russia. The latest Russian accusations of Georgia supporting and aiding Al Quaeda operations in Russia is a reminder of the fact that the war is not over. Russia uses all means available to portray Georgia as an aggressor, and thus threatens Georgia with first strike use of nuclear arms if neccessary. Judging by Russia’s willingness to use excessive force in the attack on Georgia in 2008, this represents a real threat to Georgia and also Ukraine, where the situation on the Crimean peninsula is gradually heating up. In fact the whole of North Caucasus might be targeted due to uprise and intensivated terrorist attacs in several regions.

### AT: Say No

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/27/wait\_did\_the\_system\_just\_work

#### This is the only card specific about targeted killing

**Goldsmith ’12** [Jack Goldsmith is a Harvard Law professor and a member of the Hoover Task Force on National Security and Law. He served in the Bush administration as assistant attorney general in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel, “Fire When Ready,” 3-19-12, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/03/19/fire_when_ready?page=full>, March 19, 2012]

When the Obama administration made the decision to kill Awlaki, it did not rely on the president's constitutional authority as commander in chief. Rather, it relied on authority that Congress gave it, and on guidance from the courts. In September 2001, Congress authorized the president "to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines" were responsible for 9/11. Whatever else the term "force" may mean, it clearly includes authorization from Congress to kill enemy soldiers who fall within the statute. Unlike some prior authorizations of force in American history, the 2001 authorization contains no geographical limitation. Moreover, the Supreme Court, in the detention context, has ruled that the "force" authorized by Congress in the 2001 law could be applied against a U.S. citizen. Lower courts have interpreted the same law to include within its scope co-belligerent enemy forces "associated" with al Qaeda who are "engaged in hostilities against the United States." International law is also relevant to targeting decisions. Targeted killings are lawful under the international laws of war only if they comply with basic requirements like distinguishing enemy soldiers from civilians and avoiding excessive collateral damage. And they are consistent with the U.N. Charter's ban on using force "against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state" only if the targeted nation consents or the United States properly acts in self-defense. There are reports that Yemen consented to the strike on Awlaki. But even if it did not, the strike would still have been consistent with the Charter to the extent that Yemen was "unwilling or unable" to suppress the threat he posed. This standard is not settled in international law, but it is sufficiently grounded in law and practice that no American president charged with keeping the country safe could refuse to exercise international self-defense rights when presented with a concrete security threat in this situation. The "unwilling or unable" standard was almost certainly the one the United States relied on in the Osama bin Laden raid inside Pakistan. These legal principles are backed by a system of internal and external checks and balances that, in this context, are without equal in American wartime history. Until a few decades ago, targeting decisions were not subject to meaningful legal scrutiny. Presidents or commanders typically ordered a strike based on effectiveness and, sometimes, moral or political considerations. President Harry Truman, for example, received a great deal of advice about whether and how to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but it didn't come from lawyers advising him on the laws of war. Today, all major military targets are vetted by a bevy of executive branch lawyers who can and do rule out operations and targets on legal grounds, and by commanders who are more sensitive than ever to legal considerations and collateral damage. Decisions to kill high-level terrorists outside of Afghanistan (like Awlaki) are considered and approved by lawyers and policymakers at the highest levels of the government. The lawyers and policymakers are guided in part by Supreme Court and lower court decisions that, in the context of reviewing military detentions, have interpreted the meaning, scope, and limits of the congressional authorization to use force. The executive branch also has tools at its disposal -- an elaborate intelligence bureaucracy, precision weapons, and computer targeting algorithms -- to minimize collateral damage in war like never before (indeed, these tools sometimes force an operation or target to be avoided or aborted). We do not know the full details of targeting decisions, but we do know -- from administration speeches and press coverage of internal deliberations -- that Obama administration policymakers and lawyers seriously grapple with the legal limits of their authorities, construe them narrowly to meet the case at hand, and are constrained in who they target. Congress too is involved. The executive branch only targets enemy forces that fall within the parameters set by Congress in 2001. All major targeting operations conducted as "covert actions" must, under laws in place before 9/11, be conducted in conformity with presidential "findings" and reported to congressional intelligence committees. These committees lack a formal veto, but they have many ways to push back against covert actions they dislike. House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi is said to have scaled back a covert operation in 2004 to influence the outcome of elections in Iraq by complaining to the White House, while the House Intelligence Committee reportedly persuaded the Obama administration not to arm the Libyan rebels in 2011. Operations by the U.S. military are also reported to and scrutinized by congressional armed services committees through less formal means. More broadly, Congress as a whole is well aware of the president's targeted killing program, and many congressional committees have held public hearings on targeted killing in the last few years. And yet, in contrast to its actions to tighten the president's traditional military authorities in other contexts (like interrogation, military detention, and military commissions), Congress has not tightened the president's power to target. Instead, Congress chose to reaffirm the 2001 authorization on which the president has rested his targeting practices in December 2011, and to bless the judicial construction of the statute that extended the president's authorities to co-belligerents like Awlaki, all without a word about limitations on targeted killing. Congress did this against the backdrop of many public reports that the 2001 statute was relied on to kill Awlaki. The targeted killing of Awlaki was also subject to a limited but important form of judicial scrutiny. In 2010, the ACLU and the Center for Constitutional Rights brought a novel lawsuit that sought to enjoin the president from killing Awlaki. Judge John Bates of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the case, in part because of "the impropriety of judicial review." Bates explained that the Constitution places "responsibility for the military decisions at issue in this case 'in the hands of those who are best positioned and most politically accountable for making them'" -- Congress and the president. This ruling, based on extensive precedent, is almost certainly right. Commanders in chief have always had discretion over targeting decisions in wars authorized by Congress. No court has ever suggested that judicial approval for these decisions was appropriate or necessary. This is so even though the U.S. military killed U.S. citizens in the Civil War and most likely in World War II as well, when some fought in the Italian and German armies. The Supreme Court itself has ruled -- in the context of military commissions and military detention -- that U.S. citizenship does not by itself preclude the commander in chief from exercising traditional forms of military force. This is the background against which to assess Attorney General Holder's claim that the Constitution "guarantees due process, not judicial process." Holder was referring to the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on taking life without due process, a further legal limitation on the targeted killing of U.S. citizens. Critics belittled Holder for distinguishing due process from judicial process, but Holder is right. The Supreme Court has ruled in many contexts that due process does not always demand judicial scrutiny. It has also ruled that the type and extent of process due depends on the nature and circumstances of the deprivation, including a balance between the interests of the individual and the government. A U.S. citizen's interest is obviously at its height when he is targeted with lethal force. The government's interest is at its height when it seeks to incapacitate a threatening enemy in a congressionally sanctioned war. Holder only defended the wartime authority to kill a U.S. citizen who presents "an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States" and for whom "capture is not feasible," and only when operations are "conducted in a manner consistent with applicable law of war principles." In these circumstances, he claimed, high-level executive deliberation, guided by judicial precedent and subject to congressional oversight, is all the process that is due. Is Holder right? It is hard to say for sure because the due process clause has never before been thought relevant to wartime presidential targeting decisions. The system described above goes far beyond any process given to any target in any war in American history. Awlaki was not given a formal notice and opportunity to defend himself in court, but war does not permit such formal practices. One predicate for the killing was that Awlaki was in hiding -- beyond legal process or the reasonable possibility of capture -- and plotting and directing attacks on the United States. The U.S. government made clear that if Awlaki "were to surrender or otherwise present himself to the proper authorities in a peaceful and appropriate manner, legal principles with which the United States has traditionally and uniformly complied would prohibit using lethal force or other violence against him in such circumstances." And as Judge Bates noted, while Awlaki's placement on a targeting list was publicly disclosed in January 2010, Awlaki publicly disclaimed any intention of challenging his status or turning himself in. It is hard to see how the executive branch could have taken its constitutional responsibilities more seriously while honoring its obligation to keep the nation safe. In light of Judge Bates's ruling and the analysis on which it rests, and until Congress thinks the president's approach to targeting requires change, the current system -- executive deliberation guided by judicial precedent and subject to congressional oversight -- almost certainly satisfies any constitutional requirement. In any event, it belies the claim that the president is not subject to checks and balances. This conclusion will not assuage critics like Andrew Rosenthal who insist that "the president must receive judicial input before ordering the death of an American citizen." What Rosenthal and other krytocrats have not explained is how the Constitution permits, much less demands, such ex ante judicial input. These critics have not grappled with Judge Bates's analysis. Nor have they explained how a presidential request for judicial approval to target and kill a terrorist suspect is consistent with the constitutional limitation of judicial power to cases and controversies between parties in court. It is also unclear whether judges possess the competence to assess and quickly act upon military targets, or whether they would welcome the responsibility for targeting decisions. Perhaps Congress could devise a lawful and effective scheme of judicial or administrative review of the president's targeting decisions. But it has shown no inclination to do so, and it appears to support the current arrangement.

### Case

#### Sharif failure causes laundry list of impacts- including collapse of Indo-Pak and US relations

BBC ’13 (BBC, “Viewpoints: The impact of elections in Pakistan”, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-22476174>, May 13, 2013)

Nawaz Sharif appears on course to lead Pakistan's government. Experts look at how the result will affect US-Pakistani relations. The Pakistani people spoke on 11 May. What they resoundingly said was they are more comfortable with status quo in politics than revolution. As a result, the Punjab-based Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) will lead the next government and party leader Nawaz Sharif is slated to become Prime Minister for a third time. There are three positive implications of a Sharif-led government for the United States and its primary interest in Pakistan, which is to ensure the country's political and economic instability do not impede American efforts associated with the war in Afghanistan and the fight against Al Qaeda. First, PML-N's strong parliamentary representation ensures that the United States has to worry less about the government in Pakistan collapsing from a vote of no confidence. Second, Mr Sharif brings with him the backing of the Saudi royal family, which has closely engaged the Sharif clan during its periods of governance and exile. This helps the US by potentially stabilizing Pakistan's economy and removing some burden of responsibility from the US as it makes plans to decrease its own aid to Pakistan. Third, Mr Sharif is a businessman who supports the free market. This complements the vision of regional co-operation and collaboration the United States is trying to push in South Asia as it prepares its departure from Afghanistan. However, mutual interests do not automatically translate into partnership. This is where the hard work begins for policymakers on both sides, but at least they have some positive ground to stand on despite the flimsy foundations of the overall relationship. Fast-forward 14 years. Mr Sharif is poised to return to power following Saturday's election. As he forms his government and seeks to achieve what he failed to do in two previous tries - finish his term in office - a number of questions loom that will shape US-Pakistani relations over the next few years. Can Mr Sharif work with the Pakistani military? Under the current army chief, Gen Ashfaq Kayani, the military has stepped back from politics, at least in the open. Gen Kayani retires later this year. The choice of his successor and how they work together will say a lot about whether Mr Sharif's third term will be charmed or turbulent. What can he do with India? During Mr Sharif's prior tenure, he showed a willingness to engage India and increase trade, a key to constructing a stable if not normal relationship. The military remains obsessed with India, but any political progress Mr Sharif can manage will be an important counterbalance. While Mr Sharif is cordial with American leaders, the US will want him to answer the same question posed to Mr Musharraf in 2001: Are you with us or against us? The US will watch what Mr Sharif does about extremists who threatened the election and Pakistan's overall security, about the not-so-secret US drone campaign that the military tolerates and the Pakistani people despise, and whether he will plays a constructive role in a political resolution in Afghanistan. The answers will say a lot about whether US-Pakistani relations under Mr Sharif will resemble a genuine partnership, a business relationship or a failed marriage. Despite disarray at home and obstacles to regional integration, Mr Sharif has the opportunity to make Pakistan a safe, pluralistic and prosperous trading hub and shun the path of becoming Asia's second North Korea. But before he can rewrite Pakistan's foreign policy, Mr Sharif will have to push back the military and unite his fractured country. Mr Sharif's party has won without a national mandate, causing many in the smaller provinces to call his victory the tyranny of the majority. Most Pakistanis agree on two major threats - terrorism and a plunging economy. A free market entrepreneur, Mr Sharif is known for reducing regulations, building infrastructure and encouraging foreign investment. Yet without nation-wide security build on diplomacy and the use of force against the Pakistani Taliban and secessionists, Mr Sharif will fail. Peace with strength will require unity of effort between Mr Sharif and his generals, which is in short supply. Moreover, Mr Sharif's heated rhetoric against US drone strikes has galvanized most Pakistanis against the US-funded Pakistani military. Even if Mr Sharif unites the country and reins in the generals, he will have to fight and cajole insurgents, giving the Pakistani military the one thing it desperately needs: public support. Hoping that jihadi and secessionist insurgents will disappear once the United States leaves Afghanistan is a fool's paradise. Washington should closely watch Mr Sharif's attempts at uniting and securing his country. Any hope of increasing US civilian and military aid should depend on concrete steps by Pakistan to facilitate American withdrawal from Afghanistan and, more importantly, become a regional conduit of commerce and not a hotbed of nuclear-protected terrorism. Nawaz Sharif's victory will pose new challenges for the United States. The centre-right leader has little affection for Washington or its post-9/11 counter-terror campaign in South Asia. And unless Sharif and Pakistan's army can quickly move past old vendettas to forge a stable working relationship, US officials will find it tricky to navigate between Mr Sharif and the generals. That will complicate already sensitive dealings on issues like drones and reconciliation talks with the Afghan Taliban. But the story is not entirely gloomy. Mr Sharif's pro-business rhetoric is music to many American ears. If the PML-N government follows through on campaign promises and delivers a few quick and convincing policy reforms on taxes, power or infrastructure, it would translate into more jobs, profits and government revenues. These are all essential components of national stability. Good governance will not be brought to Pakistan overnight, yet US officials would welcome even modest improvements after years of dysfunction in a country of nearly 200 million people that frequently ranks near the top of global "failing state" indexes. The other appealing component of Mr Sharif's message has to do with India. Islamabad and New Delhi have been inching forward on a trade deal that Sharif can reasonably be expected to push over the goal line. Normalised relations between South Asia's two nuclear-armed states would help US officials sleep more soundly at night. Thus, Washington and Islamabad will have their differences, but Sharif's core agenda - economic reform and improved ties with India - is one the United States should cheer.

#### Indo-Pak relations key to Asian stability

Asia News ’13 (Asia News, “Improved Pakistan-India relations key to regional stability: US”, <http://www.asianews.co/improved-pakistan-india-relations-key-to-regional-stability-us/>, September 17, 2013)

Improvement in Pakistan-India relations is key to South Asian stability and Washington would support any initiative towards that goal, U.S. Special Representative James Dobbins said ahead of an expected meeting in New York between the prime ministers of the two neighboring countries. “On India and Pakistan relations, we would support any initiatives which led to an improvement in those relations. We think it’s important for both countries, it’s important for the stability of the broader region, it’s important for the world”, Dobbins said at Washington’s Foreign Press Center.

#### Asia war goes nuclear

Landay 2k (Jonathan S. Landay, National Security and Intelligence Correspondent, “Top Administration Officials Warn Stakes for U.S. Are High in Asian Conflicts”, Knight Ridder/Tribune News Service, March 10, p. Lexis, 200)

Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy and even start a nuclear war. India, Pakistan and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe. “Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile,” said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. “We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster.” In an effort to cool the region’s tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger all will hopscotch Asia’s capitals this month. For America, the stakes could hardly be higher. There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and the United States would instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea attacked South Korea. While Washington has no defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a conflict between the two could end the global taboo against using nuclear weapons and demolish the already shaky international nonproliferation regime. In addition, globalization has made a stable Asia \_ with its massive markets, cheap labor, exports and resources \_ indispensable to the U.S. economy. Numerous U.S. firms and millions of American jobs depend on trade with Asia that totaled $600 billion last year, according to the Commerce Department.

## T

### 2AC- T

#### We Meet

Chesney ’11 (Bobby Chesney is the Charles I. Francis Professor in Law at the University of Texas School of Law, as well as a non-resident Senior Fellow of the Brookings Institution, “Offensive Cyberspace Operations, the NDAA, and the Title 10-Title 50 Debate”, <http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/12/cyberoperations/>, December 14, 2011)

B. Requirement of Presidential Authorization

Substantive conditions aren’t the only way to limit how an authority can be used. Procedural constraints, such as requiring the affirmative approval of senior officials, can contribute to this end as well. We see this in the context of “covert action” under Title 50, for example, in the requirement of a presidential finding approving such actions.

#### C/I --- Restriction is limitation, NOT prohibition

CAC 12,COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ALTERNATIVE MEDICINAL CANNABIS COLLECTIVE et al., Defendants and Appellants, DIVISION ONE, 207 Cal. App. 4th 601; 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d 716; 2012 Cal. App. LEXIS 772

We disagree with County that in using the phrases “further restrict the location or establishment” and “regulate the location or establishment” in [\*615] section 11362.768, subdivisions (f) and (g), the Legislature intended to authorize local governments to ban all medical marijuana dispensaries that are otherwise “authorized by law to possess, cultivate, or distribute medical marijuana” (§ 11362.768, subd. (e) [stating scope of section's application]); the Legislature did not use the words “ban” or “prohibit.” Yet County cites dictionary definitions of “regulate” (to govern or direct according to rule or law); “regulation” (controlling by rule or restriction; a rule or order that has legal force); “restriction” (a limitation or qualification, including on the use of property); “establishment” (the act of establishing or state or condition of being established); “ban” (to prohibit); and “prohibit” (to forbid by law; to prevent or hinder) to attempt to support its interpretation. County then concludes that “the ordinary meaning [\*\*\*23] of the terms, ‘restriction,’ ‘regulate,’ and ‘regulation’ are consistent with a ban or prohibition against the opening or starting up or continued operation of [a medical marijuana dispensary] storefront business.” We disagree.¶CA(9)(9) The ordinary meanings of “restrict” and “regulate” suggest a degree of control or restriction falling short of “banning,” “prohibiting,” “forbidding,” or “preventing.” Had the Legislature intended to include an outright ban or prohibition among the local regulatory powers authorized in section 11362.768, subdivisions (f) and (g), it would have said so. Attributing the usual and ordinary meanings to the words used in section 11362.768, subdivisions (f) and (g), construing the words in context, attempting to harmonize subdivisions (f) and (g) with section 11362.775 and with the purpose of California's medical marijuana [\*\*727] statutory program, and bearing in mind the intent of the electorate and the Legislature in enacting the CUA and the MMP, we conclude that HN21Go to this Headnote in the case.the phrases “further restrict the location or establishment” and “regulate the location or establishment” in section 11362.768, subdivisions (f) and (g) do not authorize a per se ban at the local level. The Legislature [\*\*\*24] decided in section 11362.775 to insulate medical marijuana collectives and cooperatives from nuisance prosecution “solely on the basis” that they engage in a dispensary function. To interpret the phrases “further restrict the location or establishment” and “regulate the location or establishment” to mean that local governments may impose a blanket nuisance prohibition against dispensaries would frustrate both the Legislature's intent to “[e]nhance the access of patients and caregivers to medical marijuana through collective, cooperative cultivation projects” and “[p]romote uniform and consistent application of the [CUA] among the counties within the state” and the electorate's intent to “ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right to obtain and use marijuana for medical purposes” and “encourage the federal and state governments to implement a plan to provide for the safe and affordable distribution of marijuana to all patients in medical need of marijuana.”

#### Authority is what the president may do not what the president can do

Ellen Taylor 96, 21 Del. J. Corp. L. 870 (1996), Hein Online

The term authority is commonly thought of in the context of the law of agency, and the Restatement (Second) of Agency defines both power and authority.'89 Power refers to an agent's ability or capacity to produce a change in a legal relation (whether or not the principal approves of the change), and authority refers to the power given (permission granted) to the agent by the principal to affect the legal relations of the principal; the distinction is between what the agent can do and what the agent may do.

#### C/I – Increase doesn’t require pre-existence

StephenReinhardt 5, U.S. Judge for the UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, JASON RAY REYNOLDS; MATTHEW RAUSCH, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HARTFORD FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC.; HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants-Appellees., lexis

Specifically, we must decide whether charging a higher price for initial insurance than the insured would otherwise have been charged because of information in a consumer credit report constitutes an "increase in any charge" within the meaning of FCRA. First, we examine the definitions of "increase" and "charge." Hartford Fire contends that, limited to their ordinary definitions, these words apply only when a consumer has previously been charged for insurance and that charge has thereafter been increased by the insurer. The phrase, "has previously been charged," as used by Hartford, refers not only to a rate that the consumer has previously paid for insurance but also to a rate that the consumer has previously been quoted, even if that rate was increased [\*\*23] before the consumer made any payment. Reynolds disagrees, asserting that, under [\*1091] the ordinary definition of the term, an increase in a charge also occurs whenever an insurer charges a higher rate than it would otherwise have charged because of any factor--such as adverse credit information, age, or driving record 8 --regardless of whether the customer was previously charged some other rate. According to Reynolds, he was charged an increased rate because of his credit rating when he was compelled to pay a rate higher than the premium rate because he failed to obtain a high insurance score. Thus, he argues, the definitions of "increase" and "charge" encompass the insurance companies' practice. Reynolds is correct. “Increase" means to make something greater. See, e.g., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) ("The action, process, or fact of becoming or making greater; augmentation, growth, enlargement, extension."); WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH (3d college ed. 1988) (defining "increase" as "growth, enlargement, etc[.]"). "Charge" means the price demanded for goods or services. See, e.g., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) ("The price required or demanded for service rendered, or (less usually) for goods supplied."); WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH (3d college ed. 1988) ("The cost or price of an article, service, etc."). Nothing in the definition of these words implies that the term "increase in any charge for" should be limited to cases in which a company raises the rate that an individual has previously been charged.

#### Substantial prove interp

Justice O’Connor ‘02 Sandra Day, No. 00—1089 TOYOTA MOTOR MANUFACTURING, KENTUCKY,

INC., PETITIONER v. ELLA WILLIAMS, Jan 8, http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/00-1089.ZO.html

We therefore hold that to be substantially limited in performing manual tasks, an individual must have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most people's daily lives. The impairment's impact must also be permanent or long-term. See 29 CFR §§1630.2(j)(2)(ii)-(iii) (2001).

## K

### 2AC- Jabri

#### Jabri votes affirmative- the 1AC is a better criticism of the role of drones in a broader frame and Jabri concludes liberal state good and that the War on Terror violates it

Vivienne Jabri 6, Director of the Centre for International Relations and Senior Lecturer at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, War, Security and the Liberal State, Security Dialogue, 37;47

Conclusion

The boundary shifts. It is no longer associated with the legal boundaries of the state, but is inscribed upon the body of the other. The experience of late modernity is one that at once invokes ‘humanity’ and the ‘inhuman’ (Hardt & Negri, 2004). The differentiation of the experience of late modernity and the totalizing set of practices that it enables is the phenomenological basis of the matrix of war. The operations of power, disciplinary and biopolitical, produce subject positions that are differentially located in relation to the politics of life and the politics of death. The matrix of war invokes life as the ultimate purpose of its operations. The effect is the production of subjects that are at once individuals and entire populations, so that the individual deemed enemy is at once carrier of a subject population deemed other. The discourses that emerged in the aftermath of the events of 11 September 2001 were not merely security discourses, but discourses of war. To under- stand the present requires more than a description of the bureaucratic procedures undertaken at various levels of domestic and transnational inter- action, practices aimed at immigration controls, measures of surveillance, and so on and so forth. It is indeed crucial to highlight such practices, to provide a picture of their minute workings in governmentality. However, it is also crucial from a critical standpoint to locate such practices within a wider frame of significance, and this wider frame of significance is precisely the framework that enables us to see the workings of discretionary power and its associated practices, from the most blatant act of war to the most invisible procedure enacted in some office beyond our gaze. Such a frame- work enables us to see that practices that constitute the matrix of war are intricately related to the production of different forms of subject and are hence differently experienced. The experience of the matrix of war comes to be dependent on the location of the subject of politics, a location that is not necessarily defined in geo- political space, but in societal and governmentalizing terms, between the subject of a biopolitics of the present and its constitutive other. The subject may be defined in terms of geopolitical space as well as class, gender and culture, all of which intersect as sites that are called forth into relations of power and come to constitute the subjectivities of the present (Jabri, 2004). However, the subject positions produced, or generated, in the matrix of war are in themselves ever-shifting, so that today’s friends may indeed be tomorrow’s enemies, the ever-elastic position that comes into form not just at the boundaries of the state, but on the streets, in the cities, in schools, in tenement blocs, in other countries and in detention camps in the midst of what otherwise are known as liberal democratic spaces. The ‘elasticity of the enemy’ as subject position is nevertheless in today’s global arena, in today’s Europe, bound up with the politics of difference, and specifically cultural difference. The precise nature of the relationship varies between contexts and is a matter for empirical investigation. What is clear is that while counter-terrorist measures, such as the UK’s Terrorism Act 2000, proscribe particular organizations and hence possess a degree of specificity, that such measures encompass the element of ‘prevention’ suggests a wider frame of reference, a frame that, in police operations, in institutional dis- course and in public arenas, comes to constitute the culturally marked other as the source of danger. Furthermore, when migrants are constituted as enemies, indeed are treated as such, they are by and large those racially and culturally identified as other. Racism as state practice has reached the remit of the functionary, just as those discretionary decisions beyond the law are, now openly and blatantly, informed by a racist discourse that targets the corporeal being of the other, whether through a 21st century form of colo- nization, as in Iraq, or in the detention camps that contain Europe’s refugees. As Michel Foucault (2003: 61) writes in relation to the gradual shift from the 17th century to his present (and by implication ours), the ‘discourse of race struggle’ is not a battle between races, ‘but by a race that is portrayed as the one true race, the race that holds power and is entitled to define the norm, and against those who deviate from that norm’. These are prescient words and remind us of the dangers that the liberal democratic polity faces when it instantiates and institutionalizes practices that target the cultural and racial other. The implication is the reduction of the citizen to what Giorgio Agamben (1995) refers to as ‘bare life’, a life devoid of rights, of history, of the capacity to speak. When the discourses and practices of war dominate the social sphere, when the construct of enemy is directed at particular individuals for their identification with and/or membership of particular communities, when the very corporeal presence of the other is perceived as threat, the very idea of equal citizenship before the law is banished; identification becomes, once again in the history of Europe and the United States, colour-bound. To understand the present without an appreciation of the significance of cultural and racial difference and how such difference becomes the focus of practices as diverse as anti-terrorist legislation and the invasion of Iraq and the nature of its occupation would be not just unresponsive to the lived experience of those targeted, but would defy the critical moment that reveals the workings of power upon the very corporeality of the other targeted, and hence the matrix of war as analyser. The violations of rights, occurring in the context of the war against terrorism, are not just apparent against particular individuals detained under counter-terrorist measures, but have a com- munal location. This is evidenced by increasingly intrusive surveillance measures targeted at the Islamic community. In a powerful statement against the newly instituted ‘control orders’ in the UK, Gareth Peirce states: We remember the requirement imposed upon hundreds of Americans by McCarthy to provide information on demand. . . . Naming names will be the order of the day here in just the same way; the individual will be branded, and then, on pain of imprisonment, be required to brand others. Anyone from the Muslim community in Britain, or who has any knowledge of their experience, will have heard the terrified reports, in particular of those who have no safe immigration status, of being repeatedly approached – outside their homes, in supermarkets, with their children – by intelligence agents to provide ‘information’ in exchange for regularisation of their immigration status or face the consequences if they refuse.14 The paradoxes are all too apparent for the liberal state. In the practices that now encompass the so-called war against terrorism, we see the bases for the undermining of liberal democracy’s self-understanding as a location of rights historically achieved. While terrorist violence precisely seeks indis- criminate injury, and through this the violation of societies as wide apart as those of London and Baghdad, the measures undertaken in response are in themselves violations of what constitutes democratic space and the government of individuals and communities.

#### The alt fails and threats should be evaluated in specific context to reduce likelihood of conflict – the alt will result in escalation of violence

Weaver 2k (Ole, International relations theory and the politics of European integration, pages 284-285)

The other main possibility is to stress' responsibility. Particularly in a field like security one has to make choices and deal with the challenges and risks that one confronts – and not shy away into long-range or principled trans-formations. The meta political line risks (despite the theoretical commitment to the concrete other) implying that politics can be contained within large 'systemic questions. In line with he classical revolutionary tradition, after the change (now no longer the revolution but the meta-physical trans-formation), there will be no more problems whereas in our situation (until the change) we should not deal with the 'small questions' of politics, only with the large one (cf. Rorty 1996). However, the ethical demand in post-structuralism (e.g. Derrida's 'justice') is of a kind that can never be instantiated in any concrete political order – It is an experience of the undecidable that exceeds any concrete solution and reinserts politics. Therefore, politics can never be reduced to meta-questions there is no way to erase the small, particular, banal conflicts and controversies. In contrast to the quasi-institutionalist formula of radical democracy which one finds in the 'opening' oriented version of deconstruction, we could with Derrida stress the singularity of the event. To take a position, take part, and 'produce events' (Derrida 1994: 89) means to get involved in specific struggles. Politics takes place 'in the singular event of engagement' (Derrida 1996: 83). Derrida's politics is focused on the calls that demand response/responsibility contained in words like justice, Europe and emancipation. Should we treat security in this manner? No, security is not that kind of call. 'Security' is not a way to open (or keep open) an ethical horizon. Security is a much more situational concept oriented to the handling of specifics. It belongs to the sphere of how to handle challenges – and avoid 'the worst' (Derrida 1991). Here enters again the possible pessimism which for the security analyst might be occupational or structural. The infinitude of responsibility (Derrida 1996: 86) or the tragic nature of politics (Morgenthau 1946, Chapter 7) means that one can never feel reassured that by some 'good deed', 'I have assumed my responsibilities ' (Derrida 1996: 86). If I conduct myself particularly well with regard to someone, I know that it is to the detriment of an other; of one nation to the detriment of my friends to the detriment of other friends or non-friends, etc. This is the infinitude that inscribes itself within responsibility; otherwise there would he no ethical problems or decisions. (ibid.; and parallel argumentation in Morgenthau 1946; Chapters 6 and 7) Because of this there will remain conflicts and risks - and the question of how to handle them. Should developments be securitized (and if so, in what terms)? Often, our reply will be to aim for de-securitization and then politics meet meta-politics; but occasionally the underlying pessimism regarding the prospects for orderliness and compatibility among human aspirations will point to scenarios sufficiently worrisome that responsibility will entail securitization in order to block the worst. As a security/securitization analyst, this means accepting the task of trying to manage and avoid spirals and accelerating security concerns, to try to assist in shaping the continent in a way that creates the least insecurity and violence - even if this occasionally means invoking/producing `structures' or even using the dubious instrument of securitization. In the case of the current European configuration, the above analysis suggests the use of securitization at the level of European scenarios with the aim of preempting and avoiding numerous instances of local securitization that could lead to security dilemmas and escalations, violence and mutual vilification.

#### Expertise inevitable and good on national security- the alt fails

Cole ’12 (David Cole, Professor Of Law at Georgetown, “Confronting the Wizard of Oz: National Security,

Expertise, and Secrecy” 44 Conn. L. Rev. 1617-1625 (2012), <http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1085>, 2012)

Rana is right to focus our attention on the assumptions that frame modern Americans’ conceptions about national security, but his assessment raises three initial questions. First, it seems far from clear that there ever was a “golden” era in which national security decisions were made by the common man, or “the people themselves,” as Larry Kramer might put it.8 Rana argues that neither Hobbes nor Locke would support a worldview in which certain individuals are vested with superior access to the truth, and that faith in the superior abilities of so-called “experts” is a phenomenon of the New Deal era.9 While an increased faith in scientific solutions to social problems may be a contributing factor in our current overreliance on experts,10 I doubt that national security matters were ever truly a matter of widespread democratic deliberation. Rana notes that in the early days of the republic, every able-bodied man had to serve in the militia, whereas today only a small (and largely disadvantaged) portion of society serves in the military.11 But serving in the militia and making decisions about national security are two different matters. The early days of the Republic were at least as dominated by “elites” as today. Rana points to no evidence that decisions about foreign affairs were any more democratic then than now. And, of course, the nation as a whole was far less democratic, as the majority of its inhabitants could not vote at all.12 Rather than moving away from a golden age of democratic decision-making, it seems more likely that we have simply replaced one group of elites (the aristocracy) with another (the experts). Second, to the extent that there has been an epistemological shift with respect to national security, it seems likely that it is at least in some measure a response to objective conditions, not just an ideological development. If so, it’s not clear that we can solve the problem merely by “thinking differently” about national security. The world has, in fact, become more interconnected and dangerous than it was when the Constitution was drafted. At our founding, the oceans were a significant buffer against attacks, weapons were primitive, and travel over long distances was extremely arduous and costly. The attacks of September 11, 2001, or anything like them, would have been inconceivable in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries. Small groups of non-state actors can now inflict the kinds of attacks that once were the exclusive province of states. But because such actors do not have the governance responsibilities that states have, they are less susceptible to deterrence. The Internet makes information about dangerous weapons and civil vulnerabilities far more readily available, airplane travel dramatically increases the potential range of a hostile actor, and it is not impossible that terrorists could obtain and use nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.13 The knowledge necessary to monitor nuclear weapons, respond to cyber warfare, develop technological defenses to technological threats, and gather intelligence is increasingly specialized. The problem is not just how we think about security threats; it is also at least in part objectively based.

## Politics

### Iran

#### Sanctions will pass now- its veto-proof

Koring, 1-15 -- Globe and Mail (Canada) International Affairs and Security Correspondent

[Paul, "Showdown on Iran looms in U.S. Senate; Hawks are circling over Capitol Hill and Obama's bargain with Tehran is further imperilled by members of his own party", The Globe and Mail (Canada), PAS) Accessed on LexisNexis 1-16-14]

Rapprochement with Iran - the United States' most unpredictable enemy since the mullahs toppled the Shah more than three decades ago - might eventually emerge as President Barack Obama's most significant foreign-policy achievement.¶ Ending the enmity, if not quite deserving of the Nobel Peace Prize the President has already pocketed, would avert the risk of a nuclear-weapons race in the region. The pact to expose Tehran's nuclear program to international inspection is only a first step.¶ But hawks are circling over Capitol Hill and Mr. Obama's bargain with Tehran is imperilled, not just by doubters like Benjamin Netanyahu in Jerusalem and John Baird in Ottawa who claim Iran's leaders can't be trusted, but more importantly, by defecting Democrats.¶ **Nearly two dozen** Democrat senators have joined Republicans in backing a bill that would slap new sanctions on Iran. Mr. Obama has vowed to veto any new sanctions. But a showdown looms. In a rare show of bipartisanship, the pro-sanctions group is nearing the magic number of 67 - sufficient to provide the **veto-overriding** two-thirds majority in the 100-seat Senate that could doom the deal under which Tehran has agreed to stop enriching uranium to anywhere close to weapons-grade.¶ President Obama's domestic problems with his Congressional flank were made worse Tuesday by some internal politicking in Iran.¶ Iran's President Hassan Rouhani boasted United States had capitulated to Tehran in the deal, saying on Twitter that "world powers surrendered to Iranian nation's will." That may please hard-liners at home but is certain to inflame them in the United States. The White House sought to dampen the impact, saying Mr. Rouhani was playing to a domestic audience. "It doesn't matter what they say. It matters what they do," said Mr. Obama's spokesman, Jay Carney.

#### Healthcare thumps the link- democrats abandoning Obama, guarantees sanctions now. PC is not high enough to outweigh the Israel lobby

Finkel 1-15-- editor of Against the Current

[David “Will the Iran deal hold?” <http://internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article3239>, DOA: 1-17-14]

A politically weakened U.S. president is pulled by a powerful domestic lobby and influential foreign governments toward launching a war that U.S. imperialism right now doesn’t want, that the world doesn’t want, and that the large majority of the American public doesn’t want — what will be the outcome? It’s an interesting, if dangerous and scary, test of how U.S. politics actually work. The initial results, at least, are in: The unleashed fury of the Israeli government and the “pro-Israel” lobby, the monarchy of Saudi Arabia, the neoconservative warmongers and the much-feared religious right weren’t able to block the Obama administration and European partners from reaching a six-month interim agreement with Iran over that country’s nuclear enrichment program. Any socialist, progressive or sane person must welcome this agreement. That’s not because it resolves the proliferation of nuclear weapons, or changes the hideous character of the Iranian regime in relation to its own population, or addresses the multiple underlying issues of the Middle East crisis — it does none of these things — but because it pushes back the imminent danger of a really catastrophic war. That’s one strike against the widely held theory that the toxic influence of the Israel Lobby can drag the United States into wars that this country‘s ruling class disapproves. The political fight, of course, is hardly over. We’ll explore the underlying reasons for the Israeli and Saudi sound and fury over the deal with Iran, which in fact have little to do with the rather distant specter of an Iranian atomic bomb. But we need to note the U.S. political context in which the fight will play out. If anything, this might have been expected to strengthen the hand of the “war party.” A Wounded Presidency The spectacular disaster of the Afford­able Care Act website is a self-inflicted wound from which the Obama administration will not easily, or perhaps ever, fully recover. Certainly all of us who support single-payer health insurance realized that the fantastically tangled system of “Obamacare” would ultimately fail, due to its scheme for subsidizing the parasitical private insurance industry, but no one could have expected such an immediate display of arrogant incompetence in the “rollout.” The Republican Party has regained big chunks of the ground

lost during its own government shutdown fiasco. It’s true that Congress’s approval ratings remain even deeper in the toilet than the President’s, but that fact affects both capitalist parties — and now, Congressional Democrats who stood united against repealing “Obamacare,” because that would have represented the effective end of the Obama presidency and virtual suicide for the party, are angry, alienated and afraid to be near him. Whatever political capital the President had for immigration reform, seriously raising the minimum wage, protecting food stamps from savage cuts, or much of anything else including the climate change crisis, has been dissipated. The Democrats’ chances of regaining the House of Representatives in the November 2014 midterm election, marginal to begin with, are now much less than those of losing the Senate as well. In these circumstances, this might be considered a favorable moment for the power of the Israel Lobby, Saudi Arabia and rightwing militarists to derail the Obama administration’s deal with Iran. In fact, France made a last-minute move to block the first version of the interim agreement — right after Saudi Arabia signed off on a huge purchase of French weapons (a point worth noting in case anyone thought it’s only the USA that has a military-industrial complex). The President’s **loss of control over his own party** is such that many prominent Democratic Senators have taken to the airwaves loudly denouncing his “appeasement” of the Iranians and abandonment of Israel in its hour of existential peril.

### Politics 2AC

#### Reid is blocking proves that capital is irrelevant and it won’t come up for a vote now

Los Angeles Times 1/26/14 ("Harry Reid Earns An Assist on Iran")

But the bill's authors were willing to live with the risk. They aren't happy with the terms Obama agreed to with Iran, and they say their aim is to strengthen the president's hand. It's hard, however, to see the proposal as anything but a direct rebuke to Obama over his conduct of foreign policy.¶ Initially, the bill had impressive momentum, with 16 Democrats joining 43 Republicans in support. Its backers predicted that they would soon have more than 60 votes, the number needed to move a bill forward in the Senate.¶ But then Reid planted his feet. He controls the Senate calendar, and he let senators know that he saw no need to act on the sanctions bill soon. "At this stage, I think we're where we should be," Reid blandly told reporters.

#### Your evidence says that Obama would veto any legislation – takes out any risk of the DA

Merry 1/1Robert W., political editor of the National Interest, is the author of books on American history and foreign policy “Obama may buck the Israel lobby on Iran” Washington Times, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/dec/31/merry-obama-may-buck-the-israel-lobby-on-iran/

Presidential press secretary [Jay Carney](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/jay-carney/) uttered 10 words the other day that represent a major presidential challenge to the American [Israel](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/israel/) lobby and its friends on Capitol Hill. Referring to [Senate](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/senate/) legislation designed to force President Obama to expand economic sanctions on [Iran](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/iran/) under conditions the president opposes, [Mr. Carney](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/jay-carney/) said: “If it were to pass, the president would veto it.”

### 2AC – Politics

#### Obama uses the plan to shift blame- solves losers lose

Wehner ’13 (Peter Wehner, “Barack Obama’s Staggering Incompetence”, <http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2013/09/02/barack-obamas-staggering-incompetence/>, September 2, 2013)

It’s reported that President Obama was ready to order a military strike against Syria, with or without Congress’s blessing, but “on Friday night, he suddenly changed his mind.” According to the Huffington Post: Senior administration officials describing Obama’s about-face Saturday offered a portrait of a president who began to wrestle with his own decision – at first internally, then confiding his views to his chief of staff, and finally summoning his aides for an evening session in the Oval Office to say he’d had a change of heart. In light of all this, it’s worth posing a few questions: 1. Why didn’t the president seek congressional authority before the administration began to beat the war drums this past week? Did the idea not occur to him? It’s not as if this is an obscure issue. When you’re in the White House and preparing to launch military force against a sovereign nation, whether or not to seek the approval of Congress is usually somewhere near the top of the to-do list. And why has the urgency to act that we saw from the administration during the last week–when Assad’s use of chemical weapons was referred to by the secretary of state as a “moral obscenity”–given way to an air of casualness, with Obama not even calling Congress back into session to debate his military strike against Syria? 2. The president didn’t seek congressional approval for his military strike in Libya. Why does he believe he needs it in Syria? 3. Mr. Obama, in his Rose Garden statement on Saturday, still insisted he has the authority to strike Syria without congressional approval. So what happens if Congress votes down a use-of-force resolution? Does the president strike Syria anyway? If so, will it be an evanescent bombing, intended to be limited in scope and duration, while doing nothing to change the war’s balance of power? Or does the president completely back down? Does he even know? Has he thought through in advance anything related to Syria? Or is this a case of Obama simply making it up as he goes along? This latest volte-face by the president is evidence of a man who is completely overmatched by events, weak and confused, and deeply ambivalent about using force. Yet he’s also desperate to get out of the corner he painted himself into by declaring that the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime would constitute a “red line.” As a result he’s gone all Hamlet on us. Not surprisingly, Obama’s actions are being mocked by America’s enemies and sowing doubt among our allies. (Read this New York Times story for more.) What explains this debacle? It’s impossible for us to know all the reasons, but one explanation appears to be a CYA operation. According to Politico, “At the very least, Obama clearly wants lawmakers to co-own a decision that he can’t back away from after having declared last year that Assad would cross a ‘red line’ if he used chemical weapons against his own people.” And the Washington Post reports: Obama’s proposal to invite Congress dominated the Friday discussion in the Oval Office. He had consulted almost no one about his idea. In the end, the president made clear he wanted Congress to share in the responsibility for what happens in Syria. As one aide put it, “We don’t want them to have their cake and eat it, too.” Get it? The president of the United States is preparing in advance to shift the blame if his strike on Syria proves to be unpopular and ineffective. He’s furious about the box he’s placed himself in, he hates the ridicule he’s (rightly) incurring, but he doesn’t see any way out. What he does see is a political (and geopolitical) disaster in the making. And so what is emerging is what comes most naturally to Mr. Obama: Blame shifting and blame sharing. Remember: the president doesn’t believe he needs congressional authorization to act. He’s ignored it before. He wants it now. For reasons of political survival. To put it another way: He wants the fingerprints of others on the failure in Syria. Rarely has an American president joined so much cynicism with so much ineptitude.

#### Congress wants to do the plan

Jakes ’13 (Lara Jakes, Associated Press, “Some in Congress back limits on drone strikes”, <http://www.airforcetimes.com/article/20130205/NEWS/302050314/Some-Congress-back-limits-drone-strikes>, February 5, 2013)

WASHINGTON — Uncomfortable with the Obama administration's use of deadly drones, a growing number in Congress is looking to limit America's authority to kill suspected terrorists, even U.S. citizens. The Democratic-led outcry was emboldened by the revelation in a newly surfaced Justice Department memo that shows drones can strike against a wider range of threats, with less evidence, than previously believed. The drone program, which has been used from Pakistan across the Middle East and into North Africa to find and kill an unknown number of suspected terrorists, is expected to be a top topic of debate when the Senate Intelligence Committee grills John Brennan, the White House's pick for CIA chief, at a hearing Thursday. The White House on Tuesday defended its lethal drone program by citing the very laws that some in Congress once believed were appropriate in the years immediately after the Sept. 11 attacks but now think may be too broad. "It has to be in the agenda of this Congress to reconsider the scope of action of drones and use of deadly force by the United States around the world because the original authorization of use of force, I think, is being strained to its limits," Sen. Chris Coons, D-Del., said in a recent interview. Rep. Steny Hoyer of Maryland, the No. 2 Democrat in the House, said Tuesday that "it deserves a serious look at how we make the decisions in government to take out, kill, eliminate, whatever word you want to use, not just American citizens but other citizens as well." Hoyer added: "We ought to carefully review our policies as a country." The Senate Foreign Relations Committee likely will hold hearings on U.S. drone policy, an aide said Tuesday, and chairman Robert Menendez, D-N.J., and the panel's top Republican, Sen. Bob Corker, both have quietly expressed concerns about the deadly operations. And earlier this week, a group of 11 Democratic and Republican senators urged President Obama to release a classified Justice Department legal opinion justifying when U.S. counterterrorism missions, including drone strikes, can be used to kill American citizens abroad. Without those documents, it's impossible for Congress and the public to decide "whether this authority has been properly defined, and whether the president's power to deliberately kill Americans is subject to appropriate limitations and safeguards," the senators wrote. It was a repeated request after receiving last June an unclassified Justice Department memo, which fell short of giving the senators all the information they requested. First detailed publicly by NBC News late Monday, the memo for the first time outlines the Obama administration's decision to kill al-Qaida terrorist suspects without any evidence that specific and imminent plots are being planned against the United States. "The threat posed by al-Qaida and its associated forces demands a broader concept of imminence in judging when a person continually planning terror attacks presents an imminent threat," concluded the document. The memo was immediately decried by civil liberties groups as "flawed" and "profoundly disturbing" — especially in light of 2011 U.S. drone strikes in Yemen that killed three American citizens: Anwar al-Awlaki, his 16-year-old-son and Samir Khan. Al-Awlaki was linked to the planning and execution of several attacks targeting U.S. and Western interests, including the attempt to down a Detroit-bound airliner in 2009 and the plot to bomb cargo planes in 2010. His son was killed in a separate strike on a suspected al-Qaida den. Khan was an al-Qaida propagandist. White House spokesman Jay Carney, echoing comments Brennan made in a speech last April, called the strikes "legal, ethical and wise" and said they are covered by a law that Congress approved allowing the use of military force against al-Qaida. "And certainly, under that authority, the president acts in the United States' interest to protect the United States and its citizens from al-Qaida," Carney said Tuesday. "It is a matter of fact that Congress authorized the use of military force against al-Qaida," Carney said. "It is a matter of fact that al-Qaida is in a state of war against us and that senior leaders, operational leaders of al-Qaida are continually plotting to attack the United States, plotting to kill American citizens as they did most horrifically on September 11th of 2001." Three days after 9/11, Congress approved a law authorizing the military to use "all necessary and appropriate force" against al-Qaida and other groups believed to be helping or harboring the global terror network, including the use of drone strikes. In the decade since the attacks, U.S. intelligence officials say, al-Qaida has splintered into a number of affiliates and allied sympathizers. That means the current laws could allow military force against thousands of extremists across the Mideast and North Africa who have limited or no ability to strike the United States. Currently, both the CIA and the U.S. military are authorized to remotely pilot unmanned, missile-carrying drones against terror suspects. It's unknown exactly how many strikes have been carried out, but experts say that drone attacks in Pakistan are conducted by the CIA, while those in Yemen and Somalia, for example, are by military forces. The drones have strained diplomacy between the U.S. and the nations where the strikes are carried out, as civilians have been killed alongside the targeted terrorists, even though most nations have given Washington at least tacit agreement to carry out the attacks. A Middle Eastern diplomat said that in Yemen, for example, an uptick of U.S. drone strikes last month have killed dozens of people and upset the local public, leading some leaders in Sanaa to reconsider how often they should be used. The diplomat spoke Tuesday on condition of anonymity to avoid political retribution from the Obama administration. The Pentagon is also considering basing surveillance drones in Niger to monitor on burgeoning extremist violence in North Africa, but it's not clear if they will be armed. Scaling back the use of drones also would hamper war plans in Afghanistan after combat troops are scheduled to withdraw in 2014. Drones represent a major thrust of the post-troops campaign to help the limited number of special forces units that remain there keep the Taliban from regrouping. Brennan, who currently serves as the White House counterterrorism czar, has signaled he is prepared to turn the CIA from carrying out lethal drone strikes and hand over those missions to the U.S. military. Sen. Ron Wyden, a senior Democratic member of the Senate Intelligence panel, declared himself unsatisfied Tuesday with the Justice memo and said he will press Brennan at the confirmation hearing about the administration's current policy. The drone debate puts Obama, a former civil rights lawyer, in the awkward position of carrying out lethal attacks in secret and bucking his political allies in the Democratic Party. Democratic lawmakers were incensed by the refusal of the Republican administration of President George W. Bush to hand over classified Justice Department opinions justifying the use of waterboarding, the harsh interrogation tactic that critics call a form of torture. Obama repudiated those methods — and released those opinions — when he took office in 2009. The use of drones proved to have no political cost to Obama in his re-election campaign. House Intelligence Chairman Mike Rogers, R-Mich., defended the use of deadly drones, calling it "a lawful act of national self-defense." "When an individual has joined al-Qaida — the organization responsible for the murder of thousands of Americans — and actively plots future attacks against U.S. citizens, soldiers, and interests around the world, the U.S. government has both the authority and the obligation to defend the country against that threat," Rogers said in a statement. But Rep. Keith Ellison, said the new Justice memo could spur lawmakers into taking a fresh look at deadly drones, and what he called an outdated policy guiding them. "We are sort of running on the steam that we acquired right after our country was attacked in the most horrific act of terror in U.S. history," said Ellison, D-Minn. "We have learned much since 9/11, and now it's time to take a more sober look at where we should be with use of force."

#### Winners win

Hirsh ’13 (National Journal chief correspondent, citing various political scientists, Michael, former Newsweek senior correspondent, "There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital," National Journal, 2-9-13, www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207, accessed 2-8-13, mss]

The idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly defined that presidents and pundits often get it wrong. On Tuesday, in his State of the Union address, President Obama will do what every president does this time of year. For about 60 minutes, he will lay out a sprawling and ambitious wish list highlighted by gun control and immigration reform, climate change and debt reduction. In response, the pundits will do what they always do this time of year: They will talk about how unrealistic most of the proposals are, discussions often informed by sagacious reckonings of how much “political capital” Obama possesses to push his program through. Most of this talk will have no bearing on what actually happens over the next four years. Consider this: Three months ago, just before the November election, if someone had talked seriously about Obama having enough political capital to oversee passage of both immigration reform and gun-control legislation at the beginning of his second term—even after winning the election by 4 percentage points and 5 million votes (the actual final tally)—this person would have been called crazy and stripped of his pundit’s license. (It doesn’t exist, but it ought to.) In his first term, in a starkly polarized country, the president had been so frustrated by GOP resistance that he finally issued a limited executive order last August permitting immigrants who entered the country illegally as children to work without fear of deportation for at least two years. Obama didn’t dare to even bring up gun control, a Democratic “third rail” that has cost the party elections and that actually might have been even less popular on the right than the president’s health care law. And yet, for reasons that have very little to do with Obama’s personal prestige or popularity—variously put in terms of a “mandate” or “political capital”—chances are fair that both will now happen. What changed? In the case of gun control, of course, it wasn’t the election. It was the horror of the 20 first-graders who were slaughtered in Newtown, Conn., in mid-December. The sickening reality of little girls and boys riddled with bullets from a high-capacity assault weapon seemed to precipitate a sudden tipping point in the national conscience. One thing changed after another. Wayne LaPierre of the National Rifle Association marginalized himself with poorly chosen comments soon after the massacre. The pro-gun lobby, once a phalanx of opposition, began to fissure into reasonables and crazies. Former Rep. Gabrielle Giffords, D-Ariz., who was shot in the head two years ago and is still struggling to speak and walk, started a PAC with her husband to appeal to the moderate middle of gun owners. Then she gave riveting and poignant testimony to the Senate, challenging lawmakers: “Be bold.” As a result, momentum has appeared to build around some kind of a plan to curtail sales of the most dangerous weapons and ammunition and the way people are permitted to buy them. It’s impossible to say now whether such a bill will pass and, if it does, whether it will make anything more than cosmetic changes to gun laws. But one thing is clear: The political tectonics have shifted dramatically in very little time. Whole new possibilities exist now that didn’t a few weeks ago. Meanwhile, the Republican members of the Senate’s so-called Gang of Eight are pushing hard for a new spirit of compromise on immigration reform, a sharp change after an election year in which the GOP standard-bearer declared he would make life so miserable for the 11 million illegal immigrants in the U.S. that they would “self-deport.” But this turnaround has very little to do with Obama’s personal influence—his political mandate, as it were. It has almost entirely to do with just two numbers: 71 and 27. That’s 71 percent for Obama, 27 percent for Mitt Romney, the breakdown of the Hispanic vote in the 2012 presidential election. Obama drove home his advantage by giving a speech on immigration reform on Jan. 29 at a Hispanic-dominated high school in Nevada, a swing state he won by a surprising 8 percentage points in November. But the movement on immigration has mainly come out of the Republican Party’s recent introspection, and the realization by its more thoughtful members, such as Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and Gov. Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, that without such a shift the party may be facing demographic death in a country where the 2010 census showed, for the first time, that white births have fallen into the minority. It’s got nothing to do with Obama’s political capital or, indeed, Obama at all. The point is not that “political capital” is a meaningless term. Often it is a synonym for “mandate” or “momentum” in the aftermath of a decisive election—and just about every politician ever elected has tried to claim more of a mandate than he actually has. Certainly, Obama can say that because he was elected and Romney wasn’t, he has a better claim on the country’s mood and direction. Many pundits still defend political capital as a useful metaphor at least. “It’s an unquantifiable but meaningful concept,” says Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute. “You can’t really look at a president and say he’s got 37 ounces of political capital. But the fact is, it’s a concept that matters, if you have popularity and some momentum on your side.” The real problem is that the idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly defined that presidents and pundits often get it wrong. “Presidents usually over-estimate it,” says George Edwards, a presidential scholar at Texas A&M University. “The best kind of political capital—some sense of an electoral mandate to do something—is very rare. It almost never happens. In 1964, maybe. And to some degree in 1980.” For that reason, political capital is a concept that misleads far more than it enlightens. It is distortionary. It conveys the idea that we know more than we really do about the ever-elusive concept of political power, and it discounts the way unforeseen events can suddenly change everything. Instead, it suggests, erroneously, that a political figure has a concrete amount of political capital to invest, just as someone might have real investment capital—that a particular leader can bank his gains, and the size of his account determines what he can do at any given moment in history. Naturally, any president has practical and electoral limits. Does he have a majority in both chambers of Congress and a cohesive coalition behind him? Obama has neither at present. And unless a surge in the economy—at the moment, still stuck—or some other great victory gives him more momentum, it is inevitable that the closer Obama gets to the 2014 election, the less he will be able to get done. Going into the midterms, Republicans will increasingly avoid any concessions that make him (and the Democrats) stronger. But the abrupt emergence of the immigration and gun-control issues illustrates how suddenly shifts in mood can occur and how political interests can align in new ways just as suddenly. Indeed, the pseudo-concept of political capital masks a larger truth about Washington that is kindergarten simple: You just don’t know what you can do until you try. Or as Ornstein himself once wrote years ago, “Winning wins.”

In theory, and in practice, depending on Obama’s handling of any particular issue, even in a polarized time, he could still deliver on a lot of his second-term goals, depending on his skill and the breaks. Unforeseen catalysts can appear, like Newtown. Epiphanies can dawn, such as when many Republican Party leaders suddenly woke up in panic to the huge disparity in the Hispanic vote. Some political scientists who study the elusive calculus of how to pass legislation and run successful presidencies say that political capital is, at best, an empty concept, and that almost nothing in the academic literature successfully quantifies or even defines it. “It can refer to a very abstract thing, like a president’s popularity, but there’s no mechanism there. That makes it kind of useless,” says Richard Bensel, a government professor at Cornell University. Even Ornstein concedes that the calculus is far more complex than the term suggests. Winning on one issue often changes the calculation for the next issue; there is never any known amount of capital. “The idea here is, if an issue comes up where the conventional wisdom is that president is not going to get what he wants, and [they]he gets it, then each time that happens, it changes the calculus of the other actors” Ornstein says. “If they think he’s going to win, they may change positions to get on the winning side. It’s a bandwagon effect.” ALL THE WAY WITH LBJ Sometimes, a clever practitioner of power can get more done just because [they’re]he’s aggressive and knows the hallways of Congress well. Texas A&M’s Edwards is right to say that the outcome of the 1964 election, Lyndon Johnson’s landslide victory over Barry Goldwater, was one of the few that conveyed a mandate. But one of the main reasons for that mandate (in addition to Goldwater’s ineptitude as a candidate) was President Johnson’s masterful use of power leading up to that election, and his ability to get far more done than anyone thought possible, given his limited political capital. In the newest volume in his exhaustive study of LBJ, The Passage of Power, historian Robert Caro recalls Johnson getting cautionary advice after he assumed the presidency from the assassinated John F. Kennedy in late 1963. Don’t focus on a long-stalled civil-rights bill, advisers told him, because it might jeopardize Southern lawmakers’ support for a tax cut and appropriations bills the president needed. “One of the wise, practical people around the table [said that] the presidency has only a certain amount of coinage to expend, and you oughtn’t to expend it on this,” Caro writes. (Coinage, of course, was what political capital was called in those days.) Johnson replied, “Well, what the hell’s the presidency for?” Johnson didn’t worry about coinage, and he got the Civil Rights Act enacted, along with much else: Medicare, a tax cut, antipoverty programs. He appeared to understand not just the ways of Congress but also the way to maximize the momentum he possessed in the lingering mood of national grief and determination by picking the right issues, as Caro records. “Momentum is not a mysterious mistress,” LBJ said. “It is a controllable fact of political life.” Johnson had the skill and wherewithal to realize that, at that moment of history, he could have unlimited coinage if he handled the politics right. He did. (At least until Vietnam, that is.)

#### Obama just caved to Congress and restricted the NSA- triggers their losers lose argument

Nakashima and Miller 1/17 ( Ellen Nakashima and Greg Miller, Washington Post, “Obama calls for significant changes in collection of phone records of U.S. citizens”, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/in-speech-obama-to-call-for-restructuring-of-nsas-surveillance-program/2014/01/17/e9d5a8ba-7f6e-11e3-95c6-0a7aa80874bc_story.html?tid=ts_carousel>, January 17, 2014)

President Obama on Friday made a forceful call to narrow the government’s access to millions of Americans’ phone records as part of an overhaul of surveillance activities that have raised concerns about official overreach. The president said he no longer wants the National Security Agency to maintain a database of such records. But he left the creation of a new system to subordinates and lawmakers, many of whom are divided on the need for reform. In a speech at the Justice Department, Obama ordered several immediate steps to limit the NSA program that collects domestic phone records, one of the surveillance practices that was exposed last year by former intelligence contractor Edward Snowden. Obama directed that from now on, the government must obtain a court order for each phone number it wants to query in its database of records. Analysts will be able to review phone calls that are two steps removed from a number associated with a terrorist organization instead of three. And he ordered a halt to eavesdropping on dozens of foreign leaders and governments that are friends or allies. The changes, White House officials said, mark the first significant constraints imposed by the Obama administration on surveillance programs that expanded dramatically in the decade after the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks. But the most significant change he called for, to remove the phone database from government hands, could take months if not longer to implement. And already critics from diverse camps — in Congress and outside it — are warning that what he has called for may be unworkable. Obama is retaining the vast majority of intelligence programs and capabilities that came to light over the past six months in a deluge of reports based on leaked documents. Even the most controversial capability — the government’s access to bulk telephone records, known as metadata — may well be preserved, although with tighter controls and with the records in the hands of some outside entity. The database holds phone numbers and call lengths and times, but not actual phone call content. Obama recognized that others have raised alternatives, such as the moving custodianship of the records to the phone companies or an independent third party — and that such plans face significant logistical and political hurdles. He gave subordinates including Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. until March 28 to develop a plan to “transition” the bulk data out of the possession of the government. Existing authorities for the phone records program are set to expire on that date, requiring a reauthorization by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). Both in his speech and in the specifics of his plan, Obama straddled competing security and civil liberties imperatives. His proposals are aimed at containing a public backlash triggered by Snowden, but also preserving capabilities that U.S. intelligence officials consider critical to preventing another terrorist attack. [Read the text of Obama’s speech.] Reaction to Obama’s call to end the phone records collection was mixed and underscored the political challenge he faces in achieving his goal. The chairmen of the House and Senate intelligence committees issued a joint statement focusing on Obama’s remarks that “underscored the importance of using telephone metadata to rapidly identify possible terrorist plots.” Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) and Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Mich.) added that they have reviewed the existing NSA bulk collection program and “found it to be legal and effective,” indicating they would oppose efforts to end it. “Ending this dragnet collection will go a long way toward restoring Americans’ constitutional rights and rebuilding the public’s trust,” Sens. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.), Mark Udall (D-Colo.) and Martin Heinrich (D-N.M.) said in a joint statement. “Make no mistake, this is a major milestone in our longstanding efforts to reform the National Security Agency’s bulk collection program.” Adam B. Schiff (D-Calif.), a House Intelligence Committee member who opposes bulk collection, said he thought that ultimately the NSA would have to transition to a model in which the government seeks data from individual phone companies, without forcing the companies to hold the data for longer than they do now. But many civil liberties groups said Obama failed to advance real reform by leaving open the door to third-party storage of records and data retention mandates. “He doesn’t commit to ending the bulk data collection of telephone records,” said Anthony Romero, executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union. “He gets close to understanding the concerns, but he backs away from the real reform, which is to end the bulk data collection. He gets to the finish line, but he doesn’t cross it.” Romero said he was trying to bridge irreconcilable positions: “Clearly this is a president who wants to agree with the criticism of the bulk data collection and retention, and yet wishes to retain that power notwithstanding the serious concerns,” Romero said. “And you can’t have it both ways.” John McLaughlin, a former CIA deputy director, said Obama “was trying to find a midway here.” Obama’s dilemma, he said, is responding to dual challenges: the perception that the program might one day be abused, and the reality that al-Qaeda and its affiliates are growing stronger. “So as president, he’s got to think, ‘I don’t want to take any chances here.’ ” Obama also called on Congress to establish a panel of public advocates who can represent privacy interests before the FISC, which hears government applications for surveillance in secret. Obama has instructed Holder to reform the use of national security letters — a form of administrative subpoena used to obtain business and other records — so that the traditional gag order that accompanies them does not remain in place indefinitely. But he did not, as has been recommended by a White House review panel, require judicial approval for issuance of the letters. The president also addressed another major NSA surveillance program, which involves collection of e-mail and phone calls of foreign targets located overseas, including when they are in contact with U.S. citizens or residents. He acknowledged that the information has been valuable, but directed subordinates to develop new protections for the information collected on U.S. persons. He also said he will order that certain privacy safeguards given Americans whose data are collected be extended to foreigners, including limits on the use of the information and how long it can be kept. Accompanying his speech, Obama issued a new directive Friday that states that the United States will use signals intelligence only “for legitimate national security purposes, and not for the purpose of indiscriminately reviewing the e-mails or phone calls of ordinary people.” It says that authorities will not collect intelligence “to suppress criticism or dissent” or to give U.S. companies a competitive advantage. Unless there is a compelling national security purpose, Obama said, “we will not monitor the communications of heads of state and government of our close friends and allies.” Friendly leaders “deserve to know that if I want to learn what they think about an issue, I will pick up the phone and call them, rather than turning to surveillance,” he said. As he made the case for reforms, Obama also cautioned that “we cannot unilaterally disarm our intelligence agencies.” And he caustically criticized foreign intelligence services that “feign surprise” over disclosures of U.S. surveillance while “constantly probing our government and private sector networks and accelerating programs to listen to our conversations, intercept our e-mails or compromise our systems.” He noted that some countries that “have loudly criticized the NSA privately acknowledge that America has special responsibilities as the world’s only superpower . . . and that they themselves have relied on the information we obtain to protect their own people.” Expressing frustration at those who “assume the worst motives by our government,” Obama said at another point in his speech: “No one expects China to have an open debate about their surveillance programs, or Russia to take privacy concerns of citizens in other places into account.” But he said the United States is held to a higher standard “precisely because we have been at the forefront in defending personal privacy and human dignity.” The president’s speech comes after months of revelations about the breadth and secrecy of the NSA’s surveillance activities, based on hundreds of thousands of documents taken by Snowden. New revelations based on the documents are expected to continue this year.

## CIA

### 2AC

#### CP fails- Congressional oversight is key

**McNeal 3-22**-13 [Gregory McNeal is a professor at Pepperdine University, a national security specialist focusing on the institutions and challenges associated with global security, with substantive expertise in national security law and policy, criminal law, and international law, served as Assistant Director of the Institute for Global Security, co-directed a transnational counterterrorism grant program for the U.S. Department of Justice, and served as a legal consultant to the Chief Prosecutor of the Department of Defense Office of Military Commissions, “It’s Time for a White Paper on Congressional Oversight of Targeted Killings,” <http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/04/five-ways-to-reform-the-targeted-killing-program/>]

The recent news that the Obama administration is considering transferring responsibility for drone strikes from the CIA to DOD has some questioning whether the change will have much impact on the program. Spencer Ackerman nicely sums things up when he writes:¶ The congressional reporting requirements for so-called Title 50 programs (stuff CIA does, to be reductive) are more specific than those for Title 10 (stuff the military does, to be reductive). But the armed services committees tend to have unquestioned and broader oversight functions than the intelligence committees enjoy, not to mention better relationships with the committees: Witness the recent anger in the Senate intelligence committee that the CIA lied to it about its torture programs. The military is more likely than the CIA to openly testify about future drone operations, allow knowledgeable congressional staff into closed-door operational briefings and allow members of Congress to take tours of drone airbases. But that’s not to say that there will necessarily be more transparency of the military’s drone programs. Much depends on congressional prerogative, rather than institutional requirements.¶ Thus, the transfer of the targeted killing program from the CIA to DOD won’t necessarily lead to more transparency about the conduct of the program itself. But I’m not sure that’s what’s necessary.¶ Rather what’s necessary is for Congress to specify how they are conducting their oversight, what criteria they are applying in their oversight role, and what red lines exist that would cause them to question the wisdom or legality of the program. What we need are greater assurances that those responsible for holding the President accountable are in fact doing so. Congress should release more details about their oversight activities in the form of a white paper — and it should be a bipartisan and bicameral document signed by all of the members of the intelligence and armed services committees.

## XO

### 2AC- XO

#### Doesn’t solve

#### Doesn’t solve *binding*- that’s 1AC Webb

#### Congress is key to a *binding* regime

Webb ’13 (Jim Webb is a former U.S. senator from Virginia and served as Secretary of the Navy in the Reagan administration, <http://www.jameswebb.com/articles/natlinterest-congabdication.html>, March/April Edition 2013)

The Obama administration has proven itself to be acutely fond of executive orders designed to circumvent the legislative process in domestic politics. Thus, it is not surprising that this approach would be used also in foreign policy. The phrase "legally binding" as it pertains to executive agreements had come up earlier in the Obama administration. In November 2009, the administration announced that the president would return from a conference of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Copenhagen, Denmark, with a "binding commitment" for a nationwide emission-reduction program. On November 25, 2009, this writer sent a cautionary letter to the president, reminding him that "only specific legislation agreed upon in the Congress, or a treaty ratified by the Senate, could actually create such a commitment on behalf of our country." It is difficult to understand how any international agreement negotiated, signed and authorized only by our executive branch of government can be construed as legally binding in our constitutional system. And, with respect to Afghanistan, one strains to find the rationale under which the president alone holds the power to commit our country to a long-term economic and security arrangement that far transcends his authority as commander in chief to oversee combat operations against international terrorism. If such an agreement were "legally binding," one must ask what law binds it and how, and against whom it would be enforced?

#### The *risk and fear* of Obama reneging on the CP means it doesn’t solve signal

Groll 8/8 (Elias Groll, “The Sudden and Unexpected Return of the Drone War”, <http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/08/08/the_sudden_and_unexpected_return_of_the_drone_war_yemen>, August 8, 2013)

The drone war is back. Amid fears that al Qaeda-affiliated terrorists in Yemen are plotting a major attack, U.S. drones reportedly launched three strikes in the country on Thursday alone, killing 12 suspected al Qaeda militants. In fact, the Obama administration is arguably waging its most intense drone campaign ever in Yemen, with nine suspected drone strikes in the last 13 days and six in the last three. The concentrated bombing is all the more striking considering that just days ago the State Department was shuttering nearly two dozen embassies around the world in response to what seemed an amorphous terrorist threat. The fierce campaign comes on the heels of the White House announcing a major overhaul of its use of drones. With his speech in May outlining a plan to take the United States off its "perpetual wartime footing," the president gave hope to critics of his surprisingly robust drone policy that the strikes would soon be curtailed. But according to Josh Begley, a web developer who tracks drone strikes and runs Dronestream, U.S. drones have struck five times in Pakistan and 11 times in Yemen since Obama's speech. Not since January -- when, during a five-day period, Washington carried out eight suspected strikes -- have U.S. missiles rained down on Yemen with such frequency. While three-strike days are not unprecedented in Yemen, they are far more common in Pakistan. According to Begley's analysis, there have been three likely instances in which U.S. drones struck Yemen three times in one day. In Pakistan, that has occurred 13 times. The interactive map below, courtesy of Begley, shows strikes in Yemen before (yellow dots) and after (red dots) Obama's speech (the first U.S. drone strike in Yemen took place way back in 2002). Some dots below are obscured because of multiple strikes in the same location. The flurry of strikes raises questions about the Obama administration's stated commitment to dial back its aggressive wartime tactics. In a major speech earlier this year, President Obama announced to much fanfare that he hoped to wind down the war on terror and that stricter guidelines would be put in place to govern the use of drone strikes, though those rules largely remain classified and unreleased. "America does not take strikes to punish individuals; we act against terrorists who pose a continuing and imminent threat to the American people, and when there are no other governments capable of effectively addressing the threat," Obama said. "And before any strike is taken, there must be near-certainty that no civilians will be killed or injured -- the highest standard we can set." In a letter to Congress in May, Attorney General Eric Holder hinted at this new, stricter policy. "When capture is not feasible, the policy provides that lethal force may be used only when a terrorist target poses a continuing, imminent threat to Americans, and when certain other preconditions, including a requirement that no other reasonable alternatives exist to effectively address the threat, are satisfied." What those "other preconditions" amount to remains shrouded in mystery. But as articulated in the letter, the administration's new critieria for drone strikes turn on the presence of a "continuing, imminent threat" directed at Americans. Administration officials explain that the prior guidance allowed drone strikes against groups or individuals threatening "U.S. interests" whereas the new policy tightens that guideline to require "U.S. persons" to be threatened by those targeted by drones. This time around, the U.S. government has been making an elaborate, dramatic argument that the latest threat out of Yemen poses imminent danger to Americans. The administration's decision to close and evacuate a slew of diplomatic posts served as a highly visible signal of the perceived seriousness of this threat -- and, most importantly, its implications for U.S. persons. While Obama's speech in May and subsequent policy guidance has been interpreted as an effort by the president to avoid having his legacy defined by the aggressive use of drones, the address itself was notable for its defense of the administration's tactics, which Obama argued have not only undermined terrorist groups but also saved civilian lives. That conviction has been on manifest display in the administration's response this week to the threat emanating from Yemen. Beyond vague hints, apocalyptic warnings, and bizarre leaks, however, U.S. officials have released little information about the nature of that threat. As a result, it remains difficult to evaluate Obama's commitment to his new policy. "There has been an awful lot of chatter out there. Chatter means conversation about terrorists, about the planning that's going on, very reminiscent of what we saw pre-9/11," Sen. Saxby Chambliss, the Georgia Republican, said on NBC's Meet the Press. Later in the week, administration officials revealed that the source of the warning came from an intercepted communication between the head of al Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the chief of the Yemen-based al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Given the murky nature of the threat, it remains unclear whether, in repeatedly striking targets in Yemen in recent days, the Obama administration is ramping up the pressure on al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in general or simply responding to a specific intelligence threat. The White House's secret legal guidelines would appear to require that the strikes be tied to a specific threat to U.S. persons, but that's a legal standard for which there is no outside oversight or determination. If the U.S. government wants to up the pressure and return to the 2009-2010 heyday of the decade-long drone war, there is nothing stopping it. Meanwhile, for observers of the U.S. national security establishment, the strikes in Yemen upset a commonly accepted wisdom in Washington: that the accession of John Brennan as CIA director heralded the end of aggressive drone strikes. Brennan reportedly favors moving the drone program from the the CIA to the Pentagon, where it will theoretically be subject to greater oversight and transparency. With the transfer of the program, it was also thought that drone strikes would gradually decrease as they moved out of the shadowy world of the CIA and into the, comparatively speaking, more open world of the Defense Department. But events this week in Yemen represent a profound challenge to that line of thinking. And until the White House offers a clear explanation for how it is targeting terrorists and why, prickly questions about the administration's commitment to dialing back the war on terror are likely to persist.

#### Links to politics – immense opposition to bypassing debate

Hallowell ’13 [Billy Hallowell, writer for The Blaze, B.A. in journalism and broadcasting from the College of Mount Saint Vincent in Riverdale, New York and an M.S. in social research from Hunter College in Manhattan, “HERE’S HOW OBAMA IS USING EXECUTIVE POWER TO BYPASS LEGISLATIVE PROCESS” Feb. 11, 2013, <http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/02/11/heres-how-obamas-using-executive-power-to-bylass-legislative-process-plus-a-brief-history-of-executive-orders/>, KB]

“In an era of polarized parties and a fragmented Congress, the opportunities to legislate are few and far between,” Howell said. “So presidents have powerful incentive to go it alone. And they do.”¶ And the political opposition howls.¶ Sen. Marco Rubio, R-Fla., a possible contender for the Republican presidential nomination in 2016, said that on the gun-control front in particular, Obama is “abusing his power by imposing his policies via executive fiat instead of allowing them to be debated in Congress.”¶ The Republican reaction is to be expected, said John Woolley, co-director of the American Presidency Project at the University of California in Santa Barbara.¶ “For years there has been a growing concern about unchecked executive power,” Woolley said. “It tends to have a partisan content, with contemporary complaints coming from the incumbent president’s opponents.”

## WF

### 2AC- w/ Pak Aff

#### Only our evidence is comparative

Blair ’11 (Dennis C. Blair, a retired admiral, was director of national intelligence from 2009 to 2010, “Drones Alone Are Not the Answer”, August 14, 2011)

OVER the past two years, America has narrowed its goals in Afghanistan and Pakistan to a single-minded focus on eliminating Al Qaeda. Public support for a counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan has waned. **American officials dealing with Pakistan now spend most of their time haggling over our military and intelligence activities, when they should instead be pursuing the sort of comprehensive social, diplomatic and economic reforms that Pakistan desperately needs and that would advance America’s long-term interests. In Pakistan, no issue is more controversial than American drone attacks in Pakistani territory along the Afghan border.** The Obama administration contends that using drones to kill 10 or 20 more Qaeda leaders would eliminate the organization. This is wishful thinking. **Drone strikes are no longer the most effective strategy for eliminating Al Qaeda’s ability to attack us. Past** American drone **attacks did help** reduce the Qaeda leadership in Pakistan to a fearful, hunted cadre that did not have the time or space to plan, train and coordinate major terrorist acts against the United States. **But the important question today is whether continued** unilateral drone attacks **will substantially reduce Al Qaeda’s capabilities. They will not. Instead, we must work with Pakistan’s government as an equal partner to achieve our common goals while ensuring that the country does not remain a refuge for Taliban fighters. Qaeda officials who are killed by drones will be replaced. The group’s structure will survive and it will still be able to inspire, finance and train individuals and teams to kill Americans.** **Drone strikes hinder Qaeda fighters while they move and hide, but they can endure the attacks and continue to function.** Moreover, **as the drone campaign wears on, hatred of America is increasing in Pakistan.** American officials may praise the precision of the drone attacks. But **in Pakistan, news media accounts of heavy civilian casualties are widely believed.** Our reliance on high-tech strikes that pose no risk to our soldiers is bitterly resented in a country that cannot duplicate such feats of warfare without cost to its own troops. **Our dogged persistence with the drone campaign is eroding our influence and damaging our ability to work with Pakistan to achieve other important security objectives like eliminating Taliban sanctuaries, encouraging Indian-Pakistani dialogue, and making Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal more secure. Reducing Al Qaeda to a fringe group of scattered individuals without an organizational structure** will only succeed if Pakistan asserts control over its **full** territory and brings government services to the regions **bordering Afghanistan. Washington should support a new security campaign that includes jointly controlled drone strikes**

**and combines the capabilities of both countries.** Together, **the American and Pakistani governments can fashion a plan that meets the objectives of both without committing to broader joint campaigns that would not be politically viable at the moment. We can help Pakistan with logistics, transport and intelligence; Pakistan can help us by deploying security forces and improving local government on the ground. Drone strikes targeting Qaeda leaders and other terrorists would be conducted by mutual agreement.** The raid that killed Osama bin Laden in May showed Pakistan that the United States would respect its sovereignty only so far. **A cooperative campaign against common enemies offers them the best chance of controlling American actions in their country. And** Pakistani participation in the targeting of drone strikes would remove a major source of anti-American resentment**. If we are ever to reduce Al Qaeda from a threat to a nuisance, it will be by working with Pakistan, not by continuing unilateral drone attacks.**

#### Only our evidence is comparative to a consultation process- empirics prove they say yes- consent is not public so no political backlash

Haider 10/19 (Sajjad Haider, Expert on Middle Eastern affairs and his views have been frequently aired by the International media outlets like Al-Jazeera, BBC, CBS and VOA. Sajjad Haider has participated in various workshops and international events. The notable being the World Editors Forum meet at Gothenburg, Sweden; Arab Thought Foundation meeting, Dubai; Int’l Confab on Palestine, Tehran. In 2006 Sajjad Haider was awarded the prestigious Chevening fellowship by the British foreign office. He studied Democracy, Rule of Law and Security at the Centre for Security & Diplomacy, Birmingham University and undertook extensive study tour of various European institutions including NATO and EU Commissions in Belgium, Luxembourg and Ireland. , “Strong evidence” Pakistan military approved US drone strikes: UN report”, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1050387/strong-evidence-pakistan-military-approved-us-drone-strikes-un-report>, November 19, 2013)

A recently released UN report suggests there is “strong evidence” that top Pakistani military and intelligence officials approved US drone strikes on Pakistani soil during 2004 and 2008. The study says in some cases, even “senior government figures” gave their approval to the strikes in the country’s militancy-hit tribal areas. “There is strong evidence to suggest that between June 2004 and June 2008 remotely piloted aircraft strikes in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas were conducted with the active consent and approval of senior members of the Pakistani military and intelligence service, and with at least the acquiescence and, in some instances, the active approval of senior government figures,” says the report by Ben Emmerson, UN Special Rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism. The report, however, does not elaborate on the details of the evidence collected. Islamabad officially condemns US drone attacks as a violation of its sovereignty and counter-productive in the fight against terrorism and militancy. In April this year, former military dictator Gen (Retd) Pervez Musharraf admitted in an interview to CNN that his government had given approval “only on very few occasions”. Musharraf, who ruled over Pakistan until 2008 after coming to power in a bloodless coup as army chief of staff in 1999, said drone strikes were discussed and approved “at the military and intelligence levels” but only “two or three times”. Together with a study by the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions, Christof Heyns, Emmerson’s interim report will be debated at the UN General Assembly on October 25, 2013. "In an apparent reference to Pakistan, Heyns’ report suggests consent from military or intelligence officials may not be enough to satisfy legal requirements for the US to conduct drone strikes on foreign territory, according to international, humanitarian and human rights law." “Only the State’s highest government authorities have the power to give consent to use force. It is not sufficient to obtain consent from regional authorities or from particular agencies or departments of the Government,” says the report, which lays down the legal conditions for the use of drones in armed conflicts around the world. The report adds that though consent may not necessarily be made public, it must be “clear between the States concerned that consent is being given to a use of force, and the parameters of that consent should also be made clear.”

#### The flexible middle-ground of the aff solves

Siddiqui ’13 (Taha Siddiqui, Correspondent, Christian Science Monitor, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2013/0529/After-drone-kills-Taliban-deputy-what-will-new-Pakistan-government-do-video>, May 29, 2013)

With the first drone strike in Pakistan after its landmark elections, all eyes are on new leader Nawaz Sharif, who has spoken strongly against drones. Nawaz Sharif addresses party workers in Lahore, Pakistan, May 20. A suspected US drone strike is the first since Pakistan's general election on May 11, in which Sharif’s party won, setting him up to become the prime minister for the third time next week when the new parliament session begins. A drone strike in Pakistan’s tribal region along the border with Afghanistan has killed the deputy commander of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Waliur Rehman, according to military sources operating in the region. The suspected US drone strike is the first since Pakistan’s general election on May 11, in which Nawaz Sharif’s party won, setting him up to become the prime minister for the third time next week when the new parliament session begins. Mr. Sharif’s party policy has been highly critical of drone attacks. Sharif has also stated on numerous occasions that Pakistan needs to review its alliance with the Western powers, especially the United States, in regard to the war on terror. However, analysts say that the timing of the drone attack and the choice of target for the drone makes it unclear Mr. Sharif will respond. By going after Mr. Rehman, who was a significant threat to the Pakistani state, the US is trying to build an impression that it is helping the Pakistani government to fight militancy, says Rahimullah Yousafzai, editor of The News International, an English daily based in Peshawar. “They are going to tell the Pakistani government that, ‘look, we are helping you by killing your enemy, so let us continue with these strikes’,” he says. Mr. Yousafzai adds, “But this is also a message for the new government from the United States that we mean business – and so we will go for these strikes whenever we have actionable intelligence about high value targets like Waliur Rehman.” A middle path? Sharif has been careful not to explicitly say anything about taking any extreme measures, says Ayesha Siddiqa, a Pakistan security expert. “So he will be flexible about the drone attacks issue once he takes office,” says Ms. Siddiqa. “He will definitely find a middle path by pacifying the Americans and the Pakistani public because most of the statements up until now were more to do with populism than pragmatism.” According to locals from North Waziristan, who wish to remain anonymous due to the sensitivity of the topic, Rehman was tipped to be the head of the TTP following a drone strike in 2009 that killed Baitullah Mehsud, the man behind the group’s formation. But, due to internal rifts, Rehman did not get the post. The Pakistani Taliban have previously denied such reports. Rehman was serving as the chief of the South Waziristan faction of the TTP, where the terrorist group originates from, but fled to North Waziristan after the military launched an operation in South Waziristan in 2009. North Waziristan, where the drone strike occurred early Wednesday, is known to be a haven for Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban, against which the Pakistani military has not taken any action. It is widely perceived that they operate in the area with an understanding with the military that they will only attack targets across the border in Afghanistan. The Pakistani Taliban, a local branch of the Taliban, has unleashed a series of attacks on Pakistani military and civilians killing thousands in the past few years and the government has failed to curb their terrorist activities despite repeated military operations in the tribal area and settled parts of Pakistan where they have had a stronghold. Sharif had stated in an address to his party workers on May 20, that he hopes to initiate a peace dialogue with the Pakistani Taliban, and according to his senior party leadership, a roadmap for the talks is on top of his agenda when Sharif formally takes charge next week, but the latest drone attack may complicate issues for him, says Yousafzai. “The peace talks may be jeopardized because of this drone strike, because it will affect the goodwill Sharif enjoys with the Pakistani Taliban,” he says, referring to the fact that the TTP had offered conditional peace talks to the previous government in February this year. The TTP named Sharif as one of the guarantors, though talks did not materialize.

#### No tacit consent

Times 10/24 (Times of India, “Former Pakistan PM, officials deny US drone collusion”, <http://m.timesofindia.com/world/pakistan/Former-Pakistan-PM-officials-deny-US-drone-collusion/articleshow/24666851.cms>, October 24, 2013)

ISLAMABAD: Pakistani officials and former prime minister Yousuf Raza Gilani on Thursday denied a report that they had approved US drone strikes on the country's soil. Washington Post on Wednesday quoted leaked secret documents as saying Pakistan had been regularly briefed on strikes up till late 2011 and in some cases had helped choose targets. The purported evidence of Islamabad's involvement came as Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif met US President Barack Obama at the White House and urged him to end the attacks, which are widely unpopular with the Pakistani public. A Pakistani foreign ministry spokesman said the anti-drone stance of the Sharif government, elected in May, was clear and any past agreements no longer applied. Pakistani security officials claimed the story was a US attempt to undermine Sharif's position and reduce criticism of the drone campaign, days after an Amnesty International report warned some of the strikes could constitute war crimes. Washington Post's revelations concerned strikes in a four-year period from late 2007, when military ruler Pervez Musharraf was in power, to late 2011 when a civilian government had taken over. Gilani, prime minister from 2008 until June last year, vehemently denied giving any approval for drone strikes. "We have never allowed Americans to carry out drone attacks in the tribal areas," Gilani told AFP. "From the very beginning we are against drone strikes and we have conveyed it to Americans at all forums," he added. Islamabad routinely condemns the strikes targeting suspected Taliban and Al-Qaeda militants in its northwest tribal areas. But evidence of collusion or tacit approval has leaked out in recent years. A diplomatic cable from then-US ambassador Anne Patterson, dated August 2008 and released by Wikileaks, indicated Gilani had agreed to the strikes in private. "I don't care if they do it as long as they get the right people. We'll protest in the National Assembly and then ignore it," the leaked cable quoted him as telling US officials. In April this year Musharraf told CNN that he had authorised drone strikes in Pakistan while he was in power. Musharraf's spokesman Raza Bokhari told AFP Wednesday: "There were less than 10 strikes, all of which targeted militants, and (a) few of them were a joint operation between United States and Pakistan in locations that were not accessible to ground forces of Pakistan." Post said top-secret documents and Pakistani diplomatic memos showed the Central Intelligence Agency, which runs the drone programme, had drafted documents to share information on at least 65 attacks with Pakistan. In one case in 2010, a document describes hitting a location "at the request of your government" and another refers to a joint targeting effort between the CIA and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency. A senior Pakistani security official flatly denied any official deal to help with the drone campaign. "There has never been official arrangement at the strategic or government level," he told AFP on condition of anonymity. "The purpose of giving such stories is nothing but face-saving. Americans are trying to dilute the growing pressure by using back channels and making Pakistan a party to the whole issue." A second security official said Washington wanted to spread responsibility as it was coming under increasing pressure from rights groups to halt the drone campaign. The US has carried out nearly 400 drone attacks in Pakistan's restive tribal districts along the Afghan border since 2004, killing between 2,500 and 3,600 people, according to the London-based Bureau of Investigative Journalism. Sharif this week called drone strikes a "major irritant" in ties with the US, which have recovered significantly after a series of crises in 2011 and 2012, including a US special forces raid inside Pakistan to kill Osama bin Laden. Foreign ministry spokesman Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry said the current government's position was clear — drones were a violation of sovereignty and must stop. "Whatever understandings there may or may not have been in the past, the present government has been very clear regarding its policy on the issue," he said.

### Kickout

#### 1AC Markey evidence says Paki military radicals will kick us out- one method through shooting down US drones

#### Independently- that kickout causes US-Pakistan war

Chussodovsky ’11 (Prof Michel Chossudovsky, Michel Chossudovsky is an award-winning author, Professor of Economics (emeritus) at the University of Ottawa, Founder and Director of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG), Montreal and Editor of the globalresearch.ca website. He is the author of The Globalization of Poverty and The New World Order (2003) and America’s “War on Terrorism”(2005). His most recent book is entitled Towards a World War III Scenario: The Dangers of Nuclear War (2011), “Pakistan’s Decision to Shoot Down America’s Drones: Prelude to an All Out US-Pak War?”, http://www.globalresearch.ca/pakistan-s-decision-to-shoot-down-america-s-drones-prelude-to-an-all-out-us-pak-war/28162, Global Research, December 12, 2011)

Pakistan's Decision to Shoot Down America's Drones: Prelude to an All Out US-Pak War? Remember Pearl Harbor, remember the Gulf of Tonkin… Throughout history, America has sought to provoke its enemies into ‘initiating a war”, with a view to justifying the launching of an all out out war using the pretext of “self defense”. America’s war on Pakistan is already de facto. It is a war of stealth. The “war on terrorism” allegedly directed against Al Qaeda, the illusive “outside enemy” (created by the CIA) is is an obvious smokescreen. What is required is to portray Pakistan as “the aggressor” rather than the victim of US military aggression. US military planners have examined all possible scenarios. Military escalation is on the drawing board of the Pentagon. US “counter-terrorism” operations are carried out with a view to inciting the enemy as well as triggering a process of military escalation. Is the objective of the drone attacks to provoke a response by the Pakistani military, thereby justifying a formal declaration of war by the US and its allies? In this regard, the recent decision taken by Pakistan to “shoot down any US drone that intrudes its airspace as per new directives”, could be the prelude to an all out war between Pakistan and US-NATO forces. Pakistan’s defence policy states that: “Any object entering into our airspace, including US drones, will be treated as hostile and be shot down,” “The policy change comes just weeks after a deadly NATO attack on Pakistani military checkpoints killed 24 Pakistani soldiers, prompting Pakistani officials to order all US personnel out of a remote airfield in Pakistan. The government had told the United States to vacate the Shamsi airbase by December 11. The Frontier Corps took control of the Shamsi airbase on Saturday evening after most US military personnel left, sources said. Chief of the Army Staff Gen Ashfaq Pervaiz Kayani had issued multiple directives since the November 26 NATO attack, which included orders to shoot down US drones, senior military officials confirmed to NBC News. It was unclear whether orders to fire upon incoming US drones were part of the initial orders. The Pakistani airbase had been used by US forces, including the CIA, to stage elements of a clandestine US counter-terrorism operation to attack militants linked to al Qaeda, the Taliban and Haqqani network, using unmanned drone aircraft armed with missiles. Since 2004, US drones have carried out more than 300 attacks inside Pakistan. (See dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\12\12\story\_12-12-2011\_pg1\_5) In the wake of this incident, ”Pakistan has closed supply routes that allow U.S. and coalition military convoys to cross into Afghanistan”. Also of significance, on December 11, Pakistan took possession of the Shamsi air base in Balochistan on the the border with Iran. While the base was leased to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), it had been used by US air force personnel. The downing of a US drone would be used by Washington as a propaganda ploy. It would contribute to triggering a “useful wave of indignation” across America. It would be heralded by the US Congress as an act of aggression, as an encroachment in the conduct of America’s “War on Terrorism”. Pakistan would be accused of “siding with the terrorists”, thereby providing Washington with a justification to intervene. The broader repercussions of this staged confrontation between the US and Pakistan must be understood. US-NATO military deployments in Afghanistan and Pakistan are coordinated with ongoing war plans and covert operations directed against Iran. They also have a bearing on relations between the US and China.

It should be noted that in a recent meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Moscow called for Pakistan to become a full member of the SCO. Pakistan has the status of an Obsever in the SCO. Military confrontation in Pakistan could contribute to a process of military escalation in the broader Middle East Central Asia South Asia region.

# 1AR

### T

#### Their card defines in- geographically- in in the context of the topic is not geographical- reason their card fails and this is justified

MacMillian Dictionary

In can be used in the following ways:

as a preposition (followed by a noun): The children are in the back yard. ♦ They met in 1973.

as an adverb (without a following noun): Come in and sit down.

after the verb "to be": "Is Philip in?" "No, he's gone out."

as an adjective: It was the in thing to do.

1

used for showing where someone or something is

a.

inside a container, room, building, vehicle, etc.

He had left his passport in his coat pocket.

She's downstairs in the living room.

If convicted, Goldman faces 20 years in prison.

There's room for all of us in Dad's car.

Have you seen a bag with some tools in it?

Thesaurus entry for this meaning of in

b.

within an area, city, or country

The Red Cross made an appeal, and the money started rolling in.

Thesaurus entry for this meaning of in

### AA

#### finishing

SIPRI said in a report that largely as a result of its blockbuster drone deal with Israel, Azerbaijan’s defense budget jumped 88 percent this year — the biggest military spending increase in the world. Israel has long used arms deals to gain strategic leverage over its rivals in the region. Although difficult to confirm, many security analysts believe Israel’s deals with Russia have played heavily into Moscow’s suspension of a series of contracts with Iran and Syria that would have provided them with more advanced air defense systems and fighter jets. Stephen Blank, a research professor at the United States Army War College, said that preventing arms supplies to Syria and Iran — particularly Russian S-300 air defense systems — has been among Israel’s top goals with the deals. “There’s always a quid pro quo,” Blank said. “Nobody sells arms just for cash.” In Azerbaijan in particular, Israel has traded its highly demanded drone technology for intelligence arrangements and covert footholds against Iran. In a January 2009 US diplomatic cable released by WikiLeaks, a US diplomat reported that in a closed-door conversation, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev compared his country’s relationship with Israel to an iceberg — nine-tenths of it is below the surface. More from GlobalPost: Are Iran's drones coordinating attacks in Syria? Although the Jewish state and Azerbaijan, a conservative Muslim country, may seem like an odd couple, the cable asserts, “Each country finds it easy to identify with the other’s geopolitical difficulties, and both rank Iran as an existential security threat.” Quarrels between Azerbaijan and Iran run the gamut of territorial, religious and geo-political disputes and Tehran has repeatedly threatened to “destroy” the country over its support for secular governance and NATO integration. In the end, “Israel’s main goal is to preserve Azerbaijan as an ally against Iran, a platform for reconnaissance of that country and as a market for military hardware,” the diplomatic cable reads. But, while these ties had indeed remained below the surface for most of the past decade, a series of leaks this year exposed the extent of their cooperation as Israel ramped up its covert war with the Islamic Republic. In February, the Times of London quoted a source the publication said was an active Mossad agent in Azerbaijan as saying the country was “ground zero for intelligence work.” This came amid accusations from Tehran that Azerbaijan had aided Israeli agents in assassinating an Iranian nuclear scientist in January. Then, just as Baku had begun to cool tensions with the Islamic Republic, Foreign Policy magazine published an article citing Washington intelligence officials who claimed that Israel had signed agreements to use Azerbaijani airfields as a part of a potential bombing campaign against Iran’s nuclear sites. Baku strongly denied the claims, but in September, Azerbaijani officials and military sources told Reuters that the country would figure in Israel’s contingencies for a potential attack against Iran. "Israel has a problem in that if it is going to bomb Iran, its nuclear sites, it lacks refueling," Rasim Musabayov, a member of the Azerbiajani parliamentary foreign relations committee told Reuters. “I think their plan includes some use of Azerbaijan access. We have (bases) fully equipped with modern navigation, anti-aircraft defenses and personnel trained by Americans and if necessary they can be used without any preparations." He went on to say that the drones Israel sold to Azerbaijan allow it to “indirectly watch what's happening in Iran.” More from GlobalPost: Despite modern facade, Azerbaijan guilty of rights abuses According to SIPRI, Azerbaijan had acquired about 30 drones from Israeli firms Aeronautics Ltd. and Elbit Systems by the end of 2011, including at least 25 medium-sized Hermes-450 and Aerostar drones. In October 2011, Azerbaijan signed a deal to license and domestically produce an additional 60 Aerostar and Orbiter 2M drones. Its most recent purchase from Israel Aeronautics Industries (IAI) in March reportedly included 10 high altitude Heron-TP drones — the most advanced Israeli drone in service — according to Oxford Analytica. Collectively, these purchases have netted Azerbaijan 50 or more drones that are similar in class, size and capabilities to American Predator and Reaper-type drones, which are the workhorses of the United States’ campaign of drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen. Although Israel may have sold the drones to Azerbaijan with Iran in mind, Baku has said publicly that it intends to use its new hardware to retake territory it lost to Armenia. So far, Azerbaijan’s drone fleet is not armed, but industry experts say the models it employs could carry munitions and be programmed to strike targets. Drones are a tempting tool to use in frozen conflicts, because, while their presence raises tensions, international law remains vague at best on the legality of using them. In 2008, several Georgian drones were shot down over its rebel region of Abkhazia. A UN investigation found that at least one of the drones was downed by a fighter jet from Russia, which maintained a peacekeeping presence in the territory. While it was ruled that Russia violated the terms of the ceasefire by entering aircraft into the conflict zone, Georgia also violated the ceasefire for sending the drone on a “military operation” into the conflict zone. The incident spiked tensions between Russia and Georgia, both of which saw it as evidence the other was preparing to attack. Three months later, they fought a brief, but destructive war that killed hundreds. The legality of drones in Nagorno-Karabakh is even less clear because the conflict was stopped in 1994 by a simple ceasefire that halted hostilities but did not stipulate a withdrawal of military forces from the area. Furthermore, analysts believe that all-out war between Armenia and Azerbaijan would be longer and more difficult to contain than the five-day Russian-Georgian conflict. While Russia was able to quickly rout the Georgian army with a much superior force, analysts say that Armenia and Azerbaijan are much more evenly matched and therefore the conflict would be prolonged and costly in lives and resources. Blank said that renewed war would be “a very catastrophic event” with “a recipe for a very quick escalation to the international level.” Armenia is militarily allied with Russia and hosts a base of 5,000 Russian troops on its territory. After the summer’s border clashes, Russia announced it was stepping up its patrols of Armenian airspace by 20 percent. Iran also supports Armenia and has important business ties in the country, which analysts say Tehran uses as a “proxy” to circumvent international sanctions. Blank said Israel has made a risky move by supplying Azerbaijan with drones and other high tech equipment, given the tenuous balance of power between the heavily fortified Armenian positions and the more numerous and technologically superior Azerbaijani forces. If ignited, he said, “[an Armenian-Azerbaijani war] will not be small. That’s the one thing I’m sure of.”

### CP

#### means it doesn’t solve international precedent

Webb ’13 (Jim Webb is a former U.S. senator from Virginia and served as Secretary of the Navy in the Reagan administration, <http://www.jameswebb.com/articles/natlinterest-congabdication.html>, March/April Edition 2013)

Unless Americans accept that we have by fiat devolved into a political system where the president has become a de facto prime minister, it is difficult to understand why Congress has remained so complacent when the executive branch has negotiated and signed agreements affecting long-term security and economic issues. Congress did not participate in the development of an agreement which, if not a security treaty, still could bind certain fiscal and security policies of our country through many ways, including pure financial inertia. Nor, again, did congressional leaders from either house or either political party even ask for a debate, much less a vote, as to whether it should be approved. As with the SFA in Iraq, the Afghan parliament did in fact vote on this agreement, even as our Congress was not formally consulted. THE FAILURE of Congress to meet its historical obligations while the president unilaterally engaged in combat operations in Libya promises even deeper consequences for future crises. In many international situations the future promises a different kind of warfare, made possible (and politically more complex) by the use of special-operations forces, CIA operatives, drones and precision munitions, thus removing the average American from the consequences and even the direct knowledge of military actions that a president might undertake at his or her sole discretion. But to what extent should this "cleaner" way of war also remove Congress as an arbiter of when and where our nation should become involved in overseas hostilities? The inherent right of self-defense allows the president, as commander in chief, to order strikes anywhere in the world against legitimate terrorist targets if the country in which they operate either cannot or will not take appropriate action itself. But this is a different concept than unilaterally commencing hostilities in situations that do not directly threaten our country. When we examine the conditions under which the president ordered our military into action in Libya, we are faced with the prospect of a very troubling, if not downright odd, historical precedent that has the potential to haunt us for decades. The issue in play in Libya was not simply whether the president should ask Congress for a declaration of war. Nor was it wholly about whether Obama violated the edicts of the War Powers Act, which in this writer's view he clearly did. The issue that remains to be resolved is whether a president can unilaterally begin, and continue, a military campaign for reasons that he alone defines as meeting the demanding standards of a vital national interest worthy of risking American lives and expending billions of dollars of taxpayer money. And what was the standard in this case? The initial justification was that a dictator might retaliate against people who rebelled against him. No thinking person would make light of the potential tragedy involved in such a possibility in Libya (or, at present, in Syria). But it should be pointed out that there are a lot of dictators in the world and very few democracies in that particular region. This gives the Obama standard a pretty broad base if he or any future president should decide to use it again. And then, predictably, once military operations began, the operative phrase became "human suffering" and the stated goal became regime change, with combat dragging on for months. In a world filled with cruelty, the question is not only how but whether a president should be allowed to pick and choose when and where to use military force on the basis of such a vague standard. Given our system of government, the fundamental question is: Who should decide? And even if a president should decide unilaterally on the basis of an overwhelming, vital national interest that requires immediate action, how long should that decision be honored, and to what lengths should our military go, before the matter comes under the proper scrutiny-and boundaries-of Congress? As a measure for evaluating future crises, it is useful to review the bidding that led to our actions in Libya. What did it look like when President Obama ordered our military into action in that country, and what has happened since? Was our country under attack, or under the threat of imminent attack? No. Was a clearly vital national interest at stake? No. Were we invoking the inherent right of self-defense as outlined in the UN Charter? No. Were we called upon by treaty commitments to come to the aid of an ally? No. Were we responding in kind to an attack on our forces elsewhere, as we did in the 1986 raids in Libya after American soldiers had been killed in a Berlin disco? No. Were we rescuing Americans in distress, as we did in Grenada in 1983? No. The president followed no clear historical standard when he unilaterally decided to use force in Libya. Once this action continued beyond his original definition of "days, not weeks," into months and months, he did not seek the approval of Congress to continue military activities. And, while administration members may have discussed this matter with some members of Congress, the administration never formally conferred with the legislative branch as a coequal partner in our constitutional system. Obviously, these points are not raised out of any lasting love for the late Libyan leader Muammar el-Qaddafi. But this is not about Qaddafi; it is about the manner in which our nation decides to use lethal military force abroad. This is a region rife with tribalism, fierce loyalties and brutal retaliation. Libya represented the extreme (at least so far) of executive action in the absence of the approval of Congress. We took military action against a regime that we continued to recognize diplomatically, on behalf of disparate groups of opposing forces whose only real point of agreement was that they wished to rid Libya of Qaddafi. This was not even a civil war. As then secretary of defense Robert Gates put it to this writer during a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, it is not a civil war when there is no cohesive opposition facing a regime. The too frequently ignored end result of this process was not only the rampant lawlessness that possibly contributed to the assassination of our ambassador and three other U.S. officials, but also the region-wide dispersion of thousands of weapons from Qaddafi's armories. The inaction (some of it deliberate) of key congressional leaders during this period has ensured that the president's actions now constitute a troubling precedent. Under the objectively undefinable rubric of "humanitarian intervention," President Obama has arguably established the authority of the president to intervene militarily virtually anywhere without the consent or the approval of Congress, at his own discretion and for as long as he wishes. It is not hyperbole to say that the president himself can now bomb a country with which we maintain diplomatic relations, in support of loosely aligned opposition groups that do not represent any coalition that we actually recognize as an alternative. We know he can do it because he already has done it. Few leaders in the legislative branch even asked for a formal debate over this exercise of unilateral presidential power, and in the Senate any legislation pertaining to the issue was prevented from reaching the floor. One can only wonder at what point these leaders or their successors might believe it is their constitutional duty to counter unchecked executive power exercised on behalf of overseas military action. AT BOTTOM, what we have witnessed in these instances, as with many others, is a breakdown of our constitutional process. Opinions will surely vary as to the merits of the actual solution that was reached in each case, but this sort of disagreement, which in and of itself forms the basis of our form of government, is the precise reason why each one of these cases, and others, should have been properly debated and voted on by Congress. In none of these situations was the consideration of time or emergency so great as to have precluded congressional deliberation. In each, we can be certain that Congress was deliberately ignored or successfully circumvented, while being viewed by some members of the executive branch as more of a nuisance than an equal constitutional partner. And there is no doubt that some key congressional leaders were reluctant, at best, to assert the authority that forms the basis of our governmental structure. When it comes to the long-term commitments that our country makes in the international arena, ours can be a complicated and sometimes frustrating process. But our Founding Fathers deliberately placed checks and counterchecks into our constitutional system for exactly that purpose. The congressional "nuisance factor" is supposed to act as a valuable tool to ensure that our leaders-and especially our commander in chief-do not succumb to the emotions of the moment or the persuasions of a very few. One hopes Congress-both Republicans and Democrats-can regain the wisdom to reassert the authority that was so wisely given to it so many years ago. And as for the presidency, a final thought is worth pondering. From a political standpoint, it is far smarter to seek congressional approval on controversial matters of foreign policy, as was done in the October 2002 authorization to invade Iraq, than to attempt to circumvent the legislative branch. At home, Congress and the presidency will then share accountability. Abroad, the international community will know that America is united and not acting merely at the discretion of one individual.

### 1AR- Law Key

#### Law is key to modeling

Maxwell ’12 (Mark David Maxwell, Colonel, Judge Advocate with the U.S. Army, TARGETED KILLING, THE LAW, AND TERRORISTS, Joint Force Quarterly, <http://www.ndu.edu/press/targeted-killing.html>, Winter 2012)

The weakness of this theory is that it is not codified in U.S. law; it is merely the extrapolation of international theorists and organizations. The only entity under the Constitution that can frame and settle Presidential power regarding the enforcement of international norms is Congress. As the check on executive power, Congress must amend the AUMF to give the executive a statutory roadmap that articulates when force is appropriate and under what circumstances the President can use targeted killing. This would be the needed endorsement from Congress, the other political branch of government, to clarify the U.S. position on its use of force regarding targeted killing. For example, it would spell out the limits of American lethality once an individual takes the status of being a member of an organized group. Additionally, statutory clarification will give other states a roadmap for the contours of what constitutes anticipatory self-defense and the proper conduct of the military under the law of war. Congress should also require that the President brief it on the decision matrix of articulated guidelines before a targeted killing mission is ordered. As Kenneth Anderson notes, “[t]he point about briefings to Congress is partly to allow it to exercise its democratic role as the people’s representative.”74 The desire to feel safe is understandable. The consumers who buy SUVs are not buying them to be less safe. Likewise, the champions of targeted killings want the feeling of safety achieved by the elimination of those who would do the United States harm. But allowing the President to order targeted killing without congressional limits means the President can manipulate force in the name of national security without tethering it to the law advanced by international norms. The potential consequence of such unilateral executive action is that it gives other states, such as North Korea and Iran, the customary precedent to do the same. Targeted killing might be required in certain circumstances, but if the guidelines are debated and understood, the decision can be executed with the full faith of the people’s representative, Congress. When the decision is made without Congress, the result might make the United States feel safer, but the process eschews what gives a state its greatest safety: the rule of law.

### Yes Sanctions – 1AR Wall

#### GROUP the uniqueness- three arguments-

#### FIRST- sanctions are inevitable- veto-proof majorities in Congress for sanctions now- that’s Koring.

#### PC and spin fails---no support behind Obama

Weber 1/1 -- FoxNews Staff

[Joseph, “After rough year, Obama looks for 2014 comeback, amid some unsolicited New Year's resolutions,” <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/01/01/after-rough-year-obama-looks-for-2014-comeback-amid-some-unsolicited-new-year/> DOA: 1-1-14]

However, Obama’s political power began to wane soon after, starting with his failed effort to tighten federal gun laws in the wake of two mass shootings and concluding with the disastrous rollout of his signature health care law. Obama’s job approval rating continued to fall as the HealthCare.gov website continued to malfunction and millions of Americans learned they, in fact, could not keep their existing insurance policies -- earning him PolitiFact’s lie-of-the-year award. “It’s never too late to get it right,” Dan Holler, communications director for the conservative group Heritage Action for America, said Tuesday. “So the president should finally honor the promise he made to the American people when he said they could keep their health insurance and doctors.” Along the way, even some members of the liberal media, among the president's strongest supporters, have piled on. A Washington Post political blogger wrote Obama had “the worst year in Washington.” And perhaps even worse, MSNBC commentator Chris Matthews hinted at a lost second term. “It’s not just a bad year in terms of the rollout,” Matthews said. "There’s erosion in interest. ... It feels like the seventh or eighth year of a presidency. It doesn't feel like the fifth.” His comments were included in a 15-page Republican National Committee release this week that chronicled Obama’s rough year and included the IRS scandal, in which agents targeted Tea Party groups, and revelations about the National Security Agency spying on friendly foreign leaders. Moreover, Obama “standing on the sidelines” as the events unfolded has even thrown in jeopardy his entire political legacy, the RNC argues. Democratic strategist Joe Trippi says the president and his administration could improve their lot almost immediately by being more transparent about ObamaCare enrollment numbers, releasing them every two weeks instead of every month “no matter how bad they are.” He thinks the president would have limited success trying to further extend a hand to a Congress that is stuck in partisan gridlock and should instead focus on finishing what he started. “There’s no spin that will fix things,” Trippi said Monday. “It’s now about getting things done. You cannot just say ObamaCare is great. What matters is will 7.5 million people really sign up?”

#### AND its veto-proof now- prefer insider knowledge

Gray, 1-10 -- staff writer [Rosie, "Senate Reaches Veto-Proof Majority On Iran Sanctions," Buzzfeed, 1-10-14, www.buzzfeed.com/rosiegray/senate-reaches-veto-proof-majority-on-iran-sanctions, accessed 1-20-14]

#### Support for the Iran sanctions bill in the Senate has reached a veto-proof majority, according to a Senate aide close to the process. “Based on the current counts that I’ve seen, it’s well above 67,” the aide said. CNN’s Jim Sciutto reported on Twitter that the number of yes votes on the Kirk-Menendez sanctions bill had reached 77. The number is not exactly 77, the aide told BuzzFeed, but is above the two-thirds majority required to override a presidential veto. The aide declined to provide the specific whip count or to say which senators have joined on.

#### 2nd – AIPAC

Fallows 1-17 -- national correspondent for The Atlantic

[James “The Iran Vote: This Really Matters, and You Should Let Your Senators Know,” 1-14-14, <http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/01/the-iran-vote-this-really-matters-and-you-should-let-your-senators-know/283070/> DOA: 1-17-14]

That derailment is what seems to be underway in the Senate right now. Republicans led by Mitch McConnell are pushing for a sanctions bill that is universally recognized (except by its sponsors) as a poison-pill for the current negotiations. Fine; opposing the administration is the GOP's default position. But a striking number of Democrats have joined them, for no evident reason other than **AIPAC's whole-hearted,** priority-one **support** for the sanctions bill. The screen clip below is from AIPAC's site, and here is some political reporting on AIPAC's role in the sanctions push: NYT, Politico, JTA, Jerusalem Post-JTA, and our own National Journal here and here. Also see Greg Sargent in the Washington Post. In the long run, **these Democrats** are not in a tenable position. Or not a good one. They **are opposing** what **their president**, his secretaries of state and defense, our normal major allies, and even the Russians and Chinese view as a step toward peace. And their stated reason for doing so—that new sanction threats will "help" the negotiations, even though every American, French, British, German, etc., and Iranian figure involved in the talks says the reverse—doesn't pass the straight-face test.

Obama will use unilateral sanctions relief—solves

Adam Kredo, 1/21/14, White House Seeks to Bypass Congress on Iran Deal, freebeacon.com/white-house-seeks-to-bypass-congress-on-iran-deal/

The White House has been exploring ways to circumvent Congress and unilaterally lift sanctions on Iran once a final nuclear agreement is reached, according to sources with knowledge of White House conversations and congressional insiders familiar with its strategy.

The issue of sanctions relief has become one of the key sticking points in the Iran debate, with lawmakers pushing for increased economic penalties and the White House fighting to roll back regulations.

While many in Congress insist that only the legislative branch can legally repeal sanctions, senior White House officials have been examining strategies to skirt Congress, according to those familiar with internal conversations.

Sen. Mark Kirk (R., Ill.), who is leading the charge on new sanctions legislation, said that it is unacceptable for the White House to try to bypass Congress on such a critical global issue.

“The American people must get a say in any final nuclear agreement with Iran to ensure the mullahs never get the bomb,” Kirk told the Washington Free Beacon. “The administration cannot just ignore U.S. law and lift sanctions unilaterally.”

Congressional insiders say that the White House is worried Congress will exert oversight of the deal and demand tougher nuclear restrictions on Tehran in exchange for sanctions relief.

Top White House aides have been “talking about ways to do that [lift sanctions] without Congress and we have no idea yet what that means,” said one senior congressional aide who works on sanctions. “They’re looking for a way to lift them by fiat, overrule U.S. law, drive over the sanctions, and declare that they are lifted.”

Under the interim nuclear deal with Iran that began on Monday, Tehran will receive more than $4 billion in cash, according to the White House.

President Barack Obama could unilaterally unravel sanctions through several executive channels, according to former government officials and legal experts.

Executive orders grant the president significant leverage in the how sanctions are implemented, meaning that Obama could choose to stop enforcing many of the laws on the books, according to government insiders.

Those familiar with the ins and outs of sanctions enforcement say that the White House has long been lax with its enforcement of sanctions regulations already on the books.

“It’s no secret that the president, with executive power, can determine sanctions implementation, particularly with waivers and the decision not to sanction certain entities,” said Jonathan Schanzer, a former terrorism finance analyst at the Treasury Department, which is responsible for enforcing sanctions.

“The financial pressure has always been about closing loopholes and identifying new ones to close,” Schanzer added. “If you stop that process of constant gardening, you leave a backdoor open.”

Obama could also use executive waivers to “bypass restrictions imposed by the law,” according to a report by Patrick Clawson, director of research at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP).

The president has a lot of leverage when it comes to sanctions and could effectively “turn a blind eye” to Iranian infractions.

“In the case of Iran, such an approach could allow Washington to reach a nuclear accord without Congress having to vote on rescinding, even temporarily or conditionally, certain sanctions,” Clawson wrote. “No matter how stiff and far-reaching sanctions may be as embodied in U.S. law, they would have less bite if the administration stopped enforcing them.”

One former senior government official said that President Obama’s legal team has likely been investigating the issue for quite some time.

“I’d be shocked if they weren’t putting the various sanctions laws under a microscope to see how they can waive them or work around them in order to deliver to Iran sanctions relief without having to worry about Congress standing in their way,” said Stephen Rademaker, who served as deputy legal adviser to former President George H.W. Bush’s National Security Council (NSC).

Executive branch lawyers are often tasked with finding ways to get around existing legislation, Rademaker said.

“I’m sure pretty early in the negotiating process they developed a roadmap” to ensure the president has the authority to promise Iran significant relief from sanctions, said Rademaker, who also served as chief council for the House Committee on International Relations. “I’m sure they’ve come up with an in depth analysis of what they can do relying exclusively on the president’s legal authority.”

The White House has been known to disregard portions of the sanctions laws that it disagrees with, according to Schanzer.

### Ptx – 1NC Sargent

#### Their ev cites Sargent --- he concludes all Dems are a no

Sargent, Washington Post, 1-22-14

(Greg, “Another blow to the Iran sanctions bill,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2014/01/22/another-blow-to-the-iran-sanctions-bill/, accessed 1-23-14, CMM)

Meanwhile, announcements like the one earlier this month indicating that the deal with Iran is moving forward make a vote still less likely. With Murray now opposed, that means virtually the whole Dem leadership is a No. On the other hand, those who adamantly want a vote — insisting it would only help the White House and make success more likely, despite what the White House itself wants – will be looking for any hook they can find to reactivate pressure.

### HC

#### Dems are jumping ship on Obamacare

Fox News 1/24/14 (Growing Dem Opposition Could Doom Obamacare")

ObamaCare skidded to an all-time low in the latest Fox News [poll](http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/01/23/fox-news-poll-obamacare-support-hits-record-low/), but in a switch, it’s Democrats who are driving down the already unpopular law. In June, 22 percent of Democrats were opposed to ObamaCare, which blends expansive new health-insurance regulations with a new welfare program. In the latest survey, that number rose to 30 percent, helping push overall opposition to a new high of 59 percent. (Just 36 percent overall supported the law.) While the number that is most encouraging to Republican hopes of taking control of the Senate is the sky-high 64 percent opposition to the law among independents, the spike in Democratic opposition promises to be very consequential.

#### More blowback is coming over insurance bailouts –

Fox News 1/24/14 (Growing Dem Opposition Could Doom Obamacare")

Bailout blowback - The next major fight on ObamaCare promises to be looming bailouts for the insurance industry written into a little-noticed provision of the law. Sen. Marco Rubio, R-Fla., has teed up a bill blocking the billions available to insurance companies to help contend with the sputtering implementation of the law. If the bailouts were blocked, the law would almost certainly collapse as insurers fled the new government program. The bill can’t get to the Senate floor, though, because despite the obvious unpopularity of handouts to insurance companies, the president and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid have been able to crack enough skulls together to keep Democrats mostly quiet. Polls like this one reveal a land of opportunity for OabamCare-averse Democrats, who can show their populist credentials to home-state voters by helping block a bailout.

#### Obama will get involved in the debt ceiling – Obamacare connection

Politico 1/23/14 (Paul Ryan: Obamacare Could Come Up in Debt Talks")

Obamacare could make its way into the debt ceiling debate.¶ Speaking here Thursday, Rep. Paul Ryan (R-Wis.) said Republicans are considering getting rid of “insurance company bailouts” when they lift the nation’s borrowing cap in the next few months¶ “There are issues with Obamacare,” Ryan said. “A lot of folks don’t realize there could be some massive insurance company bailouts in the near future with Obamacare that a lot of taxpayers probably didn’t know about that we don’t want to see happen. That’s one of the issues thats in the realm of possibility. There are a lot of things…that are being discussed but its just not in our interest to negotiate in the media.”¶ Republicans have already introduced bills targeting two complex pieces of Obamacare — called the reinsurance fund and risk corridors – that they say amount to bailout of the insurance companies, likening them to the “too big to fail” policies of the banking crisis.¶ Both policies are designed to limit the risk insurers have to take and try to prevent premium spikes. Backers of the health law say the provisions are needed to help insurance companies balance the cost of accepting all patients, some of whom are very expensive. The provisions are only designed to last three years until the insurance pools are more balanced.¶ The Obama administration said late last year that they might make adjustments to the risk corridors to further help insurers adjust to the changes they’ve made to the health law since its flawed rollout in October.¶ But Republicans want to repeal the provisions entirely. They say the Obama administration is using both policy tools to pump up insurance companies that might have faltered under Obamacare.

### Link

#### More restrictions are popular but squo triggers PC backlash

Wilson 1/17 (Scott Wilson, Chief White House correspondent for the Washington Post. Previously, he was the paper’s deputy Assistant Managing Editor/Foreign News after serving as a correspondent in Latin America and in the Middle East. He was awarded an Overseas Press Club citation and an Interamerican Press Association award for his work abroad. For his coverage of the Obama administration, he received the 2011 Gerald R. Ford Prize for Distinguished Reporting on the Presidency and the 2012 Aldo Beckman Award given by the White House Correspondents’ Association. He joined the Post in 1997, “Obama acknowledges real-world limits on changing U.S. intelligence practices”, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-acknowledges-real-world-limits-on-changing-us-intelligence-practices/2014/01/17/21be329c-7f9c-11e3-93c1-0e888170b723_story.html>, January 17, 2014)

Four months after taking office, President Obama spoke at the National Archives, steps away from the Constitution, and described in sharply critical terms “the season of fear” in the United States that followed the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. Torture had been practiced in interrogations. Terrorism suspects were held without trial in an offshore military prison. U.S. troops invaded a country without links to the attacks on New York and Washington. The National Security Agency was exposed for eavesdropping on U.S. citizens without warrants. “In other words,” Obama said, “we went off course.” It was understood that Obama, the constitutional law lecturer, would find the country’s compass. But as Obama acknowledged Friday, in a speech delivered just around the corner from the archives at the Justice Department, he is still navigating the politically complicated legacy of the “war on terror.” It is a legacy that has profound implications for his own as president. “When you cut through the noise, what’s really at stake is how we remain true to who we are in a world that is remaking itself at dizzying speed,” Obama said Friday, in an echo of his message almost five years ago. Obama moved quickly to fulfill his pledge to close the military prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, although political obstacles have prevented him from seeing it through. Also in those first days, he officially banned the practice of torture in interrogation, methods that had ceased by the close of the Bush administration. But those were issues where Obama’s policy inclinations, his principles and the politics of his party all came together — the easiest remnants of post-9/11 national security policy to criticize and work to end. Now he faces a more consequential challenge in changing, amid public pressure at home and abroad, a series of intelligence practices that he has called useful in preventing another terrorist attack in the United States. “This is the hard stuff,” said Anthony D. Romero, executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union. “The surveillance collection issues will go to the heart of what America is all about for generations to come. The due process issues, the torture issues certainly go to American values. But they will not affect the vast majority of Americans or others around the world. This is where the rubber meets the road.” Obama spoke both as a longtime lawyer and as a second-term commander in chief, more defensive than contrite over the work done by U.S. intelligence officers and of the utility and care with which the NSA’s bulk collection program has been managed. “It may seem sometimes that America is being held to a different standard, and I’ll admit the readiness of some to assume the worst motives by our government can be frustrating,” Obama said. “But let us remember that we are held to a different standard precisely because we have been at the forefront in defending personal privacy and human dignity.” The changes Obama ordered to NSA practices emphasize additional oversight — the “checks and balances and accountability” that he first mentioned at the National Archives years ago. Other than curtailing American eavesdropping on allied leaders, the agency’s collection efforts will remain largely intact, an enduring concern to privacy groups who argue that the government has no right to collect information about U.S. citizens without a warrant. Many of the programs disclosed by The Washington Post and the British newspaper the Guardian in recent months, based on documents provided by former NSA contractor Edward J. Snowden, will remain untouched. Having run for office as a critic of the Bush administration’s national security policies, Obama was always going to be measured, in part, by how he scaled back the excesses of post-9/11 national security practices and preserved the essentials in a still-dangerous world. The reviews on that account have been mixed. Obama withdrew U.S. troops from Iraq, a conflict he once called a “dumb war,” and has set an end-of-the-year end date for U.S. participation in Afghanistan’s war. At the same time, he has expanded the battlefield for the U.S. drone fleet and stepped up the tempo of strikes from the Bush years, another counterterrorism tool that many within his party say should have far more accountability and oversight. Only the bombings in Boston last year could be considered a successful mass terrorist attack on Obama’s watch, although there have been some near misses. As Obama alluded to several times Friday, technological leaps have both greatly expanded U.S. surveillance capabilities and made obsolete the rules governing those practices. Setting those limits now involves a set of decisions, some of which Obama presented Friday, that put into conflict his role as a commander in chief and the promises he made as a new president, particularly to those in his own party. Obama made himself vulnerable to conservative charges that by ending some Bush administration national security policies, he was putting the nation at risk of another attack. He argued that American values and national security policy could coexist. But he and his advisers were also mindful that his credibility on the subject — and more broadly, his political viability — would likely be only a terrorist attack away from ruin as a result. As the more visible elements of post-9/11 national security policy diminished, namely the large military deployments overseas, the secret elements typified by drone strikes and electronic spying grew under a president who had promised unprecedented transparency. He captured the conflict in his Friday speech. “I maintained a healthy skepticism toward our surveillance programs after I became president,” Obama said Friday, even though he had previously acknowledged that he was unaware of the sensitive “head of state” program that targeted the personal cellphones of such allies as German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Obama’s political considerations are particularly challenging on the question of surveillance, resembling those he had to consider when deciding whether to increase the U.S. presence in Afghanistan four years ago. Now, as then, many in his party are demanding more change to the NSA’s spying practices than he is willing to carry out. A Washington Post-ABC News poll in November found that Democrats were twice as likely to disapprove of Obama’s handling of the NSA than of his overall job performance. The party ambivalence was reflected on Capitol Hill in the hours after Obama’s speech. Some Democrats applauded the president for addressing the controversy, particularly over the phone-record collection program, while others urged him to do more. “The reforms outlined by President Obama today are a welcome first step in reining in the government’s unacceptable infringement on Americans’ privacy rights,” Sen. Tom Udall (D-N.M.) said in a statement. “But I’m not satisfied these reforms go far enough.” Behind Obama’s words Friday was a question asked increasingly around the West Wing: How does he want to be remembered? To a president who has already made history by being the first African American to hold the office, Obama’s answer goes beyond a simple record of his administration. He is mindful of history and his place in it, and to many of his advisers and supporters, any assessment of his legacy should provide the end of the sentence: “He was the president who . . .” Successfully ended the “season of fear” and the government excesses that defined it? Or cemented in place a vast surveillance state he once opposed? On Friday, he began to provide the answer. “I have often reminded myself that I would not be where I am today were it not for the courage of dissidents, like Dr. King, who were spied on by their own government,” Obama said. “And as a president, a president who looks at intelligence every morning, I also can’t help but be reminded that America must be vigilant in the face of threats.”

#### Squo negotiations trigger PL loss or disprove the link

Jackson 1/19 (USA Today, “President Obama's proposals to change National Security Agency surveillance policies are being nibbled at by people who have to sign off on some of them: members of Congress” <http://www.freep.com/usatoday/article/4647115>, January 19, 2014)

Some highlights from the Sunday shows:

-- Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., who chairs the Senate Intelligence Committee, questioned the idea of storing telephone metadata with a third party, as opposed to the NSA and the government. "The whole purpose of this program is to provide instantaneous information to be able to disrupt any plot that may be taking place," Feinstein told NBC's Meet The Press. -- Rep. Mike Rogers, R-Mich., chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, told CNN's State of the Union that he agrees with Obama that NSA programs are legal and necessary. But he said too many of Obama's proposals are nebulous and require more review by Congress, federal agencies and the courts. "We really did need a decision on Friday, and what we got was lots of uncertainty," Rogers said. "And just in my conversations over the weekend with intelligence officials, this new level of uncertainty is already having a bit of an impact on our ability to protect Americans by finding terrorists who are trying to reach into the United States." -- Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, said Obama did no go far enough, and that Attorney General Eric Holder will get tough privacy questions from Republicans and Democrats when he testifies about the NSA plans on Jan. 29. "Where's all this going?" Leahy told Fox News Sunday. "You still have to have some checks and balances before you can have a government that can run amok." -- Sen. Mark Udall, D-Colo., told CBS' Face The Nation that the bulk collections of phone metadata should end: "We don't need to collect phone calls of every single American on every single day." In a highly anticipated speech on Friday, President Obama said he is seeking to balance the demands of national security with the needs of personal privacy. He also said that is an ongoing process: Said Obama: "When you cut through the noise, what's really at stake is how we remain true to who we are in a world that is remaking itself at dizzying speed. "Whether it's the ability of individuals to communicate ideas; to access information that would have once filled every great library in every country in the world; or to forge bonds with people on other sides of the globe, technology is remaking what is possible for individuals, and for institutions, and for the international order. "So while the reforms that I have announced will point us in a new direction, I am mindful that more work will be needed in the future."

NSA thumps the disad or disproves the logic of the link.

Feaver 1/17/14

Peter, Foreign Policy, “Obama Finally Joins the Debate He Called For,” http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/01/17/obama\_finally\_joins\_the\_debate\_he\_called\_for

Today President Barack Obama finally **joins the national debate he called for** a long time ago but then abandoned: the debate about how best to balance national security and civil liberty. As I outlined in NPR's scene-setter this morning, this debate is a **tricky** one for a president who wants to lead from behind. The public's view shifts markedly in response to perceptions of the threat, so a political leader who is only following the public mood will **crisscross himself repeatedly**. Changing one's mind and shifting the policy is not inherently a bad thing to do. There is no absolute and timeless right answer, because this is about trading off different risks. The risk profile itself shifts in response to our actions. When security is improving and the terrorist threat is receding, one set of trade-offs is appropriate. When security is worsening and the terrorist threat is worsening, another might be. It is likely, however, that the optimal answer is not the one advocated by the most fringe position. A National Security Agency (NSA) hobbled to the point that some on the far left (and, it must be conceded, the libertarian right) are demanding would be a mistake that the country would regret every bit as much as we would regret an NSA without any checks or balances or constraints. Getting this right will require **inspired and active political leadership.** **To date**, Obama has preferred to stay far removed from the debate swirling around the Snowden leaks. This president relishes opportunities to spend **political capital** on behalf of policies that disturb Republicans, but, as former Defense Secretary Robert Gates's memoir details, Obama **has** been very reluctant to expend **political capital** on behalf of national security policies that disturb his base. Today Obama is finally engaging. It will be interesting to see how he threads the political needle and, just as importantly, how much political capital he is willing to spend in the months ahead to defend his policies.

### Uhhj idk what I’m ??

#### That means no PC loss

Kriner ’10 (Douglas Kriner, Assistant Profess of Political Science at Boston University, 2010, After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War, p. 59-60)

Presidents and politicos alike have long recognized Congress's ability to reduce the political costs that the White House risks incurring by pursuing a major military initiative. While declarations of war are all but extinct in the contemporary period, Congress has repeatedly moved to authorize presidential military deployments and consequently to tie its own institutional prestige to the conduct and ultimate success of a military campaign. Such authorizing legislation, even if it fails to pass both chambers, creates a sense of shared legislative-executive responsibility for a military action's success and provides the president with considerable political support for his chosen policy course.34 Indeed, the desire for this political cover—and not for the constitutional sanction a congressional authorization affords—has historically motivated presidents to seek Congress's blessing for military endeavors. For example, both the elder and younger Bush requested legislative approval for their wars against Iraq, while assiduously maintaining that they possessed sufficient independent authority as commander in chief to order the invasions unilaterally.35 This fundamental tension is readily apparent in the elder Bush's signing statement to HJ Res 77, which authorized military action against Saddam Hussein in January of 1991. While the president expressed his gratitude for the statement of congressional support, he insisted that the resolution was not needed to authorize military action in Iraq. "As I made clear to congressional leaders at the outset, my request for congressional support did not, and my signing this resolution does not, constitute any change in the long-standing positions of the executive branch on either the President's constitutional authority to use the Armed Forces to defend vital U.S. interests or the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution."36